Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Far East and Australasia, Volume VII, Part 2

Executive Secretariat Files

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Forrestal)¹

top secret

Washington, 1 March 1949.

In accordance with the request contained in your memorandum dated 21 October 1948, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the memorandum from the Secretary of the Army to you dated 18 May 1948, and the attached study, both on the subject of “Limited Military Armament for Japan”.^*

The major conclusions of the subject study bearing on the problem presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff are summarized for ready reference as follows:

a. Solely from the military viewpoint, the establishment of Japanese armed forces is desirable as such forces would share the burden of the defense of Japan and thus effect economies in utilization of our own limited manpower;

b. However, the establishment of even limited Japanese armed forces, other than augmentation of the civilian police and the creation of a coastal police, is not practicable and advisable at this time because such action would require amendment by the Japanese of their new constitution and our abrogation of the Potsdam Declaration. In addition, it would adversely affect Japanese economic recovery;

c. Early increase of the Japanese civilian and coastal police should be effected for local security purposes and to provide a vehicle for the possible organization of Japanese armed forces at a later date;

d. Plans should be prepared now for the eventual establishment of limited Japanese armed forces for the purpose of maintaining internal security and for local defense against external aggression; and

e. The question should be explored of obtaining an amendment to the Japanese Constitution with a view to permitting eventual Japanese military armaments for defense.

The comments of the Secretary of the Army on the above conclusions are as follows:

“While it appears desirable that the Japanese police establishment be strengthened now by re-enforcing and re-equipping the present National Rural Police and Maritime Safety Board (Coastal Patrol), it is doubtful that it will be advisable for a long time to come to permit the establishment of limited Japanese armed forces. However, there may be a present need for planning for utilization of Japanese manpower to assist reduced United States forces in the defense of Japan in the event of war in the near future.”

General MacArthur’s comments on “Military Rearmament of Japan” were obtained and are attached (Enclosure and Appendix).^† In brief, it is his opinion that it would be both undesirable and premature to initiate any measures which would be recognized as a step toward the creation of Japanese military forces since such measures “would destroy the character and purpose of the occupation.” However, General MacArthur concurs in the above-quoted comments of the Secretary of the Army.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff appreciate General MacArthur’s position with reference to even limited military armament for Japan since any rearmament is inconsistent with both the Terms of Surrender and the Potsdam Declaration which he, as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, is required to enforce. However, in view of the unsatisfactory world situation and the likelihood of its worsening, the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that anticipatory measures should be undertaken at an early date in order that some of the military potential of Japan may be used in the defense of that country should the situation demand it. This view is in consonance with the comment by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on NSC 13/1 “that it may well become extremely important to our national security for Japan to be capable of providing some degree of military assistance to the United States, at least to the extent of Japan’s own self-defense.”

NSC 13/2, which was approved by the President as of 9 October 1948, accepts the principle of strengthening and reequipping the Japanese police establishment, including the Coastal Patrol. The report indicates, however, that United States policy on post-treaty arrangements for Japanese military security should not be formulated until peace treaty negotiations are upon us and that it should be determined at that time in the light of the prevailing international situation and the degree of internal stability achieved in Japan.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that it would be unwise, in the light of the evident trend toward world unrest, to postpone consideration of the problem of Japanese military security until such time as peace treaty negotiations may be undertaken, since serious emergency conditions may well arise in the interim. They believe, therefore, that the terms of NSC 13/2 should now be reviewed in order that provision may be made for Japanese armed forces to be available to assist in home defense in an emergency. If this is to be done, planning and preliminary steps should be initiated at an early date. These steps should include the strengthening and arming of the police and Coastal Patrol in the manner indicated in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the study by the Department of the Army with a view to the use of these forces as a nucleus for light defensive Japanese units intended to maintain internal security and to be employed for local defensive action against external attack. Provision of weapons, equipment, and ammunition for this purpose should be considered an M-Day requirement for logistic planning purposes.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that it would not be practical nor desirable at this time to form a nucleus for an air arm. It might be possible at a later date, however, to arrange for some air transport facilities in order to improve the mobility of Japanese light defensive forces.

All of these measures would have to be carried out with great caution in the light of announced allied policies. The ultimate objective of eventually creating limited Japanese armed forces should be held in highest secrecy unless or until general implementation measures are warranted by the international situation.

In the light of the above considerations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that it would be in the interests of our national security that:

a. Plans be made now for the eventual establishment of limited Japanese armed forces to maintain internal security and to assist in local defensive action in event of an emergency;

b. Provision of appropriate arms and equipment for limited Japanese armed forces be considered an M-Day requirement for logistic planning purposes; and

c. The strengthening and equipping of Japanese police and coastal patrols be undertaken with the secret ultimate objective in mind of the use of these forces as a basis for the establishment of limited Japanese military forces for the defense of Japan.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that, if you concur, a copy of the subject study and of the comments of General MacArthur, together with the substance of this memorandum, be presented to the National Security Council for consideration with a view to amending NSC 13/2.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Omar N. Bradley

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

1. Copy transmitted by the Secretary of Defense with his memorandum dated March 11 to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council and the same day as NSC 44 by the Acting Executive Secretary, James S. Lay, Jr., to the National Security Council for examination with a view to preparing possible amendments to NSC 13/2 for Council consideration.
2. Circulated by separate memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, same subject, dated March 11, 1949. [Footnote in the source text; none printed.]
3. Circulated by separate memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, same subject, dated March 11, 1949. [Footnote in the source text; enclosure not printed.]