Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community, 1950–1955

149. Memorandum From William P. Bundy of the Office of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency to Director of Central Intelligence Dulles¹

Washington, May 26, 1953.

SUBJECT

• NSC 140/1, the Edwards Report²

1. Attached is the Edwards Report,³ just in case it should arise in the discussion of the Armaments question.⁴

2. For your present purposes, the following are worth noting:

a. The Report assumes a Soviet stockpile of 120 in mid-1953 and 300 in mid-1955, and proceeds from these figures with an allocation of these levels between: (1) SAC bases in US; (2) SAC bases overseas; (3) other US targets. The assumed stockpile levels are the median JAEIC figures, and the presumed allocations are regarded as logical attempts to inflict maximum damage on the US—they do not claim to be the allocation the Soviets would necessarily make. As General Edwards is pointing out in his separate letter, a need exists for a systematic study of Soviet strategy in the event of war.

b. General Webster of the JCS “neither concurs nor non-concurs.” This unfortunate position is the result of the fact that the original terms of reference called for considering overseas installations, with reference to their importance to defence of the continental US and to a US counteroffensive. This limitation was insisted on by General Bradley personally, in the original oral discussions with General Smith, specifically in order to avoid covering “every PT boat in the Adriatic.” It was the understanding of all who participated in the original laying out of the project that we would stick to the fewest possible bases abroad, and those would be related to the air effort. Unfortunately the word “air” was omitted from the written form, although the Edwards Committee orally agreed to interpret it in this way. Thus, the JCS working group got off and allocated a very small number of bombs (10, I believe) to non-air targets such as ports and major ground supply dumps. The Committee threw out this allocation and stuck to the air bases—and at the last minute General Webster took the stand that he could not sign the report! The actual difference is minimal, and should not really affect the substance. But there it is.

3. In its basic conclusions, the report fully supports statements that the Soviets could probably damage the US critically in the next few years. While the damage predicated for mid-1955 is less than some thought it would be, the curve of bombs-on-target is obviously rising between mid-1953 and mid-1955. The Committee did not consider the possible effect of the early warning McGill and Lincoln lines, since it was thought they could not be effective by mid-1955. Whether the curve can be levelled off by defensive measures is now in controversy.

WPB

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Job 80–R01440R, Box 3. Top Secret; Security Information; Special Security Handling. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that Dulles saw it on June 3.
2. Documentation on NSC 140/1, May 18, 1953, also known as the Edwards Report, is in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, pp. 328–349, 355–360, and 367–370.
3. Attached but not printed.
4. Reference may be to Allen Dulles’ participation in the May 27 NSC meeting which discussed armaments and American policy. A memorandum of that discussion is ibid., Part 2, pp. 1169–1174.