Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community, 1950–1955

52. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Administration (Scott) to the Under Secretary of State (Webb)¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

• NSC–74 Background

This is in response to your request for a full statement of the inter-departmental arrangements and planning leading up to NSC–74² and the assignment of the psychological problem to Admiral Souers.

1. NSC–10/2

NSC–10/2 (attached as Tab A),³ approved in June 1948 fixed responsibility for covert operations and directed the responsible officer to assure coordination of such activities with U.S. foreign and military policies and overt activities. This decision has remained in effect and has not been at issue in the planning of organization for overt psychological operations until Admiral Souers’ assignment.

2. NSC–4 and NSC–43

NSC–4⁴ (attached as Tab B), which was approved by the NSC in December, 1947, made provision for the coordination of foreign information measures. NSC–43⁵ (attached as Tab C), which was approved by the NSC in March, 1949, made certain provisions on planning for wartime conduct of overt psychological warfare. In December, 1949, the provisions of these two papers were consolidated with minor changes and approved as NSC–59.⁶

3. NSC–59

NSC–59 (attached as Tab D), approved in March, 1950, charges the Secretary of State with responsibilities for:

(1) Formulation of policies and plans for peacetime information program, including all foreign information activity conducted by departments and agencies of the U.S. Government.

(2) Formulation of National Psychological Warfare policy in time of national emergency and the initial stages of war.

(3) Coordination of policies and plans for the information program and for overt psychological warfare with the Department of Defense, with other appropriate departments and with related planning under the NSC–10 series.

There was directed to be established within the Department of State an organization to consist of: “(a) A Director appointed by Secretary of State after consultation with other departments and agencies represented on the National Security Council. (b) Policy consultants representing the Secretary of the State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board. (c) A consultant representing the Director of Central Intelligence for matters relating to coordination with planning under the NSC–10 series. (d) A consultant representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff on NSC–59 and NSC–10/2 matters. (e) A staff composed of full-time personnel representing the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency. (f) A liaison representative to the staff from the National Security Resources Board and such liaison representation or staff membership from other departments and agencies of the government as may be determined by the Director after consultation with the consultants.”

This organization was directed to:

• “(a) Initiate and develop interdepartmental plans, make recommendations, and otherwise advise and assist the Secretary of State in discharging his responsibilities for the national foreign information program in time of peace.
• (b) Make plans for overt psychological warfare, including recommendations for the preparations for national emergency and the initial stages of war. Such plans shall be continuously coordinated with joint war plans through the planning agencies of the Department of Defense and where such plans have a direct impact on war plans they shall be subject to the concurrence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”

4. Psychological Strategy Board

On August 17, 1950, the Department of State issued a press release (attached as Tab E) announcing the establishment of a national psychological strategy board under the Secretary of State.⁷ This Strategy Board was in fact nothing more than the “Director” and the “Consultants” under NSC–59, including the JCS representative. This step was taken in recognition of the necessity for conducting psychological measures in connection with the hostilities in Korea and the increasingly critical world-wide situation. The activities of the “organization” were in fact intensified, as the Board has met more frequently since the announcement and has dealt with more problems of a psychological character requiring joint political and military action.

5. NSC–74

In July, 1950 the Under Secretary of State transmitted to the NSC a report prepared by the Organization established pursuant to NSC–59. This report was issued for clearance as NSC–74 (attached as Tab F).

This paper has been prepared principally during the period prior to Korea and was based on the tacit assumption that any war would be general and would break out without warning. It provided an “initial stage” of psychological warfare organization to be invoked on D–day, or earlier at the discretion of the President, and a plan for the “subsequent stages” to be established as rapidly thereafter as possible.

The plan for the initial stages of war recognized the responsibility of the Secretary of State to “formulate national psychological warfare policy and issue psychological warfare policy directives to appropriate departments and agencies of the U.S. Government” and to “coordinate policies and plans for overt psychological warfare with the Department of Defense” and other agencies. The plan also directed the Secretary of State to make “detailed plans and preparations to employ psychological warfare to the maximum in consonance with this plan.” It was recognized that overt psychological warfare would be executed in theaters of military operations by theater commanders and in other areas by the Department of State.

For the “initial stages” the Interdepartmental Foreign Information Organization was to be “augmented” and established as an Interim Psychological Warfare Board to act as the “Executive Agent” of the Secretary of State in the execution of his planning and coordinating responsibility for psychological warfare. The Board was to be composed of a Chairman representing the Secretary of State, a Vice-Chairman representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and one representative each from State, Defense, and ECA.

The plan for the “subsequent stages” provided a National Psychological Warfare Board “composed of a Chairman, appointed by the President and directly responsible to him; a member designated by and representing the Department of State; a member chosen from the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization, designated by and representing the Department of Defense; and a member designated by and representing the Central Intelligence Agency.”

On September 13, 1950, Secretary Johnson submitted to the Executive Secretary of NSC his comments on NSC–74⁸ (attached as Tab G). He proposed the immediate implementation of the plan for the “initial stages”, but he considered it inadequate even for the situation at that time and thought that “we should move to create immediately an independent psychological planning board in the Executive Office of the President.” The chairman would have been directly responsible to the President and the board members would have been full-time appointees not representing the Departments.

Also on September 14, the Under Secretary of State advised the NSC that the Department of State approved NSC–74 except for the subsequent stages plan, which he believed required further study.⁹ (See Tab H.) He also stated that he had “taken steps to strengthen the Inter-departmental Foreign Information Organization established under NSC–59/1, so that it may meet the requirements of situations where joint military and political action is necessary in the field of psychological warfare”, referring to the establishment of the psychological strategy board.

After further study within the Department, a draft NSC–74/1 (attached as Tab I) was developed.¹⁰ In an effort to meet the requirements of the present situation, this paper provided for the establishment of a National Psychological Strategy Board (or National Psychological Warfare Board in time of war) “as the coordinating agent for the Secretary of State” with respect to his responsibility to “recommend broad policies and plans for the national psychological effort designed to achieve a maximum support of U.S. national objectives” and to “review the plans and programs of agencies executing psychological measures for conformity with national policy.” The chairman was to be designated by the Secretary of State, the vice-chairman by JCS and additional members by State, Defense, and CIA. This paper spoke of the “National Psychological Effort” in order to avoid the controversy about whether “psychological warfare” is conducted in time of peace, and to make adequate provision for the present situation. It was the position of the Department of State that organization in time of war should be subjected to further study.

Following discussion of the new State Department draft by the NSC senior staff, it was determined that agreement between the Departments could not be secured. A memorandum of disagreement was prepared (attached as Tab J) and submitted for NSC consideration, together with an additional memorandum from the JCS¹¹ (attached as Tab K). The senior staff memorandum stated the essential issue as follows:

“Should responsibility at the national level for psychological policy formulation, within the framework of approved national policies, and for the coordination and evaluation of the national psychological effort, including authority to issue policy guidance to all Departments and agencies of the Government executing portions of the psychological effort (1) be assigned to the Secretary of State, or, (2) be assigned to an official independent of any Department and responsible to the President.”

After NSC consideration on January 4, the President referred these memoranda “to Mr. Souers and the Bureau of the Budget for further study and recommendation to the President.”¹²

On January 18, Mr. Souers presented to you the proposal for a Board “under the NSC” with a chairman to be appointed by the President¹³ (attached as Tab L).

Last week there was a meeting at the Bureau of the Budget for discussion of this problem which was attended by Admiral Souers; Messrs. Lawton and Staats of the Bureau; Messrs. Barrett, Matthews, Joyce, and Scott. A revised draft of the Souers directive was circulated and discussed, but no copies were given out. An analysis of this revised draft is attached as Tab M.¹⁴

W. K. Scott

¹⁵

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, P Files: Lot 55 D 339. Top Secret. Although this memorandum is attached to one from Barrett to Webb, March 14, the content of Scott’s memorandum indicates that it was probably drafted about February 20.
2. See Document 17.
3. An attached list of Tabs A–M is not printed. None of the tabs are attached to the memorandum. For NSC 10/2, see Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 292.
4. Ibid., Document 252.
5. See ibid., Documents 392 and 401.
6. See Document 2.
7. Printed in Department of State Bulletin, August 28, 1950, p. 335.
8. Not found.
9. Not found.
10. Not found.
11. Neither found.
12. Not further identified.
13. See attachment to Document 45.
14. Memorandum from Scott to Webb, February 16. (National Archives, RG 59, P Files: Lot 55 D 339)
15. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.