IO Flies: US/A/C.1/1291
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles P. Noyes, Adviser, United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly
Memorandum of Meeting Held in Ambassador Austin’s Office on October 10, 1949, at 5:30 p.m.
Subject: Soviet Proposal
Participants:
French Delegation
Ambassador Chauvel
| United Kingdom Delegation | United States Delegation |
| Mr. Hector McNeil | Ambassador Austin |
| Sir Alexander Cadogan | Mr. J. D. Hickerson |
| Mr. Roger Allen | Mr. C. P. Noyes |
Ambassador Austin opened the meeting, stating he had been over the suggestions which had been worked out earlier in the afternoon between the Officers of the two delegations;1 he had been in touch with the State Department; and as to most of the points which have been changed from previous drafts there was no difficulty. However, with respect to the third paragraph of the resolution: “Noting with regret the actions of the minority…”, we had real difficulty. He felt, as in the case of the previous—much stronger proposals—of the UK along these lines, that an effort to obtain condemnation of the Soviet Bloc in the General Assembly would create real difficulties among the other delegations. It was inconsistent with the general line of the policy which the US had followed in this assembly as set forth in the Secretary’s speech. He was therefore in the position of trying to sell the UK Delegation this draft resolution without that paragraph.
Ambassador Austin felt it absolutely essential in the light of the fact that the US and the UK were the chief targets of the Russian Resolution, that we reach agreement on the text of the resolution and on tactics. Any split between us on a question of this kind would be unthinkable. He pointed out that time was of the essence; that information which had just been received from Lake Success indicated that the matter would arise tomorrow morning and that we were very [Page 105] pressed for time to consult other delegations before acting. He referred to the likelihood that many delegations, if not informed immediately of the US–UK agreement to submit a resolution, would introduce draft substitute resolutions or amendments to the Soviet resolution.
Ambassador Austin said that Dr. Arce had submitted a draft to him,2 which he was not at liberty to give them, but which was thoroughly unsatisfactory or even worse from our point of view.
Ambassador Austin said he did not know what the position of Mr. McNeil was with respect to his Government and was very anxious to know whether they could not agree with us.
Mr. McNeil indicated that he did not think we were asking the General Assembly very much in asking them to state that the Communist Nations had compromised the success of the United Nations by their actions. He thought this was the least we could do.
Sir Alexander indicated that he thought the purpose of their paragraph was rather to turn the gun on the Soviets. He thought that the USSR had made outrageous charges against us and that it was essential that we should turn the Assembly to some extent against them in the light of the fact that it was they who were responsible for the world’s situation. Mr. McNeil thought that without their proposed paragraph the USSR would easily accept the resolution.
Mr. Hickerson pointed out that they would not be able to accept the paragraph regarding the veto; the paragraph regarding participating fully in the United Nations; and the paragraph regarding the removal of barriers to the free exchange of information.
Sir Alexander replied that they could accept all the others—even perhaps turning them against us.
Ambassador Chauvel was asked his view. He avoided a direct answer at first, indicating this was primarily a matter between the US and the UK delegations. He said he would have no difficulty in supporting the British paragraph. He thought it might be worth while canvassing the other delegations.
Mr. Hickerson said that what we were principally worried about was that we were asking the other delegations to line up and choose [Page 106] between the USSR and ourselves; we were afraid that what might happen would be that we would get, say, 18 votes in favor, perhaps 10 against, and that the rest of the Assembly would abstain. He thought this was a serious risk to take.
Mr. McNeil pointed out that we could be assured of the vote of the Atlantic Treaty members and of the Commonwealth, except for India. He asked how many of the Latin-Americans we could line up in support.
Mr. Hickerson replied that we did not know but we were worried that the inclusion of this paragraph would make it more difficult to obtain support.
Mr. Allen remarked that there was something to be said for the point of view that there would be more desire on the part of the Latin-Americans to amend a more mild resolution such as this would be without the UK paragraph. If their paragraph were included, the resolution would be directed more pointedly against the USSR which would make it more difficult for such nations to add on to it the ideas, for example, which Mr. Arce had put forward. We would have a difficult time in refusing to accept such proposals which would be on their face directed to the same general aims which we were professing to support.
Mr. Chauvel indicated he thought the British paragraph was too vague in its present form. He suggested that in its present form it was subject to the same objections which the Soviet Resolution was subject to, namely, that the charges were not specified.
Mr. McNeil indicated that this was not his fault; that they had preferred a stronger and more detailed specification as well as more vigorous condemnation but that the difficulty now was that the US could not see its way to agreeing.
The summary of Mr. Rusk’s remarks made in Boston3 had been read during the conversation and Mr. McNeil observed, without any offense, that the State Department was not following the same policy on this matter as Mr. Rusk.
Ambassador Austin urged Mr. Chauvel not to ginger this resolution up any more than it was. In its present form it was too strong for us.
After some further discussion in which the British continued to argue their position, Ambassador Austin suggested that in the interests of unity and speed, both of which were essential, we might agree to the resolution with the British-suggested paragraph in it on the clear understanding that after we had had an opporunity to consult other delegations and obtained their reactions, we and the UK would use our best judgment as to whether or not it was wise to leave this paragraph in the final text.
[Page 107]Ambassador Austin asked Mr. McNeil whether he was in position to reach any agreement on this matter tonight without reference to his Government. Mr. McNeil said he thought he was and he thought they would accept whatever recommendations he made.
Ambassador Austin said he thought he was in the same position on this question and hoped, in the interests of getting on, we could reach agreement along these lines. McNeil agreed.
We than went over the resolution and made a few minor changes at British and French suggestion.
We then considered a memorandum indicating the line our Political Officers would take with other delegations. [US/A/C.1/1284]4 The British agreed to this.
In regard to paragraph No. 3,5 it was understood that Ambassador Austin should, if he desired, show a copy of the resolution, to Romulo, Padilla Nervo and Arce. Copy should also be shown to Pearson.6 Mr. McNeil said it was essential that Pearson be shown a copy; that other white members of the British Commonwealth should also be shown a copy of it. He said he would make it very clear that it was Confidential and would try very hard to keep it from leaking.
At this point we were advised that Committee 1 would not meet until Wednesday7 on this question.
As to the order of speakers, Mr. McNeil suggested that Ambassador Austin should come immediately after Vishinsky and that he would go in right after; he would be prepared to speak before Ambassador Austin if Mr. Austin desired.
As to our other stalwarts, in which he included the Canadians, Norwegians and the Belgians, he suggested that they should be spaced through the debate so as to come in after the members of the Soviet Bloc, and carry the tone of the debate.
- Reference is to the redraft of the United States–United Kingdom resolution contained in Delga 82, infra. ↩
- On the morning of October 10, Dr. Jose Arce, Chairman of the Argentine Delegation and Permanent Argentine Representative at the United Nations, left a draft resolution with Ambassador Austin which Argentina was prepared to introduce as a substitute to the Soviet proposal. Arce requested the reaction of the United States Delegation by October 11. The Argentine draft, transmitted to the Department of State in Delga 77, October 10, not printed, provided for expression of concern by the General Assembly regarding the failure of the Great Powers to resolve their differences and called for the establishment by the Assembly of an “International Conciliation Commission” composed of representatives of the nonpermanent member states of the Security Council. This Commission would study the issues dividing the Great Powers and offer its good offices with a view to facilitating agreement. The Commission would also promote Great Power adherence to a treaty of nonaggression. (501.BB/10–1049)↩
- For text of the address by Dean Rusk, Deputy Under Secretary of State, before the Boston Conference on Distribution, October 10, see Department of State Bulletin, October 24, 1949, p. 630.↩
- Not printed. Brackets appear in the original.↩
- Paragraph 3 of memorandum US/A/C.1/1284 emphasized the necessity of avoiding a leak. (IO Files)↩
- Lester B. Pearson, Chairman of the Canadian Delegation; Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs.↩
- The First Committee did not actually begin consideration of the Soviet draft resolution until its 325th Meeting, November 14.↩