Executive Secretariat Files
Report to the National Security Council by the
Acting Secretary of Defense1
top secret
Washington, June 1,
1949.
NSC 24/22
Possible U.S. Courses
of Action in the Event the USSR Reimposes the Berlin Blockade
- 1.
- This report is submitted in accordance with the Council’s
direction of May 17, 1949 (NSC Action No. 215–b3). It has been prepared in conjunction with
the Department of State, which concurs in it.
- 2.
- Alternative U.S. courses of action have been studied,
based upon the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, attached
as Appendix “A”.
- 3.
- It is recommended, in the event that the U.S.S.R.
reimposes the blockade of Berlin, that:
-
a.
- The airlift be continued at full operational
capacity.
-
b.
- The counter-blockade be reimposed.
-
c.
- No attempt be made to establish a land supply
route to Berlin by the use of armed motor convoys or
otherwise.
-
d.
- No attempt to “probe” the blockade to determine
Soviet intentions be made. This is considered to be
impracticable, to risk a serious loss of prestige
and involvement in hostilities.
- 4.
- As interim measures, while the Council of Foreign
Ministers is in session and thereafter unless a clear
written agreement is reached providing definitive
arrangements for adequate rail, road and water access to
Berlin, it is recommended that:
-
a.
- All efforts, including the airlift, be made to
increase the reserve stocks of supplies in
Berlin.
-
b.
- The airlift system be kept in a state of readiness
for full operation.
-
c.
- All measures requisite for the reinstitution of
the counter-blockade be kept in readiness.
- 5.
- If a satisfactory agreement for access to Berlin is not
reached at the Council of Foreign Ministers, it is
recommended that the Soviets be informed that any
reimposition of the blockade of Berlin will be considered to
be a matter of the gravest concern to the United States;
further, that the United Kingdom and France be urged to join
in a similar warning.4
Appendix A
Study on the Possible United States Courses
of Action in the Event the USSR Reimposes the Berlin Blockade
- 1.
- In considering the possible United States courses of
action in the event the USSR reimposes the Berlin
blockade, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have necessarily
taken account of the fact that conditions attending the
assumed reimposition of the Berlin blockade cannot be
accurately known in advance. Since it is manifest that
the seriousness of disagreement at the Council of
Foreign Ministers, prior to reimposition of the
blockade, can only be conjectured, the conclusions and
recommendations contained herein should be subject to
later re-examination based on all of the circumstances
during and at the conclusion of the meeting of the
Council of Foreign Ministers and on such indications as
there may then be as to the probable motives and
intentions of the USSR in reimposing the
blockade.
- 2.
- If the Council of Foreign Ministers fails to reach
agreement, and the Soviets reimpose the Berlin blockade,
it follows that their decision to take this step would
have very serious implications. It is, therefore,
essential from the standpoint of national security to
give full consideration to these implications. Thus, we
should not assume that the next blockade would be
intended only to resume the same nuisance position as
has existed for the last ten months. We should realize,
rather, that the new blockade may be more severe and
that its basis might be a determination to force us out
of Berlin by taking any
[Page 822]
steps necessary to make the
airlift abortive or, perhaps, to bring about a major war
issue.
- 3.
- If the Soviets do have in mind, in resuming the Berlin
blockade, the creation of a really critical major issue,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that they would hope
to cause the situation to develop in such a manner as to
place upon the United States the responsibility for the
initiation of any actual hostilities. If this is the
case, then our continuation of the airlift would impose
that responsibility upon the Soviets. On the other hand,
our resorting to steps involving force would risk our
falling in with their plans.
- 4.
- While the Joint Chiefs of Staff are aware that the
diplomatic field is not within their purview, the
possible implications of the reimposition of the Berlin
blockade are so serious and potentially far-reaching
that they believe that every practicable effort should
be made to forestall such a situation. One approach
might be to formalize at the Council of Foreign
Ministers our right for access to Berlin. It might be
said that this would not be worth trying because such
formalization will not be needed if the Council of
Foreign Ministers reaches satisfactory over-all
conclusions while, if not, the effort would naturally
fail. It may, nevertheless, be worth undertaking if
handled as a point at issue in the early sessions and,
in any case, to probe diplomatically the Soviet
intentions. It might also be worth-while, if there are
indications that the Soviets intend to resume the
blockade, to take strong prior diplomatic action,
extending even, if attendant circumstances warrant, to a
warning that blockade resumption would be considered an
unfriendly act.
- 5.
- Returning, however, to the basic assumption that the
Soviets have reimposed the Berlin blockade, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff strongly recommend that the airlift be
continued or, if at that time it has been discontinued,
that it be resumed and that our own blockade be
reimposed. (Present plans call for continuation of the
Berlin airlift until stockpiles in Berlin reach the
level of 1 March 1948. The present airlift should not be
discontinued unless and until there is satisfactory
indication that possibility of blockade resumption is
remote.) The airlift is neither a sole nor a final
action with respect to solution of a new Berlin blockade
problem. It is, however, an essential immediate step
and, in fact, it is the only practicable step short of
great risk of hostilities or decision to leave
Berlin.
- 6.
- There is now no question as to the practicability of
the airlift provided Soviet action does not seriously
interfere. The Acting Secretary of the Army’s study for
the Secretary of Defense, dated 18 May 1949, on the
“Support of Berlin Throughout Indefinite Period of
[Page 823]
Blockade”5 concludes essentially that the
Berlin airlift can be continued indefinitely provided
that adequate funds are made available upon request. The
study further concludes that the cost will be high and
that the “Military Implications Involved in Continuing
and Augmenting the Operation of the Airlift” will become
more pronounced in proportion to the additional
concentration of effort towards maintenance of our
position in Berlin. Airlift, however, is the best
solution of the problem as long as airlift remains
practicable.
- 7.
- An alternative solution, not recommended, might be to
attempt to establish a land supply route by the use of
armed motor convoys. This was thoroughly considered by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff shortly after the Berlin
blockade was first imposed and the conclusion then
reached is still considered sound, that such an attempt
would be fraught with the gravest military implications,
including the risk of war, and would probably prove
ineffective even if faced only with passive
interference.
- 8.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff at that time further
concluded that to attempt to supply Berlin by force
would be justifiable only if:
-
a.
- Every other solution had first failed or been
discarded;
-
b.
- Current evaluation indicated that the effort
would be likely to succeed;
-
c.
- The United States had first determined that
risk of war in the near future and for the Berlin
cause was acceptable; and
-
d.
- All possible time had first been gained and
used for adequate preparation for the attempt to
supply by force and for full-out major war action
in support thereof if war resulted.
- 9.
- In view of the implications as to Soviet determination
and intentions implicit in a reimposition of the Berlin
blockade, the conclusions in paragraphs 7 and 8 above
are believed to be even more valid now than when they
were first reached. In simplest terms it cannot, from
the military viewpoint, be justifiable to place
dependence on any assumption that the Soviets in
resuming the Berlin blockade would merely be bluffing.
Further, even a bluff should be called only if we are
prepared for a showdown.
- 10.
- With reference to alternative number three as
contained in Delsec
1784 of 22 May 1949,6 the Joint Chiefs of Staff
believe there would be nothing gained by such a plan. In
the first place any reinstitution of the Berlin blockade
would now in the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff be
dangerously close to an act of war, and, if the
“probing”
[Page 824]
were
then to follow there would be likelihood that the
incidence of the war would be laid at the door of the
United States. Consequently, they believe that by
so-called “probing” much would be risked extending from
serious loss of prestige to the distinct possibility of
involvement in hostilities even though they assume that
the plan is not intended to include the use of force. If
it is intended to involve even minor use of force, their
comments in paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 above regarding the
armed convoy proposal are fully applicable. Otherwise,
probing could be expected to prove only the already
known fact that the Soviets had reimposed the blockade.
A demonstration of Soviet intentions would thus not be
accomplished, while our prestige would suffer and
needless risk of minor incidents, susceptible of
development into actual hostilities, would be the only
result.
- 11.
- The only other possible alternative, if the Berlin
blockade is reimposed, would be to yield our position
there. Based on present circumstances and future
probabilities, the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not now
recommend such a step. The National Security Council on
22 July 1948, reiterated the determination of the United
States to remain in Berlin in any event.7 Developments since that date have
fully justified this determination. If, however, it
becomes evident that the supply of Berlin can only be
continued by the use of force, serious consideration
should then be given as to whether to risk war by resort
to force or whether to evacuate U.S. forces from Berlin.
At such time the effects of evacuating Berlin should be
carefully reconsidered in the light of the adverse
military situation. The improvement which a withdrawal
from Berlin would make in our immediate military
position is obvious, but there is no assurance that the
effects of such a move in reducing the threat of war
would be lasting.
- 12.
- The overriding point that becomes manifest from
consideration of the foregoing study as a whole is that
blockade reimposition would raise anew, and perhaps more
forcibly, all the military questions with respect to war
imminence and war readiness that arose with the first
blockade. In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider
that in the event the Soviets reimpose the blockade of
Berlin the airlift should be reinstituted or continued.
Further serious consideration should be given at that
time to the application of additional economic
sanctions, over and above the counter-blockade, and the
taking of the strongest diplomatic action.8
