Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community, 1950–1955

106. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner) to Director of Central Intelligence Smith and the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles)¹

Washington, April 10, 1952.

SUBJECT

• United States Policies on Support for Anti-Communist Chinese Forces

1. This memorandum is prepared for the information and use of the Director and the Deputy Director only. It summarizes the discussion which took place at the JCS Conference Room at 11:00 a.m. Wednesday, 9 April 1952. The State Department was represented by Messrs. Bohlen, Nitze, Allison and Ferguson. The JCS was represented by General Bradley, Admiral Fechteler, General Twining, General Hull and General Cabell. The Department of Defense was represented by Mr. Nash, and Mr. Lay was present for the NSC staff. Messrs. Dulles and Wisner represented CIA.

2. The stated subject matter of the meeting was the JCS paper to the NSC on Formosa,² although General Bradley pointed out that the subject matter was much broader and stemmed from the Director’s December letter to the Secretary of Defense.³ The composition of the meeting had been determined at the NSC meeting of the preceding week, at the conclusion of which it had been decided that there would be a direct discussion of the policy questions raised by the JCS paper as between State, Defense, JCS and CIA, as a preliminary to a possible NSC staff study of the matter. CIA had been included because of the matter having been originally raised by the Director’s letter and also because of the importance of the policy review to large and significant CIA operations in the area concerned.

3. Mr. Bohlen began for State by giving a brief résumé of our present policy with respect to Formosa and the Chinese Nationalists, which is largely spelled out in NSC 48/5.⁴ Following this, Mr. Bohlen said that he would like to take up the points in the JCS paper of 22 March 1952, one by one, in order to clarify certain doubts which the State Department had as to the significance and underlying meaning of these points. It was not clear to the Department whether the paper refers to what the policy should be on the assumption of a truce in Korea, or whether it proposed modifications of the existing policy either at the present time or on the basis of some other assumption. He asked whether subparagraph (c) meant that the JCS were proposing the lifting of restrictions now in order to allow the Chinese Nationalists to attack the mainland.

4. Admiral Fechteler replied that the meaning of this paragraph is that we should not close the door to movements westward from Formosa. It did not mean that the ban against westward movements should be lifted immediately, but only if conditions should warrant this in the light of developing circumstances.

5. Mr. Nitze replied that this was a very helpful clarification and one quite satisfactory to State. The Department had been concerned lest this mean a recommendation for an overt policy change at the present time—since such a policy change would be interpreted world-wide as a full engagement of U.S. power and prestige in the destruction of the Chinese Communist regime on the mainland.

6. Admiral Fechteler asked what the situation would be if the Chinese Nationalists should attempt to launch raids against the mainland from Formosa now. What would we do; would we try to stop this; and if so, by what means would we seek to stop it—by diplomatic or by military means? Messrs. Allison and Nitze replied that they regarded this as an academic question at the present time, since the Nationalists are not in a position to launch significant landings against the mainland without our help.

7. General Bradley asked Mr. Dulles whether CIA operations have suffered or are suffering from the existing policy, which prohibits movements east or west, and if so, what changes we consider necessary in order to remove the interferences.

8. [11 lines not declassified] (At a later point in the discussion, Mr. Dulles raised the question as to whether the present policy means that the Nationalists are prevented from reinforcing the offshore islands from Formosa. It was the unanimous response that the present policy does not prohibit the reinforcement or re-supply of the offshore islands from Formosa, since the policy is restrictive only against attacks upon the China mainland. It was further stated that what happens as between the offshore islands and the mainland is not affected by the present policy and that it need not be a concern of this Government.)

9. Mr. Nitze stated with respect to subparagraph (c) that State could accept the explanation and interpretation given by Admiral Fechteler provided its meaning were clearly spelled out as requiring a re-examination of all of the circumstances which might be applicable at the appropriate moment in connection with a determination of whether the circumstances might warrant a lifting of the ban on movement westward.

10. General Hull stated that he considered the question somewhat more fundamental and not so easy to dismiss. The existence of the westward ban implies that we have a substantially negative policy on the use of present and potential resources on Formosa. The question is, “Do we build up or don’t we?” If there is to be a build-up, there must be at the very least a philosophy understood and accepted at the top levels of this Government that we are building toward a positive or affirmative exploitation of the Formosa potential. Lacking this philosophy, Formosa will simply fail to receive the priorities and hence won’t get the stuff. The other competitive demands for our military aid will eat up all of the matériel, and Formosa will get nothing.

11. Mr. Nitze thought the present language of NSC 48/5 is both broad enough and sufficiently flexible to permit a build-up not only for defensive purposes but also for possible offensive purposes. He quoted portions of the language of this paper in support of his point.

12. Mr. Bohlen said he was inclined to agree with General Hull’s position that the language could be amended slightly to give it a more positive ring, provided that it was clearly understood that we would not tell the Chinese Nationalists that we were changing the policy and undertaking the support of a build-up for offensive purposes. He explained that the Chinese Nationalists would surely exploit any such statement or information on a world-wide basis with grave embarrassment to our over-all position and at a time when it is still difficult to foresee what future developments will bring.

13. Mr. Dulles said that he was troubled about the fact that this is the only spot in the world where we are using our own forces to protect the Communists. Mr. Bohlen replied that this was perhaps theoretically so, but he said that we would no doubt move to restrain any others over whom we have influence if we thought they were likely to launch overt aggressive attacks against the USSR or the satellites. He said, moreover, the “protection of the Communists” is at this time illusory since there is nothing at the moment to protect the Chinese Communists from.

14. General Hull in reply to a question from Mr. Allison stated that the JCS did not deem it within the realm of possibility to build up the Chinese Nationalists to the point where they could successfully undertake an invasion of the Chinese mainland without extensive military assistance from us. He said, “If they go back, we have got to put them back.”

15. Reverting to an earlier point in the conversation, Mr. Allison said that it might clarify the situation somewhat if we would state now that if there should be an overt Communist attack against Southeast Asia, we would employ the Chinese Nationalist potential against Hainan or such other places as might be most effectively attacked by these forces.

16. General Hull said this would be helpful. General Bradley said that this last point tended to confuse him somewhat. He was trying to sort out in his mind the difference between the paper now under consideration and discussions of another paper relating to what actions we would take in the event of an attack by the Chinese Communists against Southeast Asia. He reminded the meeting that the present discussion grew out of and had been touched off by General Smith’s letter, which had taken the line that if we are going to do anything about Formosa, time is of the essence.

17. Mr. Dulles stated that this was as he understood it to be. General Smith’s letter had clearly pointed up the aspect of wasting assets and the disintegration of the situation on Formosa from both a military and political standpoint. There are disquieting reports about the political and military situation on Formosa—reports of sagging morale and other things which open up alarming possibilities as to what may happen if we do not firm up our policy for that area and take appropriate action under the new policy.

18. General Bradley said that this obviously raises the entire question of the validity of our support to Formosa. Why should we be spending several hundreds of millions of dollars and pouring in military supplies and equipment if we are not willing to take the additional steps necessary to insure against a collapse. We are faced with several distasteful conclusions:

a. As matters now stand, we are allowing a useful potential to waste away and are merely throwing good money after bad.

b. It would appear that our present methods cannot be expected to unseat the Communist regime, and that the adoption of the additional military measures to accomplish this result at this time would risk our involvement in a general war, at least against China, and possibly Russia as well.

c. If we withhold or withdraw our aid now, Formosa will collapse in short order.

With respect to this latter point, General Bradley said that the JCS has repeatedly taken the position that the loss of Formosa would be highly damaging to our over-all strategic position, but that this was not sufficiently critical to warrant our putting in U.S. forces to hold Formosa.

19. Mr. Nash stated that the decision of the NSC had, as he understood it, been to review the entire situation and not just one or two isolated features of it. He proposed that a working group comprised of State, Defense, JCS, CIA and NSC representatives should immediately address itself to the broader task.

20. Mr. Bohlen agreed that this was the problem. He said there should be an immediate study of everything that can be done to solidify and stabilize the situation on Formosa.

21. General Bradley also agreed and added that he would like to adopt Mr. Bohlen’s proposal of a slight modification of the pertinent language of NSC 48/5. He also said that he thought subparagraphs (d) and (e) of the JCS paper of 22 March represent existing policy and therefore raise no new questions.

22. Mr. Bohlen remarked that General Chase⁵ had said when he was here that the average age of the Chinese Nationalist forces on Formosa was some four years younger than the average age of the Division which he had led in the invasion of the Philippines. (Mr. Dulles requested the undersigned to check this point.)

23. Messrs. Nash and Lay reaffirmed Mr. Nash’s earlier recommendation that a five-ply working group needs to study the problem in the broad context of General Smith’s letter to the Secretary of Defense.

24. Just at the conclusion of the discussion, Mr. Dulles stated that CIA would be very glad to continue its participation in this examination of the problem, not only because of what we might be able to contribute from the intelligence standpoint but also because of the large operational stake which we have in the outcome of the deliberation. He reminded General Bradley that CIA had no wish to continue the conduct of such large-scale operations and that General Smith had pointed this out repeatedly and had offered to divest himself of this responsibility if only the JCS or someone else would pick it up. These remarks prompted a ripple of polite laughter around the table, and General Bradley stated (with a smile and a bow towards Mr. Dulles) that he saw no reason to revise the present situation or alter the responsibilities as they now stand.

Frank G. Wisner

⁶

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director for Operations, Job 79–01228A, Box 11. Top Secret; Security Information; Eyes Only.
2. Dated March 22; see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. XIV, Part 1, pp. 20–21.
3. Document 98.
4. For NSC 48/5, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. VI, pp. 33–63.
5. Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Formosa.
6. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.