Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community, 1950–1955

124. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Bruce) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)¹

Washington, July 31, 1952.

SUBJECT

• Fifth Progress Report on NSC 59/1, “The Foreign Information Program and Psychological Warfare Planning”²

1. NSC 59/1 was approved as governmental policy on March 10, 1950. It is requested that this progress report covering the period April 15–July 31, 1952, of activities untaken in implementation of NSC 59/1 be circulated to the members of the Council for their information. In accordance with the provisions of the third paragraph of the President’s directive of April 4, 1951,³ a copy of this report is being referred to the Psychological Strategy Board for use in its evaluation of the national psychological effort.

2. The organization referred to in NSC 59/1 has been designated The Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee (POC).⁴ It will be referred to in this report as “the Committee.”

3. This report describes only those foreign information operations and plans which, being interdepartmental in nature, were coordinated through the Committee.

4. Under the Chairmanship of the Administrator, the International Information Administration, the following are regularly represented at the weekly meetings of the Committee: Secretary of Defense, the Defense Department Office of Information, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Mutual Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, Department of State, the Army, Navy and Air Force chiefs of psychological warfare and the Psychological Strategy Board staff. In accordance with the terms of the President’s directive of April 4, 1951, which among other things authorized the Secretary of State to effect readjustments in the organization established under NSC 59/1, the POC secretariat was transformed into a full time interdepartmental planning staff.

5. During the period covered by this report the Committee concentrated its attention on psychological problems connected with the Korean situation, particularly with respect to the prisoner of war issue, both as regards the physical control of prisoners of the United Nations Command and also as regards the prisoner issue in the truce negotiations. The recommendations of the Committee were designed to contribute to the ability of the UN Command to gain and maintain the psychological initiative in Korea. However, our psychological efforts in Korea were directed toward the achievement of the principal UN aim in Korea—the conclusion of an armistice.

6. Ascertaining that the United Nations Command was in a position of serious disadvantage in handling the problems described above, the Committee took prompt action resulting in the following:

a. An on-the-scene survey of psychological warfare support arrangements in Japan and Korea by a team comprised of the Administrator, the International Information Administration, Dept. of State; the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Department of the Army; and the Policy Advisor, International Broadcasting Service, Department of State.

b. The establishment in Washington on June 12 of a watch committee, with representation from the Departments of Defense and State and the Central Intelligence Agency, whose purpose is to supply a daily summary of news, editorials and public comments originating in the U.S. and foreign countries, both Communist and non-Communist, concerning the Korean situation, and to provide suggestions, information and advice on psychological matters for fast transmission to Tokyo, Pusan and Panmunjom.

c. The establishment of a corresponding unit within FECOM comprised of military, psychological warfare and public information experts whose function is to inform FECOM of current world wide public reaction to developments in Korea, and to provide, in quantity, material and suggestions which may be useful in advancing the UNC propaganda position relative to Korea.

d. The preparation of an action plan to provide for such activities as the following:

1. Exploitation of signed-in-blood petitions of UNC-held prisoners resisting repatriation;

2. Stockpiling, for possible later use, recorded and press interviews with prisoners of war, and motion pictures of the prisoner-screening process;

3. Exploitation of UNC information and education work among prisoners of war;

4. Exploitation of rehabilitation work in South Korea.

7. Bacteriological Warfare Charges

The Committee gave considerable attention to Communist charges concerning bacteriological warfare in Korea. The Committee audited the activities of a working group comprised of representatives of the Departments of Defense and State and the Central Intelligence Agency, under State leadership for the purpose of developing psychological plans for: (1) countering the Communist charges, and (2) developing when possible new measures which would be designed to seize and maintain the propaganda initiative. The group is effectively coordinating the efforts of the agencies concerned with handling the problem.

8. Troop Acceptance in Japan

The Committee provided interdepartmental coordination of a plan for developing an attitude of acceptance and an active sense of responsibility on the part of the Japanese Government and people with regard to the mission of the United States armed forces stationed in and about Japan as a consequence of the United States–Japan Security Treaty.

9. X-Day Planning

The Committee has continued to monitor the planning of its X-Day Working Group, which is preparing complete contingency plans for overt psychological operations during the initial stages of general hostilities. When completed and approved by the Committee the plans will be forwarded to the Psychological Strategy Board.

10. Yugoslav Plan

The Committee noted and referred to the staff of the Psychological Strategy Board for further development a working paper on maintenance of Yugoslav independence from Soviet domination.

11. Review of POC Business

The committee has undertaken an extensive review of unfinished POC business and is currently completing action on such business. The committee also is reviewing past POC recommendations and is monitoring the implementation of approved projects.

12. POC Recommendation Regarding Communist Military Buildup in Korea

The POC recommended that there be a full public exposition of the facts on the nature and extent of the Communist military buildup in Korea during the course of the truce negotiations. As a result of POC’s recommendation appropriate statements were issued by the UN Command, by the British and by other governments having forces in Korea.

David Bruce

⁵

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, no label, Box 115. Top Secret; Security Information. Lay circulated the report to NSC members under cover of a July 31 memorandum. (Ibid.)
2. For NSC 59/1, See Document 2.
3. See Document 60.
4. See Document 74.
5. Printed from a copy that indicates Bruce signed the original.