Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community, 1950–1955

113. Memorandum by the Director of Naval Intelligence (Johnson)¹

Washington, June 3, 1952.

ONI Instruction 003820.36A

SUBJECT

• Exploitation of maritime sources for intelligence purposes

1. Purpose. This instruction outlines an agreement between the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Agency concerning the exploitation of maritime sources for intelligence purposes.²

2. Cancellation. ONI Instruction 003820.36³ is cancelled and superseded by this instruction.

3. Background. The National Security Council places the responsibility for the collection of foreign intelligence from domestic sources with the Central Intelligence Agency. Because of the extensive naval interest in maritime matters, and the capabilities of the DIOs in exploiting this field, a mutually satisfactory agreement has been reached by ONI and CIA.

4. Procedure.

a. Counter-Intelligence and Security. The exploitation of maritime Sources, including but not limited to, masters, officers, crews, operators, owners and agents for counter-intelligence and security purposes, is the responsibility of the District Intelligence Officers without prior clearance or coordination with CIA.

b. Foreign Intelligence, Owners, Operators and Agents. Exploitation of owners, operators and agents for the purposes of foreign intelligence is the primary responsibility of CIA. If deemed advisable however, and subject to prior coordination with the CIA field office, these sources may be exploited for foreign intelligence purposes by the DIOs. Such interviews will be arranged, and at his option participated in, by the cognizant field representative of CIA. Primary responsibility of the CIA in this field does not restrict or affect in any way the responsibility of the DIOs under paragraph 4a of this instruction.

c. Foreign Intelligence, Masters, Officers and Crews. The exploitation of masters, officers and crews of merchant vessels for foreign intelligence purposes is the responsibility of the DIOs. Direct access by CIA to such sources, in exceptional cases, is not precluded by this agreement; however such special interviews will be arranged by the DIOs.

d. Dissemination.

(1) Foreign Positive Intelligence. Foreign positive intelligence obtained by DIOs from maritime sources, either afloat or ashore, shall be made available to the CIA field office for ultimate appropriate dissemination by CIA in Washington. The DIOs shall simultaneously submit reports of such intelligence to ONI for dissemination within the Naval establishment. Every effort will be made to secure duplicate copies of enclosures, in order that the CIA field office and the DIO may each forward a copy to Washington. In the event that only a single copy of enclosures is available, and reproduction is impracticable, they shall be forwarded to CIA.

(2) Counter-Intelligence. All counter intelligence and information secured under the SOMM plan⁴ will be forwarded to ONI for analysis and dissemination. No lateral distribution of such reports will be made to CIA field offices by the DIOs.

e. Sources.

(1) Counter-Intelligence. The names of counter-intelligence informants shall not be disclosed to CIA.

(2) Foreign Intelligence Sources. The names of sources furnishing foreign intelligence exclusively, whether connected with the maritime field or not, will be furnished to CIA field offices.

(3) Overlapping Sources. It is considered probable that some maritime sources, as listed in paragraph 4c of this instruction, will also be classified by the DIOs as counter-intelligence informants or SOMM plan participants. The release of names of such sources to the CIA field office is subject to the discretion of the DIO. Sufficient source description will be furnished the CIA field office to obviate false confirmation, but extreme care is urged in such disclosure that sensitive sources supplying both types of information are not jeopardized.

f. Requirements. IAC requirements for foreign intelligence from sources in paragraph 4c of this instruction will be coordinated by CIA, as necessary. General Navy requirements covering the exploitation of these sources are presently in the hands of the DIOs, and further specific requirements will be furnished from time to time by ONI. DIOs will make every effort to alert the pertinent CIA field office to the arrival of ships from high priority areas, or of unusual foreign intelligence potential. In such cases a CIA representative may furnish interagency requirements or participate in the interview if necessary.

g. DIO–CIA Field Office Relationship. It is manifestly impossible to exactly delimit all rights, responsibilities or privileges under an interagency agreement, such as this one, developed within the framework of NSCID No. 7.⁵ It is possible, however, to fashion such an agreement into an effective instrument for the complete intelligence exploitation of the maritime field. The catalyst required is an amicable working relationship between the DIOs and the CIA field offices, which can only be based upon a sympathetic understanding of each other’s problems and a desire to cooperate in a common effort. District Intelligence Officers are directed to make every effort consistent with existing directives to formulate such a working relationship at the earliest moment, and resolve such local problems as arise in connection with this agreement.

R. F. Stout

⁶

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 95–G00278R, Box 1, Folder 17. Secret; Security Information. The memorandum was sent to “Distribution List F28 (less DIC–17ND),” which has not been identified.
2. Known as the “Salt Water Agreement.”
3. Not found.
4. Not further identified.
5. See Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 427.
6. Printed from a copy that bears the typed signature of Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence Stout who signed for Johnson.