Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community, 1950–1955

81. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze) to the Under Secretary of State (Webb)¹

Washington, August 3, 1951.

Before leaving on my vacation I want to set down my views in relation to developments concerning the Psychological Strategy Board.

1. The Presidential Directive of April 4, 1951,² is somewhat unclear in setting forth the scope of the Board’s jurisdiction in that it

a. Refers to psychological objectives, strategy and operations without precisely delimiting the meaning of “psychological.”

b. Covers by reference NSC 59/1³ and 10/2⁴ in the jurisdiction of the Board without saying specifically whether the inclusion is definitive or illustrative.

c. Vests the Board with power to “formulate policy” in respect to psychological activities without defining the relationship between such policy and the national foreign policy.

2. In the efforts to get the Psychological Board operating two general approaches to the question of the Board’s purpose and jurisdiction have developed—

a. The first is generally advocated for by members of CIA active in the initial phases of the Board’s work. It is that the Board has primary authority with regard to all matters of the conduct of foreign policy short of formal hostilities.

b. The second represents the viewpoint of the Department of State and has support from the military. It is that the Psychological Strategy Board should exercise—

(1) Primary authority in ensuring among all agencies concerned maximum effectiveness and unity of objective and effort in regard to activities set forth in NSC 59/1 and 10/2.

(2) Secondary authority to see that full account of psychological factors—that is, aspects having impact on the mind, will, and morale of foreign peoples—is taken in the planning and execution of other activities bearing on the field of foreign relations, including the planning of the national objectives themselves.

3. These two points of view have been made apparent in all critical stages of the efforts to establish the understandings and the organizational arrangements to get the Board’s work under way. To clear the matter up, the Director of the Board⁵ sought to bring about an agreed definition of psychological operations as concerned in the Board’s jurisdiction. This effort produced two drafts which typify the conflicting approaches:

a. The first representing the radically broad concept of the Board’s scope is:

“Psychological operations,” as used in the President’s directive, is a cover name to describe those activities of the United States in peace and in war through which all elements of national power are systematically brought to bear on other nations for the attainment of U.S. foreign policy objectives.

b. The second, representing the more restricted view, is:

Psychological operations are interpreted within the terms of the Presidential Directive of 4 April 1951 to consist of activities designed to influence the attitudes, actions and capabilities of foreign peoples, so as to further U.S. national objectives.

The role of PSB is:

a. To formulate basic plans for the systematic employment of those psychological operations encompassed by NSC 59/1 and NSC 10/2, to coordinate their execution, and to evaluate their effect.

b. To ensure in the formulation and application of national political, economic and military policies, that the symbolic and psychological aspects thereof are adequately exploited.

In face of the prospect that the two definitions were irreconcilable, the Director decided to lay aside the effort to remedy the issue by definition and to concentrate instead on particular problems and the creation of a staff.

4. It is necessary and desirable, however, to clear up in the beginning the difference as to the Board’s purpose and jurisdiction and to resolve the issue by adopting the narrower concept. This is based on the following considerations:

a. It would be counter to the interests of the Board and to the Government in general to have friction develop between the Board and other agencies concerned over conflicting assumptions about authority. The principle that good fences make good neighbors is just as important in Government as it is anywhere else.

b. Clarity of view as to purpose and function is desirable not only to avoid jurisdictional conflicts at the top level but also to develop harmonious collaboration in day-to-day relationships at all levels.

c. Clarification is necessary in order to clear the way for going ahead with planning the Board’s work. In laying out the work it is necessary to know not only what the Board’s and its Staff’s problems will be but also to what relationship to the problems the Board and its Staff will have. Under the radically broad definition, any problem might be expounded by inference to cover the sum total of national policy. To make particular problems manageable, it is necessary to relate them to some restriction in basic concept. It would prove vexatious to everyone concerned if the Board and its Staff were to commence their labors without some clear view as to goal and limits.

d. It is well to confine the Board to a commitment which it can fulfill and which will make it most useful to the Government rather than attempting to fulfill a vast responsibility all too likely to result in duplication, conflict, and frustration running counter to the Board’s usefulness.

5. In the discussions of the organizational problem the Director and some of his immediate assistants have repeatedly stressed that a premium will be placed on staffing the organization with individuals from outside the Government service. This may be desirable in avoiding the draining away of talents needed in other agencies and in widening the sum of capabilities available to the Government. At the same time, the idea can be pushed too far. A unit composed preponderantly of individuals unfamiliar with the labyrinthine ways of the Government would all too likely find itself unable to make headway. It would find itself frustrated in trying to get its own work done. Others would find it getting in the way. It is better therefore that a balance be struck between new resources of imagination and old wisdom in the ways of the Government.

6. The following are recommended:

a. That the Under Secretary seek, at the next meeting of the Board, to bring about an agreement as to the underlying concept of the Board’s direction and limits in harmony with the principles stated in the more restrictive view of the Board’s role.⁶

b. As a matter of less urgency, that the Under Secretary give a caveat against the attitude which discounts the usefulness of individuals already in the Government and seeks a preponderance of individuals from outside the Government in staffing the Board.

Paul H. Nitze

⁷

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 64 D 563, Psychological Warfare. Secret. Drafted by Charles Burton Marshall, member of the Policy Planning Staff.
2. see Document 60.
3. For NSC 59/1, see Document 2.
4. Regarding NSC 10/2, see footnote 2, Document 42.
5. Gordon Gray.
6. The Psychological Strategy Board adopted a statement on September 25 that favored the more restrictive view of its role. It is printed in Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. I, pp. 178–180.
7. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.