894A.24/12–649
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Sprouse)
| Participants: | H. A. Graves, Counselor, British Embassy |
| Livingston T. Merchant, FE | |
| Philip D. Sprouse, CA |
Mr. Graves called this afternoon at his request and after handing Mr. Merchant the attached memorandum regarding Formosa, dated December 6, 1949,63 explained that the Foreign Office had instructed the Ambassador64 to take up with the Secretary of State certain questions relating to Formosa. He said that since the Ambassador was out of town temporarily and would not return for a day or two he was bringing this matter to the Department’s attention. Mr. Graves requested that the Secretary be informed of the British action in this matter inasmuch as the British Ambassador hoped to call on the Secretary within the next few days.
Mr. Graves briefly reviewed the concern previously expressed by the British Government, both in Washington and in London, regarding provision of military supplies to the National Government and the danger that these supplies would eventually fall into Chinese Communist hands. He pointed out that the British were particularly concerned with the shipment of tanks and planes for Formosa and expressed apprehension lest the Chinese Communists might eventually be in a position to use such equipment against Hong Kong and/or [Page 436] French Indochina. Mr. Graves recalled that Mr. Bevin and Mr. Schuman65 had expressed their concern along these lines to the Secretary at Paris in November but that he did not know what reply the Secretary had made. He said that the British Government was interested in knowing whether the U.S. Government was disposed to halt the shipment of military materiel to Formosa at this time and what the views of the U.S. were regarding Formosa, what information regarding U.S. policy toward Formosa could be told to the British Government and what the U.S. Government expected to do about Formosa.
Mr. Merchant briefly reviewed current U.S. policy toward Formosa. He said, emphasizing he was speaking in the strictest confidence, that the highest U.S. military authorities after studying the strategic importance of Formosa had reached the conclusion that U.S. armed forces should not be employed for the defense of the island. Mr. Merchant continued that about a month ago we had authorized the U.S. Consul General at Taipei to approach the Generalissimo and make clear to him that the U.S. Government had no intention of using its armed forces for the defense of the island. This step had been taken in an effort to impress upon the Generalissimo and his associates the need for energetic efforts on their own part if they were to be successful in denying the island to the Chinese Communists. Mr. Merchant pointed out it was the U.S. Government’s belief that sufficient military, economic and financial resources were available on the island to the Chinese Government to enable it to make a successful defense of Formosa and that the prime requisite was the will to stand off the Communists. In answer to Mr. Graves’ query whether the U.S. Government’s attitude regarding Formosa now differed from that expressed to Mr. Dening in September, when the latter was in Washington, Mr. Merchant replied that under existing circumstances it seemed likely the Chinese Communists would eventually be able to take over the island but that there was a hope that the Nationalists might so exert themselves as to prevent such an eventuality. Mr. Sprouse explained that it was the U.S. Government’s view that the only guarantee of the denial of the island to the Chinese Communists lay in U.S. military occupation of Formosa, He asked whether the British Government had any suggestions as to how this might be accomplished and what its views were with regard to Formosa. Mr. Graves replied the British Government’s views had just been stated and that the British Government believed, as did the U.S. Government, that all the essential ingredients for successful defense of [Page 437] the island were available to the Chinese Government. He added it was the British view, however, that the Communists would probably gain possession of the island within the next few months.
With respect to the furnishing of military materiel to the Chinese Government on Formosa, Mr. Merchant explained that the materiel now going forward to Formosa consisted of shipments under the $125 Million Grants as well as supplies purchased by the Chinese with their own funds. He further stated that this was a relatively small amount, particularly with respect to planes, compared to the materiel already on the island. When Mr. Graves expressed the opinion that it seemed paradoxical to continue shipments of military materiel when it was believed that the Chinese Communists would eventually capture the island, Mr. Merchant pointed out that the U.S. Government desired to take all feasible and practicable steps to assist the Chinese Government in preventing Communist occupation of the island and that by so doing it was, on the one hand, possible that the island might be successfully defended and, on the other hand, such action was at least buying time. Mr. Merchant concluded he did not believe that the U.S. Government would be disposed to take steps to halt the shipment of military materiel now going to Formosa for the Chinese Government.