Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community, 1950–1955

167. Draft Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner) to Director of Central Intelligence Dulles¹

Washington, January 8, 1954.

SUBJECT

• Policy Guidance for CIA planning to “capitalize on and exploit new uprisings in the satellites”

1. Referring to our conversations of Wednesday afternoon, 6 January, at which time you informed me of certain statements made to you by Mr.C. D. Jackson at or following the OCB meeting of the same day, I have looked into the questions of policy guidance and the status of our own planning in this field. I do not find that we have ever received definitive or authoritative policy guidance of the kind which would authorize us to proceed with the development of plans of a general character to either whip up or exploit uprisings which may occur in the satellites. The only policy guidance which tends to bear on this subject which I have been able to locate is as follows:

a. The guidance which we have received to “keep the pot simmering—but to avoid boiling it over”.

FILL IN APPROPRIATE REFERENCES HERE, INCLUDING EXCHANGES WITH HICOG, ETC., AS WELL AS REFERENCES TO MR. DULLES’ OWN EXCHANGES WITH TRUSCOTT ON THIS SUBJECT² (about the end of the summer).³

b. The “Winter of Unrest” paper,⁴ the salient features of which are

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c. The OCB instruction—already executed—to stockpile certain quantities of explosives and demolition materials at forward points in Europe. These materials have been so stockpiled in order to be available in case of need, but we have NO policy guidance governing the infiltration thereof either at the present time or under any specific set of circumstances in the future.

2. The fact that there appears to be a lack of understanding at higher governmental levels on this general subject is, I believe, a very serious matter. I think it is essential that we take steps promptly with a view to either

a. Disabusing the minds of those who believe we are all set to go, or are in the process of developing plans to touch off or support uprisings in the satellites; or

b. Getting some governmental policy direction in this field which will clarify our responsibilities and position.

3. Actually, it is my own understanding, which is shared by Dick Helms and by Tracy Barnes—with both of whom I have discussed the matter—that present governmental policy does not provide for or support the stirring up or the provision of significant quantities of support to satellite uprisings. I have never understood how it is possible to support from outside a satellite country a revolt or unrest of any kind which is not sufficiently strong, in and of itself, to unseat the government in power. This support can only be provided by armed military forces prepared to march to the active assistance of the revolutionists for the purpose of helping them complete their attempted coup and providing the strength necessary to consolidate and hold their gains. To the best of my knowledge there is no historical precedent for a successful revolt in a country where the weight of a large army of a foreign power, supporting the existing regime, is either in the country or standing on its borders ready to move. Nor is it my understanding that there is any US policy decision in being, nor any adequate US forces to back up any such decision, to move in and give support to an attempted revolt.

4. None of the foregoing is to say that we should not continue to encourage resistance to the Soviet satellite regimes in order to keep the pressure on and to retard the consolidation of Soviet controls in those areas. This is what I understand our policy directives to amount to at the present time, but it is one of the most difficult, unanswered questions of the day as to what US or Western policy would be in case of an attempted revolt occurring in any of the satellites within the foreseeable future and prior to the withdrawal of Soviet military power from the immediate or adjacent area. This is the question which has been posed to us repeatedly by European statesmen, of whom Ernst Reuter was one of the most succinct propounders. You may recall his repeated predictions that there would be further outbreaks of unrest, perhaps as early as the Spring of this year, in Eastern Germany, and he asked just what the West would propose to do in such event. He tended to answer his own question by speculating that we would probably be forced to stand idly by wringing our hands and seeing all possibility of future resistance go down in bloody liquidation unless we were able meanwhile, through diplomatic action of the most courageous and forceful character, to bring about a retraction of Soviet power.

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director for Operations, Job 79–01228A, Box 18. Secret. Drafted by Wisner and Helms. A note in the upper right corner reads, “Orig. To C/ w/note asking him to get together w/C/PPC and concert on rounding this out and filling in the gaps. CC sent to Ballmer w/similar message.”
2. Not found.
3. A handwritten note in the margin next to this paragraph reads, “NSC 174? [two illegible words] a balanced program.” NSC 174 is printed in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. VIII, pp. 110–127.
4. Not found.