895.00/3–1748: Telegram
Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State
priority
Zgcg 327. Subject is brief summary of local politics. The vacillation, fumbling, lack of unanimity and uncertainty inaction on the part of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, as well as the divided views on the UN resolution on the part of member governments, has caused considerable change in the political situation and in the attitude of the Koreans of south Korea.
From the time the advent of the UN Commission was known, Soviet boycott was foregone conclusion, and Communist orders were to do everything in their power to destroy its progress and force its withdrawal from Korea. However, our buildup in publicity here was such that when the Commission first arrived and there was a possibility that it might proceed to carry out its mission with dispatch, there was a well-defined move on the part of what might be called “political Communists” (opportunists who have joined the Communists in hope of reward when they come into power) to disobey orders and break away from Kremlin control and participate in elections. This move ended as soon as the Commission stalled in early February.
As the apologists and Soviet appeaser among the delegates began to show their hand (Djabi of Syria with his “political prisoners,” Jackson of Australia with his “police state” and Patterson of Canada, with his straight appeaser attitude) not only the Communist mouthpieces [Page 1156] and fellow travellers, but representatives of all dissident groups who have vague hope that through some flick of fortune, such as gaining control of the police or constabulary, or the advent of some plan of elections or forming a government that would give this or that group control or at least a strong representation without regard to the strength of their following, have put pressure on the Commission, as well as the Korean people, to stop elections or to delay them in hope they can make a coup. The effect on the UN delegates is to make some of them believe that the volume of oral and written complaints reaching their ears are the complaints of all Koreans. The effect of those delegates listening to the dissident elements together with the delegates own public and quasi-public statements and their statements of opinion expressed privately to Koreans in their multitudinous audiences is to give the dissidents great “face” and to add greatly to the strength of the Communists propaganda, as well as give the Communists new slogans for their attack against elections in south Korea. Also, the fact that prominent members of the Commission and Secretariat got into local politics and gave great and international emphasis to the Kim Koo–Kimm Kiusic ephemeral plan to get north and south political leaders together to unite Korea, and resulting in boycott by this camp of the elections with Kim Koo action in open opposition to election, is building to serious proportions. It is being joined by other sizable pressure groups, such as the north Korean refugees, demanding special representatives among those elected, with the alternative of boycotting elections.
The net result is a snow-balling loss of faith in the UN Commission being able to provide a solution for the Korean problem, a growing apathy among the supporters of elections and a growing effectiveness of the Communist efforts to block elections in south Korea. If it keeps growing, fanned by the typical negative Korean attitude on the part of groups who see no chance for them to gain complete power through straight election, we may run into an “anti-election” complex similar to and possibly comparable to the “anti-trusteeship” campaign that negated any chance of success for the Joint Commission.
I have repeatedly pointed out to the delegates of the UN Commission these dangers and the necessity for them to move firmly and aggressively and actually to exert leadership in helping educate the Koreans. Menon and Hoo have been trying half-heartedly to undo the damage they did in the Kim Koo–Kimm Kiusic camp, but have made no progress to date.
The resignation of a sizable leftist and moderate group from the Interim Legislative Assembly, although for the announced reason that they are resigning because they oppose unalterably the resolution [Page 1157] passed some days ago by the assembly calling for early elections, appear actually to be closely tied up with investigations of the acceptance by most of the resigners of bribes from the “prostitution association” in an alleged effort to get effective date of the anti-prostitution law passed by the assembly postponed. However, the fact remains that these individuals, many of whom have formed small political parties based on their prestige gained as legislators, will now because of their public statements, have to save face by opposing an election in which they know they could not possibly gain any seats. Many of them may be expected actively to join the Communists, since they have been mouthpieces of Communist propaganda all along.
Although the principal rightist youth group leaders have publicly announced their support for elections, there are indications that some of them may fall out if the bid is high enough. Communist money has been known to get into strange channels in Korea.
If the Koreans continue to lose faith in UN ability to do anything about Korea, as is now the case among even those Koreans who most heartily approve the UN action, we may have a situation here (already pointed out by me to the UN Commission) where it will be virtually impossible to hold elections, free or otherwise.
With the Communists actively violent in efforts to stop elections, the dissident middle-of-the-roaders and some rightist groups boycotting or opposed to them for selfish reasons and the mass of Koreans apathetic as to any hope of real results because of the publicized attitude of some delegates of the UN Commission showing disagreement as to Korea’s future, the picture is none too bright. Whether or not the Commission itself can and will regain prestige remains to be seen. Some delegates are beginning just now to realize the damage they have already done, but appear only to be discouraged by the situation rather than to have any desire or thought of rectifying it by positive action.