Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community, 1950–1955

162. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner) to Director of Central Intelligence Dulles¹

Washington, October 7, 1953.

SUBJECT

• Comments of DD/P on Certain of the Proposed Additions and Deletions in the Revision of NSC 10/2 and NSC 10/5

1. I question the desirability of deleting in its entirety the language of old paragraph 2. of NSC 10/2² for the reason that by such complete deletion it seems to me that we deprive ourselves unnecessarily of the evidence that there has been a deliberate and conscious determination on the part of the NSC that covert operations and espionage and counter-espionage operations should be placed within the structure of the Central Intelligence Agency, and that the two should be correlated under the control of the Director of Central Intelligence. I agree that portions of the old language should be deleted for various reasons, since they are no longer applicable and may be undesirable. However, because of the lengthy and often heated philosophical and bureaucratic discussions about the desirability of having CIA made responsible for covert operations other than intelligence—and in view of the criticisms and attacks which are still being leveled against the Agency along this very line—it seems to me useful for us to be able to point to this language which is a clear and unequivocal indication of a determination of the long disputed issue by the NSC. My purposes in this regard could be accomplished by the following minor changes in the language of the paragraph. I would retain the first sentence as written, since this is a useful reconfirmation of the fact that the CIA is charged by the NSC with conducting espionage and counter-espionage operations abroad. (We are having enough trouble with other members of the intelligence community at the present time to render it undesirable for us to voluntarily sacrifice any language from an important Governmental document which either provides or confirms our authority in this particular field.) The last sentence could be changed to read as follows:

“It is therefore determined to be desirable that the responsibility for covert operations should be retained within the structure of the Central Intelligence Agency where they can best be correlated with espionage and counter-espionage operations under the control of the Director of Central Intelligence.”

2. Concerning the proposed deletion of paragraph 2. of NSC 10/5,³ I assume that this is deleted for the reason that the responsibility and authority of the OCB is sufficiently spelled out in the Executive Order 10483⁴ plus the present supplemental memorandum of 3 September 1953.⁵

3. I question the abandonment of the language of paragraph 3.c. of NSC 10/5. This language we fought hard to get into NSC 10/5 and felt at the time that we required it in order to receive the most satisfactory assurance available that we would have some help in lining up support for our activities and operations from the Departments of State and Defense. If this language is deleted in its entirety, we are thrown back on our own resources entirely and will have no tangible “legal” basis for levying demands upon the other departments and no approved mechanism for laying on such demands. If anything, further consideration should be given to the inclusion of the newly created IIA organization and FOA (formerly ECA–MSA) as departments or agencies upon which we should be in a position to call for such assistance and support as they may be capable of providing.

4. In paragraph 3.b. at the bottom of page 3 of Attachment A, I would recommend the insertion of the word “official” between the words “with” and “overt.” The present language dangles a bit since the overt activities referred to are not in any way specified.

5. In paragraph 4. I notice that the old language of NSC 10/2 is retained intact, and although the language is pretty good from our standpoint in its present form, it does not provide for situations such as Korea. The present language speaks of “active theaters of war where American forces are engaged.” It is my recollection that General Smith worked out language with the Pentagon and the Far East Command to cover the in-between situation and undeclared hostilities, and the language of the telegrams by which this agreement was arrived at and established might be profitably consulted in this connection.

6. For better clarification of the proposed new sentence at the end of paragraph 5. I would recommend the insertion of the words “conceived as” between the words “initially” and “covert”; and also the inclusion of a comma between the words “definitions” and “and responsibility”.

Frank G. Wisner

⁶

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency Office of the Deputy Director for Operations, Job 79–01228A. Top Secret; Security Information. Copies to COP/DD/P, C/PP, C/PPC, and C/PM.
2. Printed in Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 292. The comments referred to have not been further identified.
3. Document 90.
4. Document 157.
5. An apparent reference to Document 158, or Wisner may have been referring to the September 3 date when NSC Executive Secretary Lay transmitted the Executive order to the involved government officials for implementation.
6. Printed from a copy that indicates Wisner signed the original.