Office of the Historian

740.00119 Control (Germany)/4–2049

The British Embassy to the Department of State 1

Aide-Mémoire

Mr. Bevin has instructed me to inform Mr. Acheson that he is profoundly disturbed at recent developments in Germany relative to the Basic Law. In his view these developments threaten to wreck all our plans for the establishment of a Western German Government, and so to play right into the hands of the Russians. Mr. Bevin is convinced that, if we are to retrieve the situation, we must act with resolution now.

When he left Washington on April 8th, Mr. Bevin thought it was fully understood between the Foreign Ministers that discretion was only given to the Military Governors on the understanding that in any event the message2 would be communicated to the Parliamentary [Page 245] Council before German opinion crystallised. It is now twelve days since the terms of the message were finally agreed upon. Mr. Bevin does not interpretate [interpret] the discretion given to the Military Governors as justifying a prolonged delay, particularly as it is clear that opinion is rapidly crystallising among the German parties; the meeting taking place today (April 20th in Hannover) is an example of this. On April 12th, the State Department informed this Embassy that Mr. Acheson himself was much concerned ‘at the position then developing, as the Military Governors had not then met and misconceptions of the policies of the three Governments were ‘already manifesting themselves.3

Mr. Bevin, since leaving Washington, felt justified in thinking that the clearly expressed instructions of the Foreign Ministers as to the delivery of the message to the Germans would be carried out without further delay. Mr. Bevin had also understood that as a result of the meetings in Washington, the view of the Governments would in future prevail and that it would not again be possible for the Military Governors to hold up agreed governmental decisions.

Mr. Bevin fears that the non-delivery of the message and the failure of the German political parties to reconcile their differences may seriously prejudice the whole future of a German Government in Western Germany. In his view our plans for Western Europe are at stake.

Whatever may be the outcome of the Socialist Party’s meeting at Hannover, Mr. Bevin considers it essential that the Foreign Ministers’ message be handed to the Germans on April 21st, or at latest on April 22nd, in order that it should have time to take effect before the meeting of the Military Governors with the Parliamentary Council on April 25th. Mr. Bevin would like to be assured that the State Department will now be prepared to give positive instructions to General Clay to deliver the message forthwith. In view of the delay which has taken place, Mr. Bevin hopes that at the time that the message is delivered the Germans should be informed that the Foreign Ministers stand firmly behind it.4

Washington, April 20, 1949.
  1. The source text bears the handwritten notation: “The Sec has seen L[ucius] D. B[attle]”.↩
  2. For the text of the message to the Military Governors from the Foreign Ministers of the US, UK, and France, April 8, see p. 185.↩
  3. No record of this communication has been found in Department of State files.↩

  4. In telegram 1383, April 22, to London, not printed, Holmes was instructed toz convey the following message orally to Bevin from Secretary Acheson:

    “I should like Mr. Bevin to know that my understanding of the agreement of the Foreign Ministers on the last message regarding the German constitution does not differ from his; that we have not doubted that it should be carried out as made. I understand it is being carried out today.” (862.011/4–2249)

    Holmes reported in telegram 1571, April 23, from London, not printed, that he had conveyed the message to Bevin who expressed his thanks and told Holmes that he had never doubted that his understanding of the message to the Military Governors was the same as the Secretary of State’s. (862.011/4–2349)

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