Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Far East and Australasia, Volume VII, Part 1

501.BC Indonesia/2–149

The British Embassy to the Department of State ¹

[Washington, February 1, 1949.]

In the situation which now confronts the Security Council as a result of the resolution of 28th January, it is the opinion of His Majesty’s Government that the following considerations will have to be borne in mind.

1. So far as the Dutch are concerned, there is the danger that the Security Council may seek to impose a policy which the Dutch cannot implement and which may force them into flouting the authority of the Security Council. This may lead to the imposition of sanctions by the Security Council, whereupon the Netherlands might withdraw from the United Nations. Any such development would be bound to weaken the position of the Netherlands in the Western Union and to that extent would weaken Western Union itself. In Indonesia it will do no good to undermine the authority of the existing sovereign power at a time when an Indonesian Government is in no way ready to take overpower.

2. So far as the Indonesians are concerned, there is the danger that they will focus their attention exclusively on getting rid of the Dutch and devote too little attention to preparations for the transfer of power by he Dutch. There is also a danger that the Security Council’s Commission on Indonesia will intervene to such an extent in the negotiations that the Indonesians may leave matters too much in the hands of United Nations agents and not face up to their responsibilities in regard to a common policy agreed among themselves, and in regard to control of Indonesian forces. The result may be that, when they achieve self-Government, there will be a state of disorder in the country, a general breakdown in the machinery of Government through weakness and inexperience, and that the Independent State of Indonesia will emerge as another centre of instability in the Far East rather than, as we hope, a peaceful, orderly and democratic member of the Asiatic anti-Communist group. If the transfer of power is not planned with care, and if the Indonesians do not now begin to look to the future as well as the present, such a situation is almost certain to arise.

3. The magnitude of the task in Indonesia is such that no agency of the United Nations can hope to bring about a satisfactory solution by its own efforts alone. As in other cases which have come before the Security Council, a successful outcome is only possible if both parties to the dispute can be induced themselves to make a real effort to achieve it. In Indonesia, it is the Indonesians who from now on have got to do the spadework, if they are to be in a position adequately to perform the full functions of Government by 1st July, 1950, when the transfer of power is due to take place in accordance with the Security Council resolution. For the Dutch, their duty lies in facilitating the progress towards self-Government and not interfering with the process.

4. The first step is to be the creation of a Federal Interim Government by 15th March, 1949. In order to do this, it will be necessary for the Federalists and the Republicans to come to an agreement on the composition of such a Government, and they should be urged to get on with this. When the Federal Interim Government has been set up, it is to be hoped that it will have sufficient influence to put a stop to guerilla warfare and sabotage, which can only increase the existing chaos in the country. The cessation of these activities should render it possible for the cease-fire to become a reality instead of a farce as it is at present.

5. Not until the cease-fire has become really operative and the authority of the Federal Interim Government is established will it be possible to proceed seriously to the next step, which is the holding of elections throughout Indonesia by 1st October. In view of the necessity of preparing electoral rolls, it will be by no means easy to complete the procedure by the due date. In addition to this task, the Federal Interim Government will have to create a police force and to build up the Federal armed forces of Indonesia against the transfer of power. The example of Burma makes it clear that private armies must be abolished and that the only forces in existence at the transfer of power apart from the Dutch forces (which should then finally withdraw) should be the Federal Indonesian forces under the direct control of the Central Government.

6. After the elections have been held, it will presumably be possible to set up the new Government of the United States of Indonesia, and in the few months which will then remain it will be necessary to ensure that the machinery of Government functions smoothly in order that the transfer of power can take place on 1st July 1950 with the minimum of dislocation.

7. In all the above, the agency of the Security Council can obviously help. But however large the agency may be, and however many observers it may have, it will be impossible for it to exercise more than a general supervision over these developments in so vast an area. It can smooth over difficulties and iron out disputes but it cannot govern. It can urge upon the Dutch the relinquishment of authority in this or that sphere when it is clear that the Indonesians are capable of taking over. But it should be careful not to undermine Dutch authority before the Indonesians are ready to assume a given responsibility, since no authority at all will result in chaos. The principle must surely be that one administration must be in effective control, until another administration is in a position to assume that control. The fact that definite dates have been set for the various stages leading to the transfer of power should safeguard the Indonesians from any danger that the Dutch will deliberately delay the hand-over, always provided that the United Nations agency holds a watching brief. There is a greater danger that the Indonesians will not bestir themselves sufficiently to be ready to take over efficiently when the time comes.

In the light of the above considerations, it is the opinion of His Majesty’s Government that it is now desirable—

(i) to urge the Dutch to give every facility to the United Nations agency and its observers and to the Indonesians to push on with the various steps necessary before the transfer of power takes place;

(ii) to bring home to the Indonesians, more especially in view of their temperament and comparative inexperience, the paramount necessity of reaching agreement amongst themselves and of proceeding with all speed to undertake the measures necessary to complete the various stages in the transfer of power.

1. Handed to the Secretary of State by the British Ambassador (Franks) on February 10; see memorandum of February 11 by Mr. Hickerson, p. 224.