740.0011 PW (Peace)/9–2349
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald)1
In an informal conversation held on September 20, 1949 with General MacArthur on the subject of a peace treaty with Japan, the General said that he had completely changed his views regarding post-treaty controls for Japan. He recalled that during discussions on this subject some two years ago, he had in general concurred with suggestions made at that time that a Council of Ambassadors, Commission of Inspection, and similar bodies be formed for the purpose of carrying out certain control functions in the post-treaty period.
In view of the changed world situation and developments in Japan since the early drafts of a proposed peace treaty, he felt that above all else the substantive provisions of the treaty of peace should be as simple as possible and phrased in general terminology, and should be designed solely to bring about a state of peace with Japan. He thought that the concept of exercising controls over Japan consequent upon a peace treaty would merely result in substituting a new SCAP setup at a time when efforts should in fact be made towards the reconstitution and strengthening of Japan’s sovereignty.
On the other hand, the General felt that the question of Japan’s security is one which must be given most careful consideration. He was inclined to believe that if Soviet Russia would join in an absolute guarantee of non-aggression and neutrality for Japan, such a guarantee would be sufficient and all troops withdrawn. When I interposed a remark to the effect that possibly the Japanese would not be too happy to have the Russians act as a guarantor of their sovereignty and neutrality, the General said that he would not envisage the continuation of any occupation should such a guarantee be feasible, especially as the United Nations would become the guardian of Japan. The question of strengthened police forces and perhaps allowing them some light arms could be worked out at the peace table. Lacking a guarantee, however, he felt that some arrangement must be made to continue a protective military force in Japan for the indefinite future, such force to comprise United States troops. This arrangement, he felt, should be outside the provisions of the main treaty itself, and might be on a bilateral basis between the United States and Japan, preferably at the latter’s request. While the main treaty should make no mention thereof, the General said that the Way must be left open in the treaty to accomplish this contingency.
[Page 863]On the assumption that the United States Government will in due course proceed with invitations to other interested Powers to frame a treaty of peace, General MacArthur said that he strongly recommends that Tokyo be the situs of the conference. He suggested that he, as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, should be nominated as a neutral chairman of the conference on the theory that as the representative of all the FEC nations, he would have the greatest influence over the participants to the conference, and, at least theoretically, could be neutral in conducting the proceedings. As chairman, he would not, of course, be entitled to a vote in any of the proceedings. General MacArthur said that his suggestion has many merits: all the records, files, and experts are in Tokyo and would be available immediately upon request to be consulted and heard by the conferees; the United States would have an advantage in that one of its nationals would be permanent chairman of the conference; SCAP would be able and willing to provide a full secretariat for the conference; full logistic support to the conferees could be provided by the United States Army and its facilities in Japan. Additionally, General MacArthur said that by holding the conference in Tokyo, the Japanese people would immediately become aware of what is being done. He also felt that world-wide attention would be focused upon the Far East as a whole and Japan in particular, and political gains to the United States would be great. Finally, should the conference fail, the onus for such failure would not fall upon the United States as a host.
In the above connection, General MacArthur recalled that during the visit to Tokyo of Dr. Evatt, the latter had suggested Tokyo as the best place to hold a peace conference. At that time, he told Dr. Evatt that Tokyo was not adequately equipped to handle the conference in view of the crowded conditions then existing. He now felt, however, that the situation has eased to the extent where it would be a simple matter physically to take care of the delegations and the conference in an adequate and appropriate manner.
General MacArthur said that if the United States Government were agreeable to his suggestion, the proper procedure, in his opinion, would be for the United States to issue invitations to the Powers concerned containing these suggestions.
Arising out of the above conversation, I suggested to General MacArthur the necessity for preparing the Department of State Mission in Tokyo for an eventual resumption of its proper functions in Japan, I pointed out that it appeared essential to me that the staff of USPolAd be gradually strengthened by the addition of experienced and carefully selected officers and personnel, so that it would be possible without undue friction and delay for Department of State personnel to function as an American Embassy here, I further said [Page 864] that I envisaged the necessity for having a considerably enlarged staff to carry on many of functions which are now carried out by GHQ, SCAP, such as political negotiations; economic, financial, agricultural, and labor reporting and assistance; cultural and education programs (USIE work); etc. General MacArthur replied that, without wishing to be invidious or critical, it was his opinion that the staff of USPolAd needs strengthening now. He said that he felt that Tokyo was “at the end of the line” and perhaps for that reason the Department has not seen fit to assign more experienced Foreign Service officers to carry on its functions here.
With regard to increasing the effectivenss of the USPolAd staff, both in personnel and numbers, General MacArthur said that he would leave the matter entirely in my hands, and be guided by my recommendations. He said that this is an internal Department of State matter, administrative in character, and that if I now felt the necessity for building up the staff here and if the Department of State agreed, he had no objections whatsoever.
When it becomes apparent that a peace conference is to be convoked, General MacArthur said that he would immediately give instructions to have a study prepared by his staff regarding a take-over in due, course by the Department of State. He said that the Department could rest assured that he would do everything possible to assist in this connection, and that his in opinion a take-over could at that time take place “without a ripple.” He suggested that the Department of State might perhaps be well advised prior to a take-over carefully to select, a number of civilians presently serving as experts in various SCAP Sections, as such civilians could most readily contribute towards proper continuity of effort and in any event would be more familiar with the background of the many problems which will arise in the immediate post-treaty period.
Regarding the re-establishment of the American Embassy, General MacArthur said that as of the date of the signing of the treaty of peace, the Embassy would be ready for immediate occupancy by the; senior Department of State representative in Japan.
- Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 664, September 23, from Tokyo, not printed; received September 29.↩