890.00B/2–2349
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of South-east Asian Affairs (Reed)
Subject: Spread of Communism into Southeast Asia
| Participants: | Mr. H. A. Graves, Counselor, British Embassy |
| Mr. W. Walton Butterworth, Director, FE | |
| Mr. Philip D. Sprouse, Chief, CA | |
| Mr. Charles S. Reed II, Chief, SEA |
Mr. Graves called to discuss the Foreign Office memoranda regarding the situation in China,1 the effects of the Communist successes there and the repercussions those successes will have on Southeast Asia, and the means of containing the Communist menace. He said that he had a further explanation of the British views as to these matters, but particularly as to the means to be employed to contain the Communist menace. This explanation was given in a more or less personal communication to him from Mr. Dening of the Foreign Office. The latter admitted that any concerted move on the part of the UK and the US to build up a front against Communism would result in whetting the appetites of the countries in the Far East for increased assistance from the UK and especially from the US. Accordingly, in the British approach to countries of or those interested in the Far East the British had been careful not to give the appearance of committing the US in any way and had taken pains to point out that they could not comment upon the US policy as regards the subject matter of the memoranda as this had not been communicated to them. Mr. Dening continued that the British ideas did not envisage an anti-Communist movement in terms of US dollars but rather US cooperation in terms of moral support of the British thesis that the Asiatic countries must set their houses in order and must evolve a policy of their own in the struggle against Communism. In other words, the concerted US–UK effort [Page 1119] suggested by the Foreign Office memoranda was destined merely to fill the gaps and the greatest emphasis was to be put on self-help.
Mr. Graves then asked if we would reply to the Foreign Office memoranda and give our suggestions as how best to implement the proposals therein. I replied that I thought that the British should first come forth with concrete suggestions so that we could start with those as a basis of discussion, particularly as our policy vis-à-vis Korea, Japan, the Philippines, China, Indochina, Siam, Malaya and Indonesia, had been made sufficiently clear. After I had rehearsed briefly the major points of our policy in those countries, Mr. Graves in turn touched lightly upon British policy in the mentioned countries, adding Burma to the list. From this exchange of views it appeared that so far as the memoranda were concerned we could agree that our concern was with the mainland and with the flow of Communism southward through Indochina, Siam and Malaya, with a corresponding impact on Burma.
Mr. Graves reiterated that his government would like to have a reply to the memoranda even though, as he had mentioned, our answer would be merely associating ourselves with the general principles of the British memoranda.
[Following Mr. Butterworth’s departure Mr. Graves continued the discussion of what might be suggested to implement the proposals with Mr. Reed and Mr. Sprouse, in the course of which the thought was expressed that Indochina could, if the solution of that country’s problem could be found, be a bastion in the path of a southward-rolling Communist tide. In this connection it was proffered that if Indochina went completely Communist Siam would probably not long resist the Communist pressure in view of Siam’s traditional history of opportunism and going with the nearest strong political force. At this juncture it was suggested as a point of consideration that there might be high-level talks between the British, the French, and the United States regarding how best to solve the Indochina problem.]2
- For the views of the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Bevin) as transmitted by the British Embassy, see his statement of January 11, scheduled for publication in volume viii. For letters from the British Embassy of January 3, 5, and 10, see vol. ix, pp. 2, 6, 817, and 821; and for memorandum of conversation, February 10, see ibid., p. 823.↩
- Brackets appear in the original memorandum.↩