Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community, 1950–1955

33. Memorandum From the Assistant Director for Policy Coordination of the Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner) to Staff and Division Chiefs¹

Washington, November 29, 1950.

SUBJECT

• Policy Governing the Conduct of OPC Operations Within the United States

The following policy is announced to guide all concerned in judging the appropriateness of engaging in a given activity within the United States or its outlying possessions. This policy will not be construed as an alteration of existing procedures for obtaining approval to undertake a specific project or operation.

1. Basic Authority.

a. The following sources and limitations of authority are applicable to the subject of this paper:

(1) Sec. 102(d), National Security Act of 1947:

“… Provided, that the agency [CIA]² shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal security functions.…”

(2) Excerpt from Memorandum of Agreement between ADPC and FBI:³

“… The Office of Policy Coordination recognizes the primary responsibility of the FBI in the field of United States domestic security.…”

(3) NSC 10/2:

OPC was created by NSC 10/2 (under the authority of Sec. 102(d)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947) to supplement the overt foreign activities of the U.S. Government and to conduct covert operations in support of or to accomplish U.S. foreign policy objectives. The term covert operations is defined as embracing all activities (exclusive of operations to secure intelligence and of cover and deception for military operations) against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups, which are conducted so that any U.S. Government responsibility for them is not evident and that if uncovered the responsibility therefor can be denied. Foreign policy objectives are interpreted to be those objectives which are established by the President (usually acting through the Secretary of State) in pursuance of applicable laws, and enunciated and interpreted through various regulations and pronouncements. OPC’s source for determination of what is U.S. foreign policy at a given time is the Department of State.

2. Interpretation.

a. General.

It is clear that by both law and charter OPC is precluded from engaging in operations concerned with the domestic affairs of the United States. OPC is authorized to conduct operations only against or in support of foreign states or elements thereof. Police, law-enforcement, and internal security functions are responsibilities of other U.S. Government agencies; OPC is bound by the presumption that these agencies are performing their functions faithfully and effectively.

What may not be clear is whether OPC is authorized to engage in operations within the United States against or in support of a foreign state or group and in so doing support U.S. foreign policy objectives. In many instances it might appear more practicable to carry out a given operation in the United States than elsewhere. OPC is not expressly authorized or forbidden by NSC 10/2 to conduct such operations. However, it appears to have been the intent of the NSC that covert operations were only to be executed abroad (cf., purpose of establishing OPC: “to supplement the overt foreign activities of the U.S. Government” (underscoring supplied)). Moreover and more important, it would be very difficult if not impossible to undertake covert operations in the United States in such a manner that “any U.S. Government responsibility for them is not evident and that if uncovered the U.S. Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them.” The U.S. Government has certain responsibilities under international law for acts committed within its jurisdiction which might well make impossible disavowal of responsibility for a covert act committed by OPC in the United States. For these reasons it is considered that only in the most exceptional circumstances will it be desirable to propose operations which are to be executed within the United States.

b. Auxiliary Activities.

It is also evident, however, that OPC does have occasion to carry on certain activities within the United States. [3½ lines not declassified] The fact that these activities take place within the United States is, however, purely incidental to the main purpose of the OPC operation. The essential element is that they are part of operations to be executed abroad against hostile foreign states. Such activities have no other relation to the domestic affairs of the United States than that they physically take place, for reasons of necessity, convenience, security, etc., within the United States. The determinant as to the propriety, from the standpoint of OPC’s charter, of an OPC undertaking within the United States is therefore the objective of the operation. The ultimate objective of any proposed undertaking must clearly be to produce an effect upon a foreign state or group. This effect may even be the ultimate reception abroad of an idea which has been produced and disseminated within the United States. It is not appropriate to undertake any activity which has the objective or primary effect of influencing the foreign or domestic policies of the United States, or of influencing the internal security of the United States; or which has as its target a domestic group in the United States.

c. Preliminary Activities.

There are certain other kinds of activity which OPC must carry on within the United States which are incidental but necessary to the execution of its substantive tasks. Some of these are self-evident and will not be dealt with here (e.g., personnel recruitment, domestic liaison, matériel procurement). Others are not so clearly defined and delineated and consequently provide opportunity for misunderstanding. Among these are:

• [1 paragraph (20 lines) not declassified]
• (2) External Research—Preliminary to launching some operations it may be necessary to perform certain research or to acquire information which is necessary for realistic planning. Since OPC is not a research organization, it is often obliged to turn to external sources. The employment of private individuals and organizations outside the Government is sometimes required. In this activity OPC will finance only that research which (a) deals with matériel the need for which is essential to OPC operations, and (b) can not be obtained from established U.S. governmental research organizations. Here again, however, such contacts with U.S. groups, and their utilization, is solely for the support of OPC operations abroad.

• (3) Training—Providing specialized training is an inherent prerequisite to the undertaking of many substantive activities. It is necessary to give indoctrination training to staff personnel. It is necessary to train staff agents and indigenous agents in doctrine and techniques of secret operations. It may be desirable to train individuals or groups of indigenous agents for execution of a particular clandestine operation. When it is more convenient and more practicable to do so, such training will be administered in the United States.

  There are other types of training which involve personnel not under the permanent or complete control of OPC but which enable OPC indirectly to execute operations abroad. The training of a selected group of members of a foreign internal security service in anti-sabotage techniques might enable OPC effectively to discharge a requirement for protection of vital materials or installations in the country represented. [4 lines not declassified] It is appropriate for OPC to provide these types of training within the United States if (1) the objective of such training is within the charter of OPC, and (2) the training can, for reasons of convenience, security, control, or availability of facilities, most effectively be provided within the United States. OPC can of course provide this training through its own or through other available facilities where it is more desirable to do so.

• (4) Technological Research and Development—In order that proficiency in execution of operations and capabilities for new operations may be constantly expanded, it is desirable to conduct research into and to sponsor the development of new devices, weapons, and equipment, including psychological warfare aids. It is necessary and appropriate to carry on this activity within the United States. In so doing, however, OPC will insofar as practicable conduct research and development through other Government agencies, OPC will not initiate research or development directly through private organizations in the United States, except where OPC has principal interest in the article to be developed, and where it is demonstrably impracticable to work through an established Government agency.

3. Chief, Staff III will promulgate this policy through appropriate regulations.⁴

Frank G. Wisner

⁵

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Operations Job 80–01795R, Box 3. Top Secret. Drafted in I/PR on November 21 and 24. All ellipses in the original.
2. Brackets in the original.
3. Not found.
4. A handwritten note in the margin next to paragraph 3 reads: “Done! see OPC Reg 50–15 dated 30 Nov 50. [initials not declassified] 30 Nov.” [text not declassified]
5. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.