At the request of the Director of Central Intelligence, his memorandum
outlining the procedures which the Psychological Strategy Board has
agreed to follow in carrying out its responsibilities under NSC 10/5,2 is transmitted herewith for the
information of the statutory members of the Council.
Annex
Washington, October 30, 1952.
Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence
Smith to the Members of
the Psychological Strategy Board3
SUBJECT
- Procedure for NSC 10/5
Matters
In the field of unconventional and psychological operations the
Central Intelligence Agency is an executive and operating agency
charged with carrying out projects in support of national policies.
These projects include political and paramilitary operations, the
general desirability of which have been determined by the senior
departments of the Executive Branch of the Government. As an
operating agent for these departments, CIA requires more than policy guidance. The programs
and major projects which it proposes to undertake in furthering
national policy should be carefully scrutinized before final
approval, and the net value of the operations themselves should be
periodically assessed by some authority outside the Agency, but
representative both of it and of the interested executive
departments. The mounting cost of these operations makes such prior
assessment and continuous audit a matter of great urgency.
Under the existing mechanism for providing policy guidance and
program approval, the Agency has continued in the position of having
to assume too much responsibility and authority. While in the field
of cold war both vision and imagination are essential, yet these
qualities must be controlled by selective judgment of a detached,
objective authority.
It is inevitable that cold war operations will continue over a long
period of time. They involve activities which do not lend themselves
to precise evaluation and it is impossible to judge in absolute
terms the successes or failures of particular programs. Unlike
military operations which require the continuous and increasing
application of force toward an abrupt and conclusive ending,
activities of this type require a
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fluctuating effort with no clear termination
in prospect. For this reason, it is all the more important that they
should not be undertaken unless all concerned are satisfied as to
their desirability.
The responsibilities in their respective departments of the
individuals who make up the PSB, and
the demands made upon their time, are such as to preclude their
giving detailed study, analysis and review to the covert operations
of CIA. There is needed a method by
which these persons can depend, in the exercise of their
responsibilities as members of PSB,
on the recommendations of qualified subordinates, reserving their
personal detailed consideration for those cases and matters which,
by their nature, require their direct attention.
Here I have in mind the provision of a few highly qualified officers
upon whom the principals could rely completely as their technical
advisers, and whom their respective departments would accept in that
status. It would be essential that these selected officers have
competence to speak with the greatest degree of authority compatible
with the individual responsibilities of the members of the PSB on the various matters to be
considered, both in their capacity as advisers and staff officers of
the three principals and as representatives of the departments from
which they are seconded. Time would be lost and insecurity would
result from formal reference of cold war projects to the routine
machinery of the major departments, since this would have the
inevitable result of allowing these matters to get down into the
depths of departmental staffs and to be fought over and widely
discussed by a large number of relatively junior officials. Hence,
the selected staff officers would have to be held responsible by the
principals for the necessary amount of coordinating and checking
within their departments.
The Board set up a Panel in its paper dated February 20, 1952,
subject: “Procedure for Handling 10/5 Matters in PSB”.4 It is not equipped
nor staffed for prompt and decisive action. Panels of this size and
nature tend to be slowed down by procedural matters, and their
energy dissipated.
I believe a smaller group consisting of one representative from each
of the Departments of State and Defense and CIA, and with the Director of PSB as permanent chairman, can produce the results we
desire, provided these representatives have the work of this group
to which they are assigned as their primary responsibility, to take
priority over any other work even, if necessary, to the exclusion of
other duties. I believe the Joint Chiefs of Staff should provide an
advisor to this Group and the Departments and Agency should furnish
aides and clerical assistance as may be necessary.
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I would stress to each Member of the Board the importance of
selecting a high-quality representative for this Group.
Representatives on the present Panel are excellent, but unhappily
will not be available to us much longer. Replacements must be found
of similar stature, and who will have the complete confidence of
their respective departments and agency. Needless to say, they
require full support from the very top. The success of this project
will depend upon the persons selected by us.
Specifically, I recommend the Board amend its previous decisions in
this field and follow the procedure set forth below except in such
cases as may be otherwise provided by the President.
- (1)
- Each Board member should designate as a member of a reviewing
group a senior representative from his department or agency who
will be competent to represent such member in the review of
NSC 10/5 programs and
projects and to make recommendations thereon. When designated,
such individual should be fully empowered to obtain quick,
responsive and effective action on any such program and project
from any level of his department. The work incident to his
assignment to this group should have priority over any other
work so that he will be sufficiently free of other duties to
give all the time necessary for such review. In the case of the
Department of Defense, a general or flag officer representative
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should also be designated as
military adviser to the reviewing group.
- (2)
- The Director of PSB should
chair the reviewing group.
- (3)
- The reviewing group should not only review NSC 10/5 programs and major
projects in the first instance and recommend their approval or
disapproval either in whole or in part, but should also
periodically review such programs and projects and recommend
whether they are to be continued or discontinued, speeded or
slowed, increased or decreased.
- (4)
- The reviewing group should propose to the PSB such amendments to the present
10/5 Procedure as will implement the above recommendations, and
thereafter propose to the PSB
any further procedures which will enable the group efficiently
to expedite its review responsibility.
- (5)
- Final action in each case will be taken by the PSB.
If this procedure is concurred in, I recommend that it be brought
formally to the notice of the National Security Council as the
method which will be followed by the Board in carrying out its
responsibilities under NSC 10/5.
