740.00119 Control (Korea)/5–1149
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth)
| Participants: | Dr. John M. Chang |
| Dr. Chough Pyung Ok | |
| Mr. W. Walton Butterworth | |
| Mr. Niles W. Bond |
The Korean Ambassador,1 accompanied by Dr. Chough, called on me today by mutual request.
I raised at once the matter of the press release issued by the Korean Government on May 7 in the name of President Rhee (Seoul’s telegram No. 506, May 7) and said that, as the Ambassador presumably was aware, the reaction to that statement in U.S. Government circles in Washington had been very unfavorable indeed. I reminded the [Page 1020] Ambassador and Dr. Chough that I had made it a point to counsel them against this very thing during the course of our last conversation,2 knowing from previous experience the unfortunate effects which such utterances were bound to have. I pointed out that the reflection on U.S. intentions with respect to Korea implicit in that statement, coming as it did at a time when the Congress was about to consider the question of aid to Korea, could only complicate the task of those of us who were endeavoring to obtain sympathetic consideration of the needs of the Korean Government in the fields of economic, military, and other assistance.
I went on to say that we took particular exception to President Rhee’s statement that we had “invited” the Russians into Korea. U.S.–Soviet agreement on the 38 degree parallel line had not, I pointed out, served to let the Soviets into north Korea, but had had the effect rather of preventing them from occupying south Korea as well. I reminded the Ambassador that Russian troops had occupied Korea north of the 38 degree parallel as much as three weeks before we had entered south Korea, and that but for that line they could easily have occupied the entire peninsula by the time the first American troops set foot on Korean soil. The Ambassador replied that rightly or wrongly most Koreans, including himself, have long been under the impression that the division of Korea between the U.S. and the USSR was agreed upon at Yalta, and that it was this impression which doubtless lay behind President Rhee’s statement. I pointed out that it was a responsibility of the Korean Government to attempt to disabuse the Korean people of misconceptions, not to foster them.
Dr. Chough then stated that, while he knew nothing about the statement beyond what he had read in the newspapers, he was certain that President Rhee intended no criticism of the U.S., an interpretation which I stated that I accepted. Dr. Chough went on to point out, however, that the prospect of the pending withdrawal of U.S. occupation forces from Korea, considered in conjunction with recent Communist successes in China and aggravated by the unceasing barrage of Communist propaganda from Radio Pyongyang, was having a deleterious effect on the morale of the people of south Korea, who were becoming increasingly restive and uneasy about the future. He went on to say that this had in turn had a disturbing effect on President Rhee who felt that, as a counter-measure, some public assurance should be forthcoming from the U.S. to the effect that it would not abandon Korea—perhaps a reaffirmation of U.S. adherence to the Treaty of 1882.3 I said that, while we had had some reservations concerning the wisdom of referring specifically to the Treaty of 1882, it certainly was not our [Page 1021] intention to abandon Korea and there should be no objection to our saying as much at an appropriate time. The Ambassador urged that we give serious consideration to the early issuance of such a statement.
Ambassador Chang then added that one of the favorite themes of the Communist radio was that the U.S., having “washed its hands” of China, was now preparing to do the same thing in Korea. In response to this remark I hastened to make it clear to the Ambassador that the U.S. had in no sense “washed its hands” of China, but that on the contrary it was the Chinese Nationalists who had “put their hands in their pockets” by failing to put up any effective resistance to the Communists, thus rendering further U.S. aid unavailing. I then reminded the Ambassador in passing of the lessons which his Government should learn from the China situation.
Reverting to President Rhee’s statement concerning a defense pact with the U.S.,4 I said that it seemed to me that it was inadvisable on his part to hold out to his people the implied promise of obtaining such a pact when in fact he must know that a commitment of this sort was out of the question for the U.S.
In conclusion Ambassador Chang expressed his grave concern over the activities of a group of Korean “Communists” on the west coast of the U.S., a problem which I suggested he discuss with Mr. Bond.