37. Memorandum by J. L. Barnard of the Bureau of European Affairs1
PRODUCTION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES
General Bedell Smith’s direction of CIA has resulted in a significant change in that organization’s production of finished intelligence. CIA is now in the business of producing what are called National Intelligence Estimates along the lines laid down in NSC 50. These papers are interdepartmental in character, designed to focus all available intelligence [Page 67] on a problem of importance to the national security. In the preparation of these Estimates, CIA is now relying on the State Department, rather than its own staff, for political and economic intelligence, the Department of the Army for military, etc., etc. A reorganization within CIA is in process with the emphasis on quality rather than quantity of personnel. CIA’s Office of Reports and Evaluation (ORE) is being eliminated so far as political intelligence is concerned, and a small top level Office of National Estimates has been created to integrate the departmental drafts for the approval of the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC). (The IAC advises the Director of Central Intelligence and is made up of the chiefs of intelligence of State, Army, Navy, Air, AEC, FBI, and a representative from the Joint Staff in the Department of Defense.) Upon approval by the IAC, the paper becomes a National Intelligence Estimate and is sent by the Director of Central Intelligence to the President, appropriate officers of Cabinet level, and the NSC.
What all this means to EUR is simply this: heretofore reports written by CIA’s former evaluation office (ORE) were sent to the R area of the Department for comment and concurrence or dissent. In this procedure, the Bureau’s role was gauged to the relatively minor importance of these papers. The R area checked with the Bureau to insure that the Department was speaking with one voice, but the papers seldom dealt with major issues.
With the new CIA product, however, it is obvious that Bureau participation will be more important than it has been in the past. These National Intelligence Estimates, as can be seen by the auspices under which they are prepared and their eventual destination, carry considerable weight. What the new CIA Office of National Estimates wants and should have from State is the pooled intelligence of the Bureau and R. This approach does not mean that the Bureau will have to do any original drafting—such drafts will be prepared by the R area—but it does mean that the Bureau will share the responsibility for making State’s contribution.
In practice, the preparation of a National Intelligence Estimate breaks down into the following steps: (1) the R area (OIR) prepares a first draft of the political and/or economic section of the paper under interdepartmental agreements as provided for in NSC 50; (2) these sections are then taken by the Office of National Estimates (CIA) and worked into a draft of the whole paper; (3) this CIA draft is sent to the contributing Departments for comment; (4) after consideration by the Departments, it is further discussed in CIA by an interdepartmental working group; (5) a final draft is then issued by CIA for approval by the IAC.
Although the Bureau may, on occasion, be consulted at stage (1), it will generally not enter the picture until stage (3) when the CIA draft [Page 68] of the whole paper is sent to the Departments for comment and suggestion. Stage (3) should be the beginning and the end of Bureau participation, unless the draft is radically changed in the course of its future development either in the working group discussion or the IAC (see below). The Bureau will receive its copy for comment through the Intelligence Adviser. Bureau comment may be made either in writing to the Intelligence Adviser, or directly to the OIR personnel involved (in which case the Intelligence Adviser should be informed). In the event that the Bureau or OIR feel that further discussion is needed in order to develop a unified Departmental position, they will notify the Intelligence Adviser who will then arrange a meeting for a reconciliation of views. If there is a fundamental divergence of interpretation between the Bureau and R, this fact and the opposing arguments will be presented to the Special Assistant for Intelligence who will follow the accepted principles of action and review by referring the matter to higher authority for a decision as to the Departmental position.
In this connection it should be noted that the Special Assistant speaks for the Department in the IAC. This role has its complications. The IAC, although formerly concerned almost exclusively with jurisdictional matters, has now been transformed under General Smith’s chairmanship into a substantive group, which means that there is considerable give and take around the table before a final version of an Estimate is approved. Should the Special Assistant feel that in his judgment the final version is so changed by this give and take as to run counter to the Departmental position, he can either ask time for further consideration (in which case the Bureau will be apprised) or, if time does not permit, he can publish the Departmental position as a dissent in an appendix to the National Estimate.
Throughout this whole process, it must be recognized that once a National Estimate draft is underway, the timing on deadlines for contributions or comments is out of the hands of R. The Special Assistant will attempt to have these deadlines made realistic, but the ultimate decision as to their urgency rests with the IAC itself. Therefore, in order to incorporate the Bureau’s views in this new and influential series of intelligence appraisals, it is essential that every effort be made within EUR to meet the due dates specified.
It is hoped that the procedure cited above will not place too great an additional burden on Bureau personnel, while, at the same time, it will ensure that the Bureau’s role as a contributor of intelligence is being effectively played.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, INR Files: Lot 58 D 528, NIE Correspondence VI, 1950–54. Confidential. The memorandum was prepared to provide information to EUR on the production of National Intelligence Estimates. It was attached to a memorandum entitled “Background Paper for Mr. Armstrong’s Statement at UM on National Intelligence Estimates.” After that meeting, held on January 5, Special Assistant for Intelligence, W. Park Armstrong, Jr., circulated a list of completed and projected National Intelligence Estimates to 20 senior officials in 20 different offices and bureaus of the Department of State. (Ibid., Central Files (1950–54, 103.11/1–851)↩