640.61/9–1450: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State 1
703. Prospect that Bevin2 toying with taking up mantle of peacemaker particularly disturbing at time when NAT countries just getting good start in building up sufficient forces to guarantee implementation and permanency of any detente in which Soviets may be forced to participate. Effect of any move along this line would be to validate Soviet peace campaign and give substantial impetus to attainment its objective of disintegrating resistance to Soviet power. Although Soviets may recognize unprofitability of resorting to armed conflict, it is far too early to arrive at firm conclusion quite apart from fact [Page 1247] abandonment of path of military adventure for Soviets does not preclude political and ideological offensives.
Failure of Soviets to intervene overtly in Korea and absence of indications of offensive military mobilization here are only negative indications concerning Soviet attitude toward risking global conflict. Certainly tangible evidence of cooperative attitude at various points of friction such as atomic control, Austrian Treaty, Trieste, etc., would be necessary as minimum indication of Soviet inclination toward detente with West. Coming session GA itself may reveal clues to current Soviet thinking but conclusions can only be safely drawn when what is expressed is related to Soviet actions in other parts of the world.
Embassy recalls timing of unilateral British recognition Communist Chinese regime rested on Bevin’s intuition and gave rise to complications which are still source of many current difficulties.