501.BC/7–649: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
priority
805. In the light of the present situation in the SC, we suggest reconsideration of our instructions in urtel 330, June 22, with respect to casting a negative vote on applications of Satellites, if it turns out a vote is necessary.
[Page 296]The UK would reluctantly join US in voting negatively on these 5 states; China has told us it will vote negatively on Mongolia; otherwise SC members will register abstentions.
The USSR compromise proposal has probably improved her tactical position. She will undoubtedly pose as willing to cooperate on reasonable terms and will probably attack US for allegedly obstructing a solution we originally proposed in 1946. We can make a good reply to such an attack on the basis of Herschel Johnson’s statements at the SC’s 55th meeting, August 28, 1946.1
The USSR may also be behind the recent suggestion of Argentina to trade Italy for Mongolia and it may be possible that there will be further developments along this line.
It would seem advantageous from our point of view to retain as much freedom of action as possible so as to be better able to take advantage of any new developments later on. We therefore feel it might be wiser for us to abstain on the Russian Satellites. This will have the additional advantage of leaving US less exposed to the above-mentioned charge that it is the US who is primarily responsible for preventing the admission of the 12 states.
- Ambassador Johnson was Deputy U.S. Representative on the Security Council in August 1946.↩