Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community, 1950–1955

75. Memorandum From Robert P. Joyce of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze)¹

Washington, June 21, 1951.

SUBJECT

• The Director of Central Intelligence on the Scope and Pace of CIA Activities with Particular Reference to Para-Military Operations and Preparations for Operations

General Walter B. Smith met this morning with the ad hoc committee of the Senior Staff of the NSC to set forth verbally his ideas on the above-mentioned subject. The representatives of the Departments of State, Defense and the JCS who act as consultants to OPC of CIA were also present.²

General Smith started by querying whether it was desirable for CIA to operate as a sort of “covert War Department” for the conduct of large-scale guerrilla operations. He added that para-military, large-scale guerrilla operations might go on for a period of years in this present era of the tepid war. He commented that no commander should accept responsibility for important missions unless he is assured of receiving proper support. He went on to speak of CIA’s present support of guerrilla warfare on the China Mainland. He stated that it was possible that these operations might develop into a very large military effort involving perhaps two or three hundred thousand men who would have to be equipped and supplied. If this situation did in fact develop it would naturally involve a large production program for specialized light weapons and would mean in addition, a large-scale training, shipping and air-supply and re-supply program which would amount to a military operation. In other words an “operation of war” on a grand scale.

General Smith doubted that the CIA was the proper agency to undertake such a program. He stated that our Military Establishment would undoubtedly feel uncomfortable with such an operation left to a civilian agency. He added that although the Secretary of Defense and the top echelon of the three services might agree with such an operation to be undertaken by the CIA, nevertheless the working levels in the armed services would not be prepared to go along and the end result would be that necessary logistic and other support would not be forthcoming in a degree which would permit the CIA successfully to fulfill its responsibilities. General Smith cited several instances whereby support for CIA in terms of personnel had been agreed to by the Secretary of Defense but that long delays and whittling down by the lower echelons of the three services had resulted in his obtaining only a minimum of support. For example, the Secretary of Defense had agreed that CIA should receive from 400 to 500 officers but that after a period of four months only 40 officers had been supplied to the CIA. He emphasized that the delays in the staff echelons and the reluctance to make available qualified personnel had made it virtually impossible for the Director of Central Intelligence to meet the requirements which had been laid upon him by the JCS itself. General Smith then spoke of the responsibility and authority vested in a theatre commander to accomplish certain missions and added that he did not see how the Director of Central Intelligence or his representatives could ever obtain in peacetime like authority to accomplish missions of great magnitude which had been laid upon the CIA. He then stated that it might be possible for high ranking and highly competent generals loaned to CIA to obtain such authority but there were very few of these and they were most difficult to obtain from the Military Establishment. In other words, available talent in this category was limited.

General Smith went on to say that he, acting on his own responsibility, could do and did do certain things in the field of special operations. As an illustration he mentioned activities designed to impede the supply of aviation gasoline to the Chinese communists which was presently entering the Portuguese port of Macao. He said that an operation of this kind would only require a few men and his organization could handle it. On the other hand, however, a large para-military support program for anti-communist guerrillas in China is entirely another thing and perhaps beyond the capabilities of the CIA given present dispositions and attitudes within the working levels of the Military Establishment.

General Smith went on to say that the major mission of the CIA is intelligence and that the operations tail are now starting to wag the intelligence dog and that CIA was already spread very thin. He added that the obtaining of necessary funds was not presently a problem as the honeymoon with Congress was still going on. He added, however, that these honeymoons never lasted forever and that sooner or later he would probably have to justify to the Congress programs and large projects involving the expenditure of several hundred million dollars.

General Smith stated that as the Director of Central Intelligence it would afford him great relief if he could wrap up in one package this whole problem of guerrilla warfare and present it to the military as a military and not a CIA responsibility. He felt that he must do this for the reasons which he had already set forth and unless there should be enthusiastic, timely and real support from the Military Establishment which was not presently forthcoming and which he did not anticipate. He went on to point out that the military were apparently placing great hopes in the so-called retardation project. He feared that these D–Day hopes of what could be done were unrealistic and therefore dangerous. He spoke of the large preparations which would be required and stated that it had been his experience that by the time an adequate force could be equipped and trained it would undoubtedly be penetrated. He mentioned the difficulties faced by the French resistance due to enemy penetration and stated that in the present case the dangers of communist-penetration were much greater and that whole groups which had been painfully prepared might be gobbled up almost instantly when and if D–Day came. He emphasized that there was a high degree of wishful thinking and unreality within the Military Establishment as to what could be accomplished by special operations in wartime and that this was a dangerous situation to be allowed to develop further. He stated that the conventional army officer did not understand the enormous difficulties involved due to an understandable lack of knowledge of just what guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines involved. He added that there should be a careful auditing of the requirements the military were placing upon the CIA in this field with a view to there being a complete understanding as to the probable capabilities of the CIA. This would avoid misunderstandings as well as erroneous military planning based on false assumptions.

General Smith stated that, as a minimum, there should be joint CIA-military participation in planning and operations in order that the military should bear its responsibility for large-scale guerrilla operations. This would assure that the necessary support from the military for the CIA would be forthcoming. He stated that there might be set up within the JCS a joint staff where CIA and military officers could plan para-military operations. General Smith suggested that CIA specialized personnel might assume responsibility for first contacts with underground leaders and guerrilla commanders. The CIA might even assume the responsibility for providing modest supplies to guerrilla movements in order to see how their capabilities develop. If such guerrilla capabilities develop in a large way and turn into important military operations, then the CIA responsibility should cease and the military should take over and be charged with the responsibilities for supply, re-supply and other logistic support.

Admiral Stevens stated that there was already in progress joint planning as between the CIA and the representatives of the JCS and that he considered that this situation was working out well. He added that naturally there was a time lag in getting projects approved due to the fact that the JCS had a continually clogged agenda. He added that, in his opinion, the military generally speaking were trained and held responsible for formal military operations and that they were incapable of waging cold war. General Magruder agreed that there was insufficient flexibility in the formal Military Establishment or in the formal military mind successfully to carry on delicate covert operations where a great deal of flexibility and sophistication in political matters was called for.

It was generally agreed that a great deal of educational work was necessary before the military could realize the nature and potentialities of covert operations. It was suggested that perhaps the best way for the CIA to obtain the requisite support from the Military Establishment would be for General Marshall to issue orders to the effect that the CIA operation was a national effort of the greatest importance and that the heads of the military services should see to it down the line that it received what it needed to have in an expeditious manner as a matter closely related to the national security. There was discussion as to whether it might or might not be desirable for the President to issue the necessary instructions in order that CIA should receive unstinted and generous support.

Robert P. Joyce

1. Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, NSC 10 Series, 1951. Top Secret. Drafted by Joyce.
2. The consultants to the Office of Policy Coordination were Joyce (for the Department of State), Brigadier General John Magruder (for the Department of Defense) and Rear Admiral Leslie C. Stevens (for the Joint Chiefs of Staff).