Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere, Volume II

501/11–749

Memorandum Prepared by the United Nations Planning Staff, Bureau of United Nations Affairs

restricted

[Washington,] November 4, 1949.

Strengthening UN Within Charter Framework

possible subjects for inclusion in congressional resolutions¹

The subjects covered by the Vandenberg Resolution (S. Res. 239) adopted by the Senate on June 11, 1948, are shown in the attached copy of that resolution. A list of other possible subjects follows.

1. Use of UN organs, subsidiary bodies, and specialized agencies whenever possible in connection with matters involving international cooperation.

2. Subject to the requirements of Articles 33 and 52 of the Charter that parties to a dispute likely to endanger the peace should seek to settle the dispute by peaceful means outside the UN, the U.S. should bring and encourage others to bring to the UN important problems coming within the purview of the Charter.

3. UN action in the economic and social fields to strengthen the world peace structure.

4. The U.S. should in general encourage and support the broadening, through liberal interpretations of the Charter and through usage, of the international problems of legitimate interest to the UN and of the powers and functions of UN organs, and should in general oppose interpretations or usage which would have an opposite effect.

5. Further use of such international institutions and patterns of administration as

(a) those contemplated for the Trieste territory; and

(b) those developed by the World Bank.

6. Agreement of the Great Powers to refer important matters to the General Assembly, or some other organ of the UN, for binding determination as was done in the case of the Italian colonies.

7. Renewed efforts to provide the Security Council with contingents of national armed forces as provided in Article 43.

8. Efforts to provide the Security Council with an international armed force.

9. Provision of armed forces (national contingents or international) for use by UN with the understanding that if the Security Council should be prevented from taking the necessary action to restore international peace, the forces would be used in accordance with any recommendations made by the General Assembly through a two-thirds vote.

10. Proposal to plug the gap in the Charter by a collective security pact open to all Members by which each could agree to assist the victim of an armed attack (or aggression) if requested to do so by two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly. The Thomas–Douglas Resolution (S. Con. Res. 52) on this subject provides for:

“A supplementary agreement under Article 51 of the Charter open to all members of the United Nations, by which the signatories agree, if the Security Council is prevented from fulfilling its duties, to come to the aid of the victim of the attack if requested to do so by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly, including three of the permanent members of the Security Council.

“Such an agreement should specify the forces that each signatory agrees to maintain, under the spirit of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 43, for immediate use of the United Nations (a) upon call of the Security Council, or (b) upon call of the General Assembly by a two-thirds vote, including at least three of the permanent members of the Security Council.”

11. Resolution by General Assembly to meet promptly in the event of armed attack and make findings (and recommendations).

12. Increased use of the General Assembly where necessary to avoid improper use of the permanent member veto in the Security Council.

13. The U.S. should give full effect to the twin doctrines that

(1) the obligations of Members under the Charter do not lapse because of the failure of the Security Council to take action; and

(2) such failure to take action does not deprive the U.S. and other Member nations of their right and moral duty in case of clear aggression to take collective action outside the framework of the UN to uphold the principles of the Charter.

14. The U.S. should agree to modification of the “domestic jurisdiction” exception to its acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, so as to permit the Court to make the determination whether a matter comes within this exception.

15. Preparation by the International Law Commission of the UN of an international criminal code and of a statute for an international criminal court.

16. The U.S. should seek to establish and obtain acceptance and observance of standards of conduct in political, economic, cultural, social, scientific and technical fields, and particularly the field of human rights. Unique national patterns of behavior, however, must not be imposed on other nations through the UN.

17. Provision of independent sources of revenue for the United Nations in addition to the revenue provided by contributions made by Members.

18. The U.S. should support UN publicity efforts and other attempts to familiarize the public with UN symbols (flag, travel-papers, etc.) with a view to developing awareness of and support for the UN as the organ of the free international community.

19. The U.S. should encourage the development of a group of effective and loyal UN civil servants through action designed to increase their responsibility, independence, and initiative at the expert level. In this connection, the U.S. should use its influence to strengthen the international character of the UN Secretariat by maximizing so far as possible the freedom of members of the Secretariat from dominance or unwarranted interference by the States of which they are nationals.

20. Establishment of a consultative assembly of the General Assembly consisting of representatives of the political parties of members somewhat similar as to composition and function to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe.

[Attachment]

Vandenberg Resolution (S. Res. 239)²

Whereas peace with justice and the defense of human rights and fundamental freedoms require international cooperation through more effective use of the United Nations: Therefore be it

Resolved, That the Senate reaffirm the policy of the United States to achieve international peace and security through the United Nations so that armed force shall not be used except in the common interest, and that the President be advised of the sense of the Senate that this Government, by constitutional process, should particularly pursue the following objectives within the United Nations Charter:

(1) Voluntary agreement to remove the veto from all questions involving pacific settlements of international disputes and situations, and from the admission of new members.

(2) Progressive development of regional and other collective arrangements for individual and collective self-defense in accordance with the purposes, principles, and provisions of the Charter.

(3) Association of the United States, by constitutional process, with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, and as affect its national security.

(4) Contributing to the maintenance of peace by making clear its determination to exercise the right of individual or collective self-defense under article 51 should any armed attack occur affecting its national security.

(5) Maximum efforts to obtain agreements to provide the United Nations with armed forces as provided by the Charter, and to obtain agreement among member nations upon universal regulation and reduction of armaments under adequate and dependable guaranty against violation.

(6) If necessary, after adequate effort toward strengthening the United Nations, review of the Charter at an appropriate time by a General Conference called under article 109 or by the General Assembly.

1. This document illustrates also how the Department of State was becoming increasingly concerned with a number of resolutions which were being introduced in both Houses of Congress in 1949, and which propounded various schemes looking toward world government or a union of the countries of the North Atlantic Basin (Atlantic Union). These reflected a definite impatience if not disillusionment with the United Nations on the part of articulate sections of the American public which was sharply at variance with the established policy of this Government. A sub-committee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had been established to study such proposals, and hearings were scheduled early in 1950.
2. Passed by the Senate June 11, 1948; see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. i, p. 25, footnote 7.