740.0011 PW (Peace)/712–2.3.49
The Secretary of Defense (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
top secret
Washington, 23 Dec 1949.
Dear Mr. Secretary: On October 3rd, you
wrote me requesting advice as to the essential security requirements
of the United States in a peace settlement with Japan. This
presented military questions of great seriousness and difficulty,
which depended in some degree upon legal questions.
I regret that it has not been possible to answer your letter at an
earlier date, but I know that you have been kept informed of the
reasons which prevented this.
Inclosed is the opinion from the Joint Chiefs of Staff which I have
just received. I concur in this opinion.
I am concerned about the psychological effect upon the Japanese—and
therefore about the effect upon the success of our
occupation—resulting from the wide-spread public discussion during
recent months about an early treaty, including extensive debates in
the Japanese Diet. This prospect has raised great hopes in Japan. I
feel that we must promptly give consideration to the steps necessary
to deal with this very real problem.
Sincerely yours,
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense
(Johnson)
top secret
Washington, 22 December
1949.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have formulated the following statement
of their views concerning negotiations, at this time, leading
toward a Japanese peace treaty, together with a statement of
United States treaty requirements for military forces and bases
in Japan:
-
a.
- On 6 May 1949, the President determined it to be national
policy that it was then premature to press for a peace
treaty with Japan (NSC
13/3). On 9 June 1949, in response to an inquiry by the
Department of State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirmed
their view that a peace treaty with Japan was
premature.1 This expression of views was forwarded
on 14 June 1949 by the Secretary of Defense to the National
Security Council (NSC
49).
-
b.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff have again re-examined the
military and national security factors involved in the
matter of an early peace treaty with Japan, and in doing so
have taken note of:
- (1)
- The unsettled political and military conditions
and uncertain military action in the Asian
continental areas near Japan;
- (2)
- The highly unstable political and military
situation in Taiwan and in southeast Asia, both
subject to relatively rapid deterioration and
change;
- (3)
- The fact that a treaty consistent with the terms
of the armistice by which Japan surrendered could
not at this time assure the denial of Japan’s
ultimate exploitation by the USSR or assure her
orientation toward the western powers.
During this period of political and military instability in the
Far East the following are the minimum military requirements of
the United States as to forces and bases in the islands of the
Japanese Empire, not considering Taiwan and the Pescadores:
-
a.
- The United States to be the only foreign power which would
have military forces and base rights in any of the Japanese
islands to the southward of Sakhalin and the Kurils
Islands;
-
b.
- Arrangements whereby the United States strategic
trusteeship over the Marianas, Caroline, and Marshall
Islands would not be disturbed by any provision of the
treaty;
-
c.
- The United States to secure exclusive long-term strategic
control of the Ryukyu Islands south of latitude 29° north,
Marcus Island, and the Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan;
and
-
d.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff would expect that the United
States forces to be stationed in Japan would be somewhat
less than at present and that bases would be required:
- (1)
- On Okinawa, together with such other facilities in
the areas delineated in subparagraph c above as are deemed essential
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff;
- (2)
- At Yokosuka, as a protected naval base (NSC 13/3 and NSC 49); and
- (3)
- In the four main islands of Japan, Army and Air
Force bases generally as at present.
From the military point of view the Joint Chiefs of Staff
consider that a treaty to be acceptable must include both the
USSR and the de facto Government of China
as party signators to the document.
In light of the conditions noted in paragraph 1 b above and since it is apparent that the minimum
military requirements and the requirement that the USSR be a
party signator to the document are probably mutually exclusive,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their previous view that
negotiations now, leading toward a peace treaty with Japan, are
still premature.
If, nevertheless, it is decided that peace treaty negotiations
shall be undertaken, it is requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff
collaborate in the formulation of those terms of the treaty
having military implications.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Omar N. Bradley
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff
