760H.61/12–849: Telegram
The Chargé in Yugoslavia (Reams) to the Secretary of State
1263. Most common assumption both here and elsewhere with regard to probable future course of Tito-Stalin dispute appears to be that Tito liquidation absolutely essential and will be achieved at any cost. While we accept this assumption as valid basis for long-term prognosis, we feel it requires close analysis before any attempt is made to predict Soviet actions against Yugoslavia in near future. Specifically, we are impressed by apparent attempts of Kremlin ideologically to seal off Yugoslav heresy (for example, last month’s Cominform resolution branding Tito reactionary Fascist and denying him right to term self Communist1) and we suggest that speed and extent spread of heresy may exercise considerable influence upon Soviet estimate of urgency required in solution Tito problem.
Effect upon beliefs and attitudes of Communists both east and west of curtain of an orthodox Communist Tito successfully building socialist state free of Kremlin overlordship is of course vital concern in Moscow. No more potent threat to Soviet imperialism could exist. [Page 982] Soviets must have realized that at time of original break that temporization was possible, compromise was not.
In retrospect it appears that they first hoped tried and proven methods of international Communism would oust Tito clique and bring Yugoslavia back to fold. Failure realize these hopes meant formulation new strategy which has guided Cominform actions against Yugoslavia for at least past twelve months. This strategy combines tactics such as economic blockade, border incidents, Soviet troop movements and political pressures designed encourage internal Yugoslav breakdown and revolt expected place pro-Cominform elements again in saddle with assiduously developed propaganda backdrop of a Fascist Tito, tool of western imperialist warmongers, in order to minimize his heretical influence pending his collapse.
We do not believe Soviets have yet abandoned hope this strategy may succeed but, examining Yugoslav domestic situation, we see no reason to alter our previous views that stability Tito regime is not in foreseeable future threatened by present Cominform efforts. While Yugoslav economy has been seriously affected by necessity shift trade from east to west and five-year plan has experienced forced revision we have little doubt that with present and contemplated measures of assistance from west Yugoslav Government will be able maintain at least minimal economic health.
Politically we feel regime has established impressive record of internal solidarity and we see no internal or external threat to that solidarity.2 In last month’s Cominform resolution Cominform itself appears tacitly to recognize this situation by vastly enlarging unacceptable Tito clique beyond original four. We conclude from foregoing that there is every probability Tito will survive at least until such time as Kremlin decides that present anti-Tito strategy has failed and that more active measures (which, since we heavily discount possibility and efficacy his assassination, can only mean actual invasion by Soviets or Soviet-backed satellites) must be taken to eliminate him.
Given even a small possibility of their involvement in general war, we believe that basis upon which Soviets take this decision must be their estimate of success his example is having in stirring revolt against Kremlin suzerainty among world Communists. In satellite orbit we have always believed Titoism would require considerable [Page 983] period of incubation and we have never expected quick and successful resistance to Soviet domination to follow Tito’s defection.
At moment we feel consolidation Soviet power in orbit is proceeding smoothly if brutally and we do not from here perceive difficulties this process sufficiently great to cause Soviets decide Tito must immediately be crushed. In Western Europe as in the Far East, however, present Soviet control of Communism is less apparently secure and we suggest that any considerable progress in Titoism or like deviation these areas might induce Soviets to believe object lesson needed even at risk of war.
If the above analysis be accepted we believe that indefinite postponement of Soviet war against Yugoslavia is possible since we believe it unlikely, on basis available evidence, that a Communist leader, not yet holding the reins of power in his country (e.g.—Togliatti3 Duclos4) would abandon influence and support of Soviet Union to pursue problematical advantages of an independent course. At same time what such leaders might do if a rise to actual power and what attitudes might evolve in minds of Communist rank and file if Yugoslav Government defies Kremlin and survives still represent long-term real dangers to Soviet imperialism inherent in Titoism which we do not believe Soviets can eliminate by present sealing off campaign. Nevertheless, over short term, if Soviets feel secure in their control of party organizations, a control bolstered by conversion of Tito to Fascist enemy to be hated, not emulated, we believe they may feel no imperative need to destroy him physically, although they would certainly continue present strategy of harassment.
Foregoing should in no way convey impression we do not recognize Soviets may reason quite differently and may regard blackening of Tito regime as necessary prelude to shortly inevitable war against “Fascist” country. This, however, we regard as improbable since we feel Soviets unlikely run risk of general war within next few years if risk at all avoidable.
Sent Department 1263; repeated Rome 131, Moscow 179, London 112, Paris 165, pouched Sofia, Bucharest, Budapest, Prague, Warsaw; Department pass Moscow.
- Representatives of the Communist parties of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Poland, France, Czechoslovakia, and Italy held a Cominform meeting in Hungary in late November 1949. This meeting issued a communiqué, circulated in the Communist press, which included a resolution denouncing the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. For the text of this resolution, see Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs, White Book, pp. 174–178. For documentation regarding the Cominform meeting and resultant resolutions, see pp. and 54.↩
- In his telegram 1252, December 5, from Belgrade, not printed, Charge Reams observed that the Embassy in Belgrade and American military representatives in Yugoslavia concurred in the opinion that there was little or no likelihood of serious guerrilla warfare developing from within Yugoslavia. Pro-Cominform opposition within Yugoslavia appeared to be so weak as to preclude any possibility of a spontaneous outbreak from that source. Even if guerrilla activity were introduced from abroad, which the Embassy believed highly unlikely, would have little effective popular support and would doubtless be liquidate quickly (860H.00/12–549).↩
- Palmiro Togliatti, Secretary General of the Communist Party of Italy.↩
- Jacques Duclos, Secretary and member of the Politburo and Central Committee of the French Communist Party.↩