Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East and Australasia, Volume VI

501.BC Indonesia/12–1448: Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State ¹

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us urgent
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Batavia, December 14, 1948—2 p. m.

1092. Gocus 485. In amplification my views in Gocus 481 and 488, both of December 12,² I submit following relating to Netherlands aide-mémoire December 10 (Usgoc 230³).

1. Throughout aide-mémoire Netherlands refers only to first of 6 additional Renville principles. True adherence to Renville requires settlement consistent with all 18 Renville principles, not based on 1 only, and that 1 taken out of context.

2. Aide-mémoire emphasizes necessity of recognition of Netherlands sovereignty over Indo in interim period and charges in effect that Republic repudiates this. Actually such recognition is entirely consistent with Republic position that Netherlands, while retaining ultimate powers of sovereign, should, by terms of political agreement between parties and Netherlands decrees implementing same, voluntarily impose upon itself restraints and limitations which would prevent exercise of sovereign powers by Netherlands officials from being absolute and uncontrolled.

3. In discussion sovereignty as purely abstract conception which requires that Netherlands have uncontrolled and irresponsible power in interim period so far as Indos are concerned, aide-mémoire ignores realities of situation. Republic is actual govt carrying on all de facto functions of such and exercising control over 30,000,000 people. Those who have been in Republic come to appreciate fact that despite many handicaps Republic does govern with support of governed, remarkable in sustained circumstances of adversity. Such a govt is unlikely subject itself to absolute authority of another without requiring adequate guarantees that that authority will not be abused. Republicans emphasize that experiences of 3 years, including sequels both of Ling-gadjati and Renville, have caused them be suspicious.

4. Believe paragraph 3 of aide-mémoire inaccurate in stating Hatta willing give only formal recognition to Netherlands sovereignty and not concede it in practice. Republic position seems to be that govt in interim period should be based on both Indo and Netherlands authority with Netherlands having both ultimate sovereignty and full powers carry out obligations thereof. Hatta is willing stipulate that high representative have veto power and that he be empowered to act regardless of ordinary legal limitations in state of siege, war and insecurity. He requires merely that some standards be included in Netherlands law, or decree setting up interim govt, so that high representative’s power to veto or to declare emergency should not be exercised on purely arbitrary and personal basis. See paragraphs 8, 9, 10 of Hatta note December 13 in Gocus 484.⁴ Also paragraph 11 for indication of how Netherlands misunderstanding here may have arisen. Likewise, Hatta concedes Netherlands authority over foreign relations as basic sovereign power. See Hatta’s aide-mémoire November 10, in paragraph 11 Gocus 441 of same date.

5. I decidedly do not agree with statement in paragraph 4 of aide-mémoire that Republic position in direct talks nullifies their earlier acceptance of USDel plan as basis for resumption negotiations. My information is that Republic is generally in accord with provisions USDel plan, which was written on basis Renville principles, and in fact, has shown willingness for sake of harmony to waive much which USDel plan and Renville would give them. On other hand, it is Netherlands delegation which stated in note of October 14, commenting on USDel plan, that “there are parts of draft agreement, to which objections of such a serious nature exist, that they could not be incorporated in the political agreement.” See also oral notes 1 and 2 attached thereto, Gocus 402, October 5.

6. Position assumed by Netherlands delegation in 4 A, B, C and 8 B of aide-mémoire seems to leave no room for true negotiations. They indicate that what is required of Republic by Netherlands is more in nature of surrender than willingness to negotiate fair and reasonable agreement.

7. Allegations made in paragraph 5 of aide-mémoire seem unfair. Hatta’s unwillingness to act without consultation with, or against opposition of, Republic political parties typifies normal attitude of leaders in democratic state. My own observation is that Hatta and Sukarno are skillful leaders with substantial support and are not dominated by “irresponsible and extremist elements”. Noteworthy in this connection is that Netherlands delegation has constantly temporized when seeking instructions from Hague and that even Netherlands ministerial delegations unable to negotiate freely on basic issues without returning to report and obtain instructions from home government. See also Usgoc 233, December 11, repeating Hague’s 834,⁵ revealing difficulty Netherlands Govt keeping in hand Netherlands parties and “extreme elements among Netherlands officials in Indo”.

8. Paragraphs 3 and 7 of aide-mémoire raise question of truce enforcement. For evaluation this situation see GOC 4th interim report and also GOC special report, Gocus 480, December 12.⁶ Note that allegation made in second sentence paragraph 7 does not necessarily involve complicity Republic Govt, nor has evidence referred to been made available to GOC, except sketchy data of limited probative value. Following considerations are also important in discussion this problem:

(a) Neither justice nor political realities permit that Republic alone be required take unilateral measures for truce enforcement.

(b) Perhaps greatest difficulty in implementation truce arises from failure reach political agreement after 10 months. Can be no lasting improvement without political agreement. Political agreement is really condition precedent to improvement rather than vice versa.

(c) At least one important factor in unrest is economic deterioration arising partly from failure to implement section 6 of truce agreement, which surely is not sole responsibility Republic.

9. I submit that parties have obligation to permit reasonableness of their respective positions to be assessed in full negotiations with GOC in position to observe and to contribute to fullest extent consistent with position as good officers. I must condemn any disposition of one party to block resumption of such negotiations.

10. Reference Usgoc 231, December 10 relaying Hague’s 835.⁷ Now apparent that original draft US aide-mémoire not prepared under any misapprehensions as to true circumstances of departure from Batavia of Netherlands ministerial delegation. See no purpose in preparation note to Republic. I have gone to all lengths thru whole period to bring parties together and have found cooperative attitude on parts Hatta and Sukarno. Republic reiterates willingness to negotiate basis USDel plan and to present full position on all issues in GOC.

11. Above likewise will serve as commentary on Usgoc 233 of December 11 repeating Hague’s 834. Believe suggestion last paragraph met by Gocus 484, December 13. With reference to penultimate paragraph Hague’s 834, (likewise paragraph 6 Netherlands aide-mémoire), regard to practicability of Republic participating in federation interim govt after creation, see position taken in paragraph 7, GOC special report (Gocus 480⁸). See also IV of Netherlands delegation letter December 11 to GOC (Gocus 479)⁹ which states “possibility for incorporation of Republic-held areas in federation system must remain open.” It is not known whether term “Republic-held areas” used here instead of “Republic” is intended to have special significance.

12. ReDeptel 642, December 11, repeating Hague’s 842.¹⁰ British Consul General call today. I told him of visit to Republic and gave him copy of Hatta letter quoted Gocus 484. He indicated would cable his govt regarding results my visit and make no separate representations to Republic unless further instructed. Signed Cochran.

Sent Department 1092; repeated Hague.

Livengood

1. Repeated in telegrams 4786, December 14, 7 p. m., to Paris (far Jessup), and 628, December 15, 5 p. m., to The Hague.
2. Telegrams 1084 and 1086; latter not printed.
3. Telegram 635; see footnote 1, p. 544.
4. Telegram 1090, December 13, p. 552.
5. December 8, p. 539.
6. See footnote 2, p. 549.
7. Not printed.
8. Telegram 1083, December 12; see footnote 2, p. 549.
9. Telegram 1082, December 11, p. 548.
10. December 10, not printed.