Office of the Historian

204. Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 5/11

Washington, January 11, 1955.

COORDINATION OF THE FOREIGN CLANDESTINE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES OF THE ARMED SERVICES WITH THOSE OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Pursuant to the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended,2 and for the purpose of defining under NSCID No. 5,3 those clandestine collection activities which the Armed Services conduct in [Page 594] order to carry out their responsibilities and assigned missions, and to protect the security of their foreign based military commands or installations, and for the purpose of coordinating such activities with those of the Central Intelligence Agency (except in areas where United States armed forces are engaged in active combat operations, in which event the provisions of paragraph 10 of NSCID #5 shall be deemed applicable), the following is established:

1.
Where United States military commands or installation are located outside of the United States and its possessions, the commanders thereof may conduct such foreign clandestine collection activities as they deem essential to the execution of their assigned missions, in accordance with the principles and procedures set forth hereinafter.
2.
Review and coordination of plans for the clandestine collection activities of the Armed Services and plans of the Central Intelligence Agency for the clandestine collection of information of interest to the Armed Services will be accomplished with each service to the extent practicable at the national level.
3.
In order to assure field coordination of clandestine collection activities, the designated representatives of the military commanders concerned and of the Director of Central Intelligence will review together all such activities of those military commanders, as well as the operational plans and procedures therefor. They will also review together those clandestine collection activities of the Central Intelligence Agency which are undertaken in direct support of the military commanders concerned. Coordination may involve the creation and utilization of common support facilities, the exchange of operational information, and the establishment of informal committees.4
4.
In the event that the designated representative of the Director of Central Intelligence considers an activity, plan or agent to be potentially harmful to the over-all clandestine effort, the proposed action will not be carried out except as provided in paragraph 5 below, without prior approval resulting from agreement between the appropriate military service intelligence chief and the Director of Central Intelligence.
5.
In those instances when the military commander considers the action proposed in paragraph 4 above to be essential to the immediate conduct of his mission or critical to the security of his forces, and time does not permit referral of the issue to Washington, the action may proceed on the responsibility of the military commander, pending resolution in Washington. The military commander will inform the designated representative of the Director of Central Intelligence as to his action.5

  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC Intelligence Directives. Secret. On January 11, NSC Executive Secretary Lay circulated this directive by memorandum to the National Security Council and noted that the Director of Central Intelligence would make reference to it and other directives in his quarterly oral report at the January 13 NSC meeting. (Ibid.) In a January 12 memorandum to the Secretary of State, Armstrong also transmitted this directive and described it as follows: “Specifically, DCID 5/1, attached, defines the respective areas of responsibility of CIA and the armed services in the field of clandestine intelligence. As such it represents a long sought agreement between Defense and CIA in this very sensitive, very complex, but very important field. Neither the NSC nor DCI Intelligence Directive provides for coordination with the Department on clandestine intelligence activities which bear upon foreign policy, although coordination of this kind is specifically provided in directives pertaining to covert [psychological] Operations. I do not, however, recommend that any revision be made at this time.” (Ibid., S/S–NSC Files: Lot 66 D 95, National Intelligence Objectives) Brackets and emphasis in the original.↩
  2. Pursuant to P.L. 216 of August 10, 1949, National Security Act amendments of 1949, the Department of Defense was established to coordinate and direct the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force. (63 Stat. 578)↩
  3. Document 255.↩
  4. Upon the issuance of this Directive, a systematic review and adjustment, where necessary, of ongoing operations will be made in the field in conformity with the provisions of this Directive. [Footnote in the original.]↩
  5. Printed from an unsigned copy.↩