Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community, 1950–1955

141. Letter From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Hoover)¹

Washington, December 17, 1952.

My Dear Mr. Hoover:

On October 31 you formally advised this office of certain observations in connection with National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 9 (NSCID 9) as revised on October 24,² and you requested that they be brought to the attention of the appropriate members of the NSC. Those observations were, in effect, as follows:

1. The Attorney General, as Chief Legal Officer of the Government, should be a member of the Special Committee of the NSC whenever matters of interest to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) are before that Committee; and it should be made explicit that the FBI is to assist the Attorney General and the Special Committee when such matters are before the Committee.

2. The right granted to the United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB) “to investigate and study the standards and practices of its member agencies and departments in utilizing and protecting COMINT (communications intelligence) information” is too broad and may lead to abuse.

3. The authority granted to the Director, NSA “to have direct access to … any elements of the … civilian COMINT agencies on any matters of operational and technical control as may be necessary” also is too broad, as is the Director’s authority “to obtain such information and intelligence material from (those agencies) as he may require.”

With reference to the first point above, I am informed that it was the understanding when the Directive was drafted, that the Attorney General, under the established procedures of the NSC, would be a member of the Special Committee whenever matters of interest to the FBI were before that Committee; and that in such instances, the Attorney General could, as a matter of course, have the assistance of the Bureau. That understanding has been confirmed by the President when, in approving this Directive, he directed that this procedure is to be followed. NSCID 9 will be revised accordingly regarding the membership of the Special Committee.

In connection with your second and third points, the Secretaries of State and Defense acting as the Special Committee of the NSC for COMINT with the assistance of the Director of Central Intelligence, have directed me to advise you as follows.

It is understood that your concern regarding these latter two points is that they might result in encroachment upon or interference with the unique responsibilities of the FBI in the internal security field and that, consequently, you desire that the FBI be granted explicit exemption from those portions of the Directive.

With specific reference to your second point, paragraph 1f of the Directive states that the Board’s authority in the matter under discussion shall be binding only if it is adopted by the unanimous vote of the members of the Board. Furthermore, this paragraph prescribes that any recommendation of this sort approved by a majority, but not all, of the members of the Board shall automatically be transmitted by the Board to the Special Committee. No such action of the Board therefore can be binding on you unless you agree to it and, in the event of disagreement, the matter would be considered by the Special Committee, augmented by the Attorney General, as a matter of course and not as a matter of formal appeal on your part.

With specific reference to your third point, above, paragraph 2f of the Directive recognizes that elements of the Armed Forces and other agencies will require close COMINT support and that necessary direct operational control of specified COMINT facilities and resources will be delegated by the Director to the chiefs of other agencies. The types of operations contemplated by the FBI undoubtedly would fall within the meaning of a close support requirement for the accomplishment of your mission, in which case it would be possible for you to arrange with the Director, NSA, for the assignment to your Bureau of such facilities as are needed for this requirement.

In connection with the authority granted to the Director, NSA, to have direct access to any elements of civilian COMINT agencies and to obtain information and intelligence material from those agencies, such access is always established through mutually prescribed channels. However, the vital element of security would be eliminated if normal channels of interdepartmental exchange were prescribed for the conduct of COMINT business. On the other hand, all members of the Board would be handicapped severely if they could not participate laterally in all phases of the COMINT operation through mutually acceptable channels.

With reference to your reservation regarding the allocation of votes in USCIB, which was raised orally by your representatives in addition to the points made in your letter, this device was only designed as an administrative mechanism to provide a reasonable dividing line between civilian and non-civilian issues if such were to arise. In view of your reservation, however, the Special Committee has decided that the FBI representative should cast two votes at Board meetings—as is provided for the representative of the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence—and that the representative of the Secretary of Defense should also cast two votes. This would equalize your voting strength with that of the other civilian members and still provide the possible advantage of the reasonable dividing line. NSCID 9 will be amended accordingly.

It may be pertinent in conclusion to review the reasons for the existence of NSCID 9. That Directive was issued for the following reasons:

1. To set forth with exactitude the fundamental principle that the COMINT activities of the U.S. are a national responsibility rather than a matter of primary interest to any one of the departments or agencies concerned.

2. To delineate clearly the broad lines of policy which will govern this mutual assumption of responsibility.

3. To reconstitute USCIB in a manner which will assure an orderly, precise, secure and effective complex of COMINT activities.

4. To set up the most rapid and equitable system which not only would give full protection to the individual agencies and departments on the Board but also would provide final adjudication, as needed, by the Chief Executive.

The Directive, amended as indicated above, would appear to accomplish the foregoing as regards all agencies participating in COMINT activities. On the other hand, excepting the FBI from adherence to portions of the Directive would weaken the Directive to a point where it would have little meaning or value because the fundamental principle of its creation would have been destroyed. Since COMINT must be set apart from the normal operations of Government and a special mechanism created to handle COMINT activities, those activities must be coordinated by the bodies which have been created to handle them—namely, the Special Committee and USCIB—on a basis of mutual responsibility with equitable representation of all interested departments and agencies.

In summary, however, nothing in the directive should be construed to encroach upon or interfere with the unique responsibilities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the field of internal security. This will be made explicit by adding a paragraph to this effect in NSCID 9.

Sincerely yours,

James S. Lay, Jr.

³

1. Source: National Security Agency, Center for Cryptologic History, Series XVI, C.6 (Other Staff Papers). Top Secret; Security Information. Ellipsis in the original.
2. See Document 132. Hoover’s comments have not been found.
3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.