Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

761.00/11–750: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

confidential

Moscow, November 7, 1950—8 p. m.

987. Usual summation of internal and external developments affecting Soviet people and their government delivered this year by Bulganin¹ at anniversary celebration in Bolshoi Theater. Embassy assumes text available to Department through monitoring service.

Early assessment leaves impression that compared to 1949 this past year was lean one for Soviet foreign policy and that Kremlin recognizes this fact. Bulganin devoted by far greatest proportion of address to achievements of Soviet people in economic field—highlight beings announcement of fulfillment of tasks set for fourth five year plan. String of glowing successes in this field relieved only by backwardness in housing construction and high cost of capital construction both of which are of serious concern to government. More detailed appraisal of economic and agricultural statistics will follow in separate telegram.² It should be noted that last year’s labored contrast of economic progress in the Soviet orbit with economic deterioration in the US and other free world countries was absent in Bulganin’s speech. The superiority of the Soviet socialist system was indicated in reference to the grandiose projects announced earlier this year described here as “real projects of communism” in their scope.

Treatment of events in foreign field reflects absence of major achievements comparable to establishment of CPR and GDR last year. This imparts note of reserve to speech contrasting with Malenkov’s exuberance in 1949.³

Bulganin followed the familiar pattern of contrasting the peace policy of the Soviet Union with the war policy of the USA and portrayed pertinent events along lines already well laid out in the Soviet press. A significant highlight was the attention given to Korea where the Korean people were pictured as suffering temporary reverses in the face of overwhelming odds but were destined for victory such as the young Soviet regime attained in a similar situation at the time of intervention and civil war. “Korea has become the banner of the liberation movement of oppressed and dependent peoples”. Although treating German question along standard current Soviet lines Bulganin did not mention the Soviet request for a CFM. This coupled with belated and cursory publication their note leaves impression that Soviets concerned that their people would interpret this request as sign of weakness. It may be important that stress was laid in the speech upon fact that peaceful coexistence is possible, in spite of foreign assertions to contrary, but that it depends upon willingness of parties concerned—Soviet Union being willing and US not. Both China and the peoples democracies who received a fair amount of attention in Malenkov’s speech last year were dealt with in a few sentences but this may only be due to the greater importance the other problems mentioned assumed during the course of the past year. The peace movement as such came in for less treatment although its organized nature was referred to as was the Praha extension of the Stockholm appeal and the impressive signature total of 500 million. Frank recognition of the charges of “Communist menace” and espousal of CP’s abroad along with their identification with masses may be indication of continued basic reliance of the faithful rather than on more diverse partisans of peace.

Continued support of UN noteworthy. Latter mentioned along with Potsdam declaration⁴ as part of agreed system of postwar international collaboration for peace and still called upon to be “serious instrument of preserving peace and international security”.

In brief, except for the announcement of the fulfillment of the five year plan and the statistics of economic, social and cultural achievements, there was nothing new or startling in the speech and the important events of the year were chronicled along lines already made clear in the Soviet press.

A significant change in this speech over that of Malenkov last year is apparent in the part touching upon the possibility of war. Although both assert that the Soviet people cannot be frightened Bulganin stated they would defend the interests of their homeland with weapons in hand if need be and stressed that communism could not be destroyed whereas Malenkov declared that it was the imperialists, who should be afraid and threatened the extinction of capitalism in a third world war, if it occurred.

Reflection of current Soviet preoccupation with Korea contained in speech of Marshal Budyenny⁵ who reviewed military parade on November seven. Only foreign, item his entire speech was statement that Soviet people express their sympathy with Korean people fighting for their independence.

Stalin, Malenkov, Beria⁶ did not attend the ceremony at the Bolshoi Theater and were not present on Lenin’s mausoleum for the military parade. Parade was shortest in recent years with popular demonstration completed by one p. m. Weather was drizzly and misty. Air force and cavalry portions of parade omitted. Speculation here that show shortened to spare constitutions of leaders. Bow to peace made in release of two white doves during parade.

Department please pouch to Paris, London, Rome, Frankfort, Berlin, Badnauheim.

Kirk

1. The anniversary speech was delivered on November 6, by Marshal Nikolay Alexandrovich Bulganin, who was a member of the Politburo and Orgburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and a Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, among other positions held.
2. The Embassy sent lengthy comments on the economic aspects of this speech in telegram 1008 from Moscow on November 13; not printed. (861.00/11–1350) Bulganin had summarized in some detail the achievements of the fourth five-year plan, and the Embassy pointed out that some of the failures of complete fulfillment of the plan had been concealed by evasions and omissions. Bulganin’s references to the economy of the United States were “unusually mild” and the disparagements were less severe than those made the year before or even in “more recent policy addresses.” It seemed that this attitude might indicate a “genuine awareness US boom has penetrated Soviet mentality … rendering obsolete mothy propaganda line impending US depression.”
3. Georgy Maximilianovich Malenkov was a member of the Politburo and Orgburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and a Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, among other positions held. For the Embassy comments on his speech of November 6, 1949, see telegram 2791 from Moscow on November 7. 1949, Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. v, p. 671.
4. Foreign Relations, 1945. The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), vol. ii, p. 1499.
5. Semen Mikhailovich Budyenny was a Marshal of the Soviet Union, a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and a Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Chairman of the Technical Council of that Ministry’s Main Administration of Horsebreeding.
6. Lavrenty Pavlovich Beriya was a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and of its Politburo, and a Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers.