Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere, Volume II

710.35/3–849

The Chargé in Argentina (Ray) to the Secretary of State

secret

Buenos Aires, March 8, 1949.

No. 167

Sir: I have the honor to refer to a secret memorandum of conversation, dated February 10, 1949, between Mr. Paul C. Daniels, Director of ARA, and Uruguayan Ambassador Domínguez-Cámpora.¹

1. It was understood here for a while that Vice President Barkley would visit Argentina. It would, of course, create quite a furor if Vice President Barkley should visit Chile or Uruguay or any neighboring country and not come to Argentina. I assume that no such possibility was contemplated.²

2. The question of an Austral Bloc dominated by Argentina is one that all of Argentina’s neighbors love to talk about. It is true that the general feeling of most Argentine officials now is that Argentina should dominate the southernmost countries of South America. In fact many of the Argentines in the government now have remarked to us that the way to settle the problems of the western hemisphere would be for Argentina to take everything south of the Isthmus of Panama and the United States to take over the northern part.… In spite of Argentina’s grandiose ideas, it has never initiated aggression against any of its neighbors and there may be something in the old wheeze that barking dogs don’t bite.

There is no doubt that Argentina would like to have political and economic ascendency over its neighbors. Argentina’s own economic and financial plight is so sad at the present time that it can do no better than make feeble efforts and dabble a little here and there. The administration here, including Bramuglia, made no effort to hide its dislike of Natalicio González and it is probable that Argentina contributed to some extent to his overthrow.³

Argentina does not appear to be in a position at the present time to assert to any full extent its economic and political ascendency over its neighbors. I am convinced that there is no danger whatsoever in the foreseeable future of Argentina’s initiating armed aggression against Uruguay or any of Argentina’s other neighbors.

Both Perón and Bramuglia have remarked to me that they are aware of the existence of the Rio Pact⁴ and that they also fully believe that whether any Rio Pact existed or not, the United States would not tolerate armed aggression against any of its neighbors. Perón has remarked to me more than once that conditions are so bad in Paraguay and Bolivia that Argentina would certainly not wish to take these two countries over even if it could. Perón added that Argentina already had enough underdeveloped areas and so far has not been able to carry out its plan of industrialization and raising the standard of living. Whether Perón is sincere in this, I do not know, but I am convinced that he does know he would have no chance of getting away with it even if he tried.

3. The point of Argentina’s intervention in the overthrow of President González on January 31, 1949, has been largely covered above. We know here that the Argentine administration did not like González but we are unable to find any evidence that they actually took part in the overthrow of González.

4. Argentina is not now in a position to acquire arms for which it would have to make payment in dollars. So far as we can learn, it is not endeavoring to obtain any substantial quantities of arms from sources other than the United States. The Argentines argue that they are behind Brazil in armaments and that Brazil has more modern equipment. The opinion of our military observers is that while the spirit of the Argentine Armed Forces is good and the morale high, their equipment is not up to date and is probably not as good as that of Brazil.

5. Argentina does not appear at present to have a well-defined attitude towards the problem of recognition. It has generally tended to favor the Estrada Doctrine⁵ rather than the policy which we have followed in the past.

6. I have no comment to make on this point.⁶

With regard to a statement of our position, it seems to me that it is quite sufficient for us to give Uruguay and other countries the assurances outlined in the memorandum under reference prepared by Mr. Daniels and I believe it would serve no useful purpose for us to make any public statements on the subject or to endeavor to give more categoric or specific assurances.⁷

Respectfully yours,

Guy W. Ray

1. Not printed. The numbered sections of this despatch corresponded in general with those in the memorandum of conversation and covered approximately the same subjects (811.003 Barkley, A. W./2–1049).
2. Mr. Barkley did not travel to South America in 1949.
3. Juan Natalicio González, recently ousted President of Paraguay.
4. Text in Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1838, and 62 Stat (pt. 2) 1681.
5. Enunciated in 1930 by Mexican Foreign Minister Genaro Estrada, it held that recognition should be automatic and should not be used as an instrument of national policy.
6. The reference is to arrangements surrounding proposed lectures at American universities by Ambassador Domínguez-Cámpora.
7. The Uruguayan Ambassador had pressed for assurances of U.S. aid in the event of an armed attack on Uruguay and specifically wanted to know if, in addition to its readiness to fulfill the obligations of the Rio Treaty, the United States would come forth with armed assistance without waiting for a meeting of the OAS Organ of Consultation. Mr. Daniels said that he could not commit his government and that he considered an attack at this time on Uruguay a remote possibility, but he supposed that the United States in such a hypothetical case would offer armed assistance before the Organ of Consultation met, since such action would be within the spirit of the Rio Treaty. (811.003 Barkley, A.W./2–1049) For further documentation, see the compilation on Uruguay, pp. 780 ff.