501.AA/6–2149
Memorandum by Miss Ruth Bacon, Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth), to the Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs (Sprouse)
I. Requests for Visas by the Chinese Communists.
Under the Headquarters Agreement of June 26, 1947, between the US and the UN1 we are obligated not to impose any impediments to transit to or from the headquarters district of representatives of members of the UN or their families (Section 11). This obligation exists “irrespective of the relations existing between the Governments of the persons referred to in that section and the Government of the United States” (Section 12). If an application were made by the Chinese Communists for visas for a delegation to the UN in the near future, we might take the position that the delegation was not the delegation of a member of the UN since the Chinese delegation was already in New York. The Communists might then appeal to the Secretary General of the UN and transmit credentials for a permanent representative to the UN.
In the case of credentials of a permanent representative under normal practice the Secretary General would forward to the Department [Page 284] through our mission in New York the name of the person for whom diplomatic status is sought with a statement that his credentials are satisfactory. Our mission in New York states that in reaching his decision “doubtless he (the Secretary General) will consult with us and other Delegations”. There would seem to be some question, however, how far we can rely with certainty upon the Secretary General’s consulting with us. It would seem desirable that our mission should do whatever may be appropriate to make clear to the Secretariat that concerned Governments, including ourselves, should be consulted before the Secretary General reaches a determination of this question.
If the Secretary General determines that the credentials presented by the Chinese Communists are not those of a permanent representative of a member of the UN, then we have no problem. If, however, the Secretary General accepts the credentials, we shall then have to decide what action to take. As the particular circumstances of the case may affect the decision, it is believed that no over-all policy should be prescribed at this time.
It is possible of course that the Chinese Communists might choose as permanent representative someone already in the United States. In that case, of course, the visa question would not arise.
II. Attempts of Chinese Communists to Obtain Seats on UN Councils.
In the past Chinese delegations have for the most part given full support to US delegates in the UN. Of late there have been indications that this support may falter, and it is entirely possible that the Chinese will seek in future to abstain on questions dividing the US and the USSR. On the other hand, in an effort to obtain our support for their continued presence on UN organs Chinese delegates may receive instructions to give unfaltering support to our policies. In either case we are likely to be better off than with Chinese Communist representatives in UN organs.
If the Chinese Government should become a government in exile or if for all practical purposes the Communists should supplant the present government pressures among many delegations to take account of such circumstances would undoubtedly arise. For the present, however, these pressures have not developed and, in the absence of a Communist national government, are not likely to develop immediately.
If, following the establishment of a Communist national government and its recognition by some powers, the Communists seek to obtain places on UN councils, we shall have to decide how active a part we intend to play. As will be indicated more fully below, if a number of states abstain on certain votes affecting the position of the present Chinese delegates our position might be undermined. Accordingly, if we desire at that time to have the Chinese delegates retain [Page 285] their seats it would probably be necessary for us to make clear to the UN Secretariat and to other UN members our support for the present Chinese delegates.
If the Chinese Communists should seek to take over China’s place on the Security Council, credentials would probably be presented to the Secretary General, who would make a preliminary examination as to whether the credentials were issued by the head of a government or the minister of foreign affairs of a member. If he decides that the credentials are not acceptable, he may let the matter drop or he may make a report to the Security Council. The report would then be voted upon in the Security Council and a question would arise whether acceptance of the report was a procedural or substantive matter. If acceptance is a procedural matter, only seven affirmative votes in the Council are required for approval. If acceptance of the report is a substantive matter then the concurrence of all the permanent members would be required.
The present membership of the Security Council is as follows: the five Great Powers and Argentina, Canada, Ukraine, Cuba, Norway, and Egypt.
If the Secretary General finds that the credentials are not those of a member of the UN it should be possible to find seven votes in support of this position unless several states abstain. The UK and France, for example, might prefer to abstain and their example might be followed by Canada and Norway. The USSR and the Ukraine would vote against such a report. That would leave only five affirmative votes in support of the Secretary General’s findings that the Communists’ credentials were not in order. If we desire to prevent such a result, we should accordingly make clear our position in support of the National Government’s representatives on the Security Council and use our influence with other powers likely to waiver to ensure that they do not abstain.
If the Secretary General’s report concludes that the credentials of the Communist representative are in order it would probably be difficult for the USSR to obtain the necessary seven votes. In such case abstentions would be effective in preventing the accumulation of seven votes. On the other hand, abstentions by a number of powers would serve to indicate a lukewarm position on the question and would probably encourage the Communists in further efforts to unseat the National Government’s representatives.
A similar situation would arise if the USSR were to challenge the right of the National Government’s representative to sit on the Council. The Chinese representative, even if challenged, would continue to hold his seat until seven votes could be obtained for a motion to unseat it.
[Page 286]If the vote should become close the USSR or China, depending on the issue, might assert that the question was not procedural but substantive and accordingly claim a right of veto.
- 61 Stat. 758. For documentation on this negotiation, see Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. i, pp. 22 ff.↩