Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community, 1950–1955

121. Memorandum From the Director of the Armed Forces Security Agency (Canine) to Secretary of Defense Lovett¹

Washington, July 8, 1952.

SUBJECT

• Brownell Committee Report²

REFERENCE

• Your Memorandum of 23 June 1952³

1. After a careful study of the report of the Brownell Committee, I have concluded that it presents a fair and essentially accurate picture of the history and development of COMINT and of its present functioning. I have followed closely the work of the Committee throughout their investigation and have been greatly impressed with their objective approach to and deep penetration of the extremely complicated problem which confronted them. It is my opinion that they have reached eminently sound conclusions.

2. In those portions of the report containing historical and other background information, there are a few errors in fact, and also certain statements which may convey erroneous impressions. While these appear to have had no significant effect on the Committee’s obviously thorough understanding of the essentials involved, and their whole background, it is desirable that certain of these errors be set straight for the record; this is done in inclosure 1.⁴

3. In my opinion the organization of COMINT activities proposed by the Brownell Committee is both workable and practical at all three levels, subject to the comment given below. It would constitute an extension on a joint basis of the vertical principle of organization which, as the Committee points out, now exists in each of the three Armed Services separately. I regard as particularly important the degree of authority which the Committee proposes to vest in the Director of AFSA, an authority which, for the first time since the creation of the Agency, will be commensurate with his responsibilities.

4. It is noted that the Committee apparently intends that the responsibilities of the Director of AFSA be extended in the Communication Security field to embrace the production and protection of the codes and ciphers of the entire U.S. Government, rather than merely the Department of Defense as is now the case. I consider such an extension of jurisdiction in the Communication Security field to be desirable. However, the Committee has not seen fit to elaborate upon this proposal and, in fact, has included in its report very little comment on the problems involved. Moreover, the proposed directive contains no specific provisions as to organization above, within, or below AFSA for the purpose of conducting communication security activities on a national basis. In this connection it is desirable to invite to your attention two facts:

a. There is in existence an Executive Order dated 3 July 1945,⁵ which created a National Cryptographic Security Board charged with responsibility for the efficient coordination and supervision of all cryptographic systems and related procedures of the Federal departments and agencies. This Board was established as a body apart from the then existing Communication Intelligence Board for the reason that different interests were involved.

b. The United States Communication Intelligence Board (USCIB) has considered at some length the advisability of extending its responsibilities to include communication security matters but has thus far failed to reach agreement.

In view of the foregoing facts, I believe that further study is required to determine the best national structure for communication security activities. Accordingly, the comments and proposed changes set forth herein have to do with COMINT activities only. I will have a separate study made of the communication security problem with a view toward preparing a separate directive. It is believed advisable to treat the two categories separately, and this can be done without detriment to either. An attempt to combine the two in a single directive would probably introduce complications which could result in delaying implementation of the Committee’s clear-cut recommendations on COMINT.

5. With respect to the latter recommendations, the following comment is submitted in response to paragraphs 3 and 4 of your memorandum:

a. Recommendations as to Changes in Organization Above AFSA

(1) Retention in USCIB of the principle of decision and action on certain matters by unanimous agreement would serve to perpetuate one of the chief difficulties which according to the Committee now hamper USCIB, since the matters where this would apply are essentially those to which the Board has confined its attention in the past. This would particularly affect the protection of COMINT sources. The net result would be to preserve for each Department and Agency virtual autonomy in the application of COMINT security measures, despite the fact that the maintenance of such security is vital to all. It is true that the right of appeal to higher authority is provided for in the proposed Board procedures. Nevertheless, this would place the burden of such appeal on the majority, where it would be reluctantly exercised, whereas in matters involving the common interest the burden of obtaining exception should rest on the minority. Extension of the majority-rule principle to all of the Board’s decisions and actions would not only accomplish the latter but would also simplify the Board’s procedures. Certainly it would appear desirable to extend this rule at least to security matters.

(2) Paragraph d. (5) of the proposed Presidential Memorandum provides for certain special consideration in matters of appeal which involve the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense as Executive Agent. These responsibilities pertain to those matters which fall within the jurisdiction of the Director of AFSA. The propriety of according this consideration to appeals made by the representative of the Secretary of Defense is appreciated; nevertheless, since the Director of AFSA is also directly under the Secretary and is the individual immediately responsible, it would appear a less complicated arrangement to have the Director rather than the representative of the Secretary of Defense, given this special consideration in appeals. Accordingly, it is suggested that consideration be given to the advisability of this change.

(3) Experience has demonstrated that the special nature of COMINT activities requires that they be treated in all respects as being outside the framework of other or general intelligence activities. If this is not done the protection of COMINT sources is seriously jeopardized. In recognition of this fact, the current charter of USCIB (see paragraphs 6 and 8 of National Security Council Intelligence Directive #9)⁶ contains certain provisions which I strongly urge be carried over into the new directive.

b. Recommendations as to Organization within AFSA

(1) The introductory statement to this section of the Committee’s conclusions and recommendations appears to imply that there are serious weaknesses in the present organizational structure of AFSA. I agree in general with what are apparently intended to be supporting comments of the Committee, but it strikes me that these comments are not, in fact, criticisms of structure but are remarks pertaining to personnel policies applicable to AFSA. They actually deal with incumbency of the Directorship and other key positions, the alleged high rate of turnover of personnel, and various other personnel problems. I assume therefore, that the Committee found no basic faults in the AFSA structure as such.

(2) With regard to the recommendation that the Director should have a civilian chief technical assistant who would have under him all research and development in the cryptanalytic field, it is to be noted that the Chief of the Office of Research and Development, one of the three principal subdivisions of AFSA, has been a civilian since January 1952. As a result of recommendations of the Special Cryptologic Advisory Group (SCAG) a plan for improving the organization of these activities is now in the process of development with the assistance of SCAG members.

(3) It is noted that paragraph 2. a. of the Committee’s proposed Presidential Memorandum excludes from the meaning of COMINT and the mission of AFSA the evaluation and dissemination of information obtained from intercepted communications, and its synthesis with information from other sources. It is noted further that paragraph 2. c. (2) of the same memorandum states that the responsibility assigned to the Director of AFSA does not contravene the responsibilities of the departments and agencies in respect to these same functions. Whereas the former statement is positively preclusive, the latter appears to afford the Director some freedom of action provided he does not interfere with the legitimate work of other agencies. Some latitude in this is essential for technical purposes, especially in the field of traffic analysis. It is, therefore, recommended that the former statement be omitted and the latter be retained, with a slight modification, as a separate and final provision of the proposed memorandum.

c. Recommendations as to Changes in Organization Below the AFSA Level (In the Service COMINT Organizations)

(1) While the meaning of “COMINT activities” as used in Public Law 513 is probably clear from the context of that Law it may be well to define more specifically the scope of the term for the purposes of the proposed directive. When read out of context, the definition of Communication Intelligence contained in the Law could be interpreted to include postal censorship and the monitoring and processing of foreign press and propaganda broadcasts. It is believed advisable to make it clear that such activities are not to be included under the provisions of the new directive.

6. Attached hereto as inclosure 2⁷ is a suggested redraft of the proposed Presidential Memorandum for the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. In addition to certain substantive changes which are recommended on the basis of the foregoing comment, there is some rearrangement of the section which deals with the directive to USCIB. This rearrangement is considered advisable because of the recommended change in Board procedure. I consider that the proposed executive memorandum contains no information of classification higher than Secret, and have reclassified the proposed revision of Exhibit K accordingly.

Ralph J. Canine

⁸
Major General, US Army

1. Source: National Security Agency, Center for Cryptologic History, Series V, F.7.12. Top Secret; Security Information.
2. See Document 99.
3. Not found.
4. Not printed.
5. Not found.
6. See Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 435.
7. Not printed.
8. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.