49. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Barrett) to Secretary of State Acheson1
SUBJECT
- Meeting with Admiral Souers
Regarding your meeting with Admiral Souers:
When the parties concerned were unable to resolve their differences over who should supervise psychological strategy now and in event of war, the question was referred to the NSC.2 The President then directed Admiral Souers, with the assistance of the Bureau of the Budget, to study the subject and make recommendations.
The Admiral came up with what he considered a compromise plan. This was a plan for a board as proposed by the Defense Department, [Page 93] consisting of one representative each from State, Defense, Joint Chiefs and CIA, plus an “independent” chairman. However, the Admiral proposed that the chairman should report to the National Security Council—not to the President as recommended by Defense.
We have objected strenuously to this plan, and accordingly, we understand it hasn’t been presented to the President.
Subsequent discussion with Admiral Souers developed the fact that he had in mind a board whose field would be far broader than that discussed in any of the NSC 74 papers.3 The original papers all specified that the board would give broad direction to overt information and psychological warfare matters and just “coordinate with” covert psychological operations. The Admiral, it developed, was thinking in terms of a board that would plan general strategy for virtually all unconventional warfare measures. These would include overt psychological strategy, covert psychological strategy (whispering campaigns, etc.), covert operations of the old OSS variety, and perhaps certain economic warfare measures (like pre-emptive buying).
Admiral Souers has implied in private conversations that he believes the planning for perfectly overt psychological operations should continue under the coordination of the Secretary of State, as is now the case with our Psychological Strategy Board, which presently operates under the authority given the Secretary in NSC 594 and which would be strengthened under State’s version of NSC 74. He seems, however, inclined to advocate the creation under NSC of a superboard to coordinate overt psychological planning with planning in all the other unconventional warfare fields mentioned above.
The following is a listing of U.S. foreign propaganda programs in being or planned and the state of coordination with each:
In addition to the Department’s USIE program, programs are now being carried on or are planned by CIA, ECA, Army, Air Forces, NATO and SHAPE.
The Department, ECA, Army, NATO and SHAPE are now engaged in overt information activity abroad.
Coordination of overt operations by the Department is undertaken through the National Psychological Strategy Board (members: State, as Chairman, Defense, JCS, CIA, ECA and NSRB) which has been set up under NSC 59, and through direct liaison in the U.S. and abroad between the Department and the agencies concerned. The independent charters held by ECA and the Army occasion a lack of coordination [Page 94] and/or duplication in some operations such as the Armed Forces Radio Service and the activity of some ECA country units.
Covert propaganda operations are centered in CIA although the ECA and Army, in some instances, appear to be involved in activity of this nature (to the apparent annoyance of CIA).
CIA covert propaganda operations are coordinated with the Department through an agreement for direct liaison between P and CIA’s Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), through the role of Mr. Joyce (S/P) as CIA consultant, and through CIA participation in the National Psychological Strategy Board. I consider that coordination in this field is satisfactory, but do not know and do not need to know the substance of all of CIA’s programs. ECA and Army covert or semi-covert operations are not coordinated with State or CIA in all cases. NATO and SHAPE information operations are in the formative stage, and we are working out the problems of coordination. No major problems here have been uncovered so far.
Psychological warfare in areas of military operations is under the control of the theatre commander, as in Korea.
There is a substantial lack of coordination in relation to psychological operations in Korea. This is a problem not only for the Department but for the JCS, the Department of the Army and CIA.
Research in psychological warfare is being undertaken by State, Army, Air Forces, and CIA.
There is a definite lack of coordination in the field of psychological warfare research, particularly within the defense establishment.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–54, 511.00/2–1351. Secret. Sent through the Executive Secretariat.↩
- See Documents 45 and 47.↩
- See Document 17.↩
- For the text of NSC 59/1, see Document 2.↩