211. Editorial Note
In the course of a discussion on the Formosa crisis in the President’s office at 2:30 p.m. on March 11, 1955, which was attended by Secretary of State Dulles, DCI Dulles, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Radford, Chief of Staff of the Air Force Twining, Chief of Naval Operations Carney, the President’s Staff Secretary Goodpaster, and Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Cutler, President Eisenhower also raised some more general questions regarding U.S. intelligence, as follows:
“i. The President complained about conflicting intelligence information coming to him. He said he wanted steps taken to centralize and centrally evaluate all intelligence. It was agreed that the NIC should [Page 622] be ‘beefed up’ and put on a 24 hour basis. Secretary Dulles said there are three aspects to intelligence:
- “a. rapid communication of intelligence from the field
- “b. coordination of intelligence in Washington
- “c. obtaining accurate intelligence as to Chinat loyalty on Formosa
“The President said that—under emergent circumstances like the present—he wanted (1) intelligence transmitted from the field to Washington very fast; (2) a prompt evaluation of such intelligence at a central point where all interested agencies were represented, so as to obtain a commonly agreed assessment as quickly as possible; (3) in the case of something ‘hot’, a warning to himself and other key persons, pending such central evaluation.” (Memorandum for the Record prepared by Cutler; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Series, Formosa—Visit to CINCPAC) The full text of Cutler’s memorandum is printed in Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, volume II, pp. 355–360.