194. Letter From Edwin H.
Land, Chairman of the Technological Capabilities Panel of
the Science Advisory Committee, Office of Defense Mobilization, to
Director of Central Intelligence Dulles1
Washington, November 5, 1954.
Dear Mr. Dulles:
Here is the brief report from our panel telling why we think overflight
is urgent and presently feasible. I am not sure that we have made
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it clear that we feel there
are many reasons why this activity is appropriate for CIA, always with Air Force assistance. We
told you that this seems to us the kind of action and technique that is
right for the contemporary version of CIA; a modern and scientific way for an Agency that is
always supposed to be looking, to do its looking. Quite strongly, we
feel that you must always assert your first right to pioneer in
scientific techniques for collecting intelligence—and choosing such
partners to assist you as may be needed. This present opportunity for
aerial photography seems to us a fine place to start.
With best wishes,
Edwin H.
Land
For: Project 3, Technological
Capabilities Panel
Office of Defense Mobilization
Executive
Office of the President
Project Members:
E. H.
Land
James G.
Baker
Joseph W.
Kennedy
Edward M.
Purcell
Attachment
Washington, November 5, 1954.
Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence
Dulles3
SUBJECT
- A Unique Opportunity for Comprehensive Intelligence
For many years it has been clear that aerial photographs of Russia
would provide direct knowledge of her growth, of new centers of
activity in obscure regions, and of military targets that would be
important if ever we were forced into war. During a period in which
Russia has free access to the geography of all our bases and major
nuclear facilities, as well as to our entire military and civilian
economy, we have
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been
blocked from the corresponding knowledge about Russia. We have been
forced to imagine what her program is, and it could well be argued
that peace is always in danger when one great power is essentially
ignorant of the major economic, military, and political activities
within the interior zone of another great power. This ignorance
leads to somewhat frantic preparations for both offensive and
defensive action, and may lead to a state of unbearable national
tension. Unfortunately, it is the U.S., the more mature, more
civilized, and more responsible country that must bear the burden of
not knowing what is happening in Russia. We cannot fulfill our
responsibility for maintaining the peace if we are left in ignorance
of Russian activity.
While aerial photography could be the most powerful single tool for
acquiring information, it has until now been dangerous to fly over
Russia. Up till now, the planes might rather readily be detected,
less readily attacked, and possibly even destroyed. Thus no
statesman could have run the risk of provocation toward war that an
intensive program of overflights might produce. The Air Force has,
for a long time, studied a program of overflight as a natural aspect
of its Reconnaissance mission and has, in recent months, considered
several proposals for airplanes designed for this purpose. While it
is important that such research and development continue in the Air
Force, for the present it seems rather dangerous for one of our
military arms to engage directly in extensive overflight.
On the other hand, because it is vital that certain knowledge about
industrial growth, strategic targets, and guided missile sites be
obtained at once, we recommend that CIA, as a civilian organization, undertake (with the
Air Force assistance) a covert program of selected flights.
Fortunately, a jet powered glider has been carefully studied by
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation for overflight purposes. This
manufacturer proposes to take full responsibility for the design,
mock-up, building, secret testing and field maintenance of this
extraordinary and unorthodox vehicle, making it feasible for a
CIA task force to undertake this
vital activity. Such a task force requires highly specialized and
able guidance in procurement and operation (by Air Force officers
for aircraft, by scientists for photographic and electronic
equipment). The Lockheed super glider will fly at 70,000 feet, well
out of reach of present Russian interception and high enough to have
a good chance of avoiding detection. The plane itself is so light
(15,000 lbs.), so obviously unarmed and devoid of military
usefulness, that it would minimize affront to the Russians even if
through some remote mischance it were detected and identified.
Since the proposed mission of this plane is first of all
photographic, and only secondarily electronic, a word should be said
about the information expected from the photographs, as well as
about the effects
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of the
cloud cover over Russia. Photographs are appended4 that demonstrate the large
information content of pictures taken from these great altitudes. A
single mission in clear weather can photograph in revealing detail a
strip of Russia 200 miles wide by 2,500 miles long. Cloud cover will
reduce completeness, of course, but clouds are not a serious
obstacle because one can afford to wait for good weather; alternate
routes over clear areas can be selected in flight; and finally, the
number of intelligence targets accessible during a single mission is
so large that even a partial sampling would yield an extraordinary
amount of intelligence.
The opportunity for safe overflight may last only a few years,
because the Russians will develop radars and interceptors or guided
missile defenses for the 70,000 foot region. We therefore recommend
immediate action through special channels in CIA in procuring the Lockheed glider and in
establishing the CIA task force. No
proposal or program that we have seen in intelligence planning can
so quickly bring so much vital information at so little risk and at
so little cost. We believe that these planes can go where we need to
have them go efficiently and safely, and that no amount of
fragmentary and indirect intelligence can be pieced together to be
equivalent to such positive information as can thus be provided.
It is recommended that
- (a)
- The Central Intelligence Agency establish an initial task
force to complete any necessary feasibility studies in a few
weeks, and that, assuming successful completion of the studies,
the following further actions be taken.
- (b)
- A permanent task force, including Air Force supporting
elements, be set up under suitable cover to provide guidance on
procurement, to consolidate requirements and plan missions in
view of priority and feasibility, to maintain the operation on a
continuing basis, and to carry out the dissemination of the
resulting information in a manner consistent with its special
security requirements.
- (c)
- The procurement of a coordinated system from Lockheed,
consisting of CL–282 aircraft with photographic and electronic
equipment, be authorized.
- (d)
- Such high altitude overflights be authorized in
principle.
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Attachment5
A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY FOR COMPREHENSIVE INTELLIGENCE—A
SUMMARY
Opportunity
Collection of large amounts of information at a minimum of risk
through prompt development of a special, high altitude airplane.
Assurance of thousands of photographs that will yield critical
analysis of vast Soviet complexes. Protection of mission by decisive
altitude advantage over Soviet interception. This protection good
for only a few years, thus assured only through very prompt
action.
Objectives
Providing adequate locations and analyses of Russian targets
(including those newly discovered).
More accurate assessment of Soviet Order of Battle and of early
warning indicators, thus improving our defenses against surprise
attack.
Appraising Soviet guided missile development (through photos of test
range, etc.).
Improving estimates of Soviet ability to deliver nuclear weapons and
of their capacity to produce them.
Disclosing new developments which might otherwise lead to
technological surprise.
Appraising Soviet industrial and economic progress.
Organization
Secret task force under Central Intelligence Agency with strong Air
Force staff assistance to equip and carry out entire mission up to
point where flow of useful new intelligence is established. Task
force to include top experts selected from Government agencies,
armed services, universities and industry to provide for most
effective application of science and technology toward fulfillment
of this objective.
Vehicle
Special “powered glider” CL–282 aircraft proposed by Lockheed.
ALTITUDE–70,000 feet. SPEED–500 kt. RANGE–3,000 n. mi. GROSS
WEIGHT–15,000 lbs. TAKE-OFF DISTANCE–1,200 feet. CREW–lone
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pilot in heated,
pressurized suit. AVAILABILITY–four aircraft for field use in 17
months assured by Lockheed.
Cameras
Standard Trimetrogon for charting entire overflown strip. Focal
lengths from 12–48 inches to be used in multiple mounts for main
work load. Special long focal length spotting camera for detailing
concentrated areas down to objects as small as a man. Clear
identification of Roads, Railroads, Power Lines, Industrial Plants,
Air Fields, Parked Aircraft, Missile Sites and the like within a
strip 200 miles wide by 2,500 miles long per flight.
Electronics
Electronics intercept [less than 1 line not
declassified] data to be recorded on special automatic
recorders preset for selected frequencies. More extensive electronic
data available by optional use of additional electronic gear in
place of photographic gear.
Schedule
New intelligence to start flowing within twenty months.
Cost
$22,000,000 to initial flow of significant intelligence. (Includes
procurement of design, development and test of six CL–282 aircraft,
training and operation of special task force and initial logistic
support.)
