Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East and Australasia, Volume VI

501.BC Indonesia/12–748

The Netherlands Ambassador (Van Kleffens) to the Acting Secretary of State

Washington, December 7, 1948.

My Dear Mr. Secretary: The Hague has sent me copies of a number of documents emanating from the T.N.I. and other organs of the Indonesian Republic which have fallen into the hands of the Netherlands authorities. This documentation has been collected by the Netherlands authorities to be used, should this appear useful, as documentary evidence (which will be annexed to a comprehensive and detailed survey which is now in process of being made) with regard to the attitude adopted by the T.N.I. and other official agencies of the Indonesian Republic as to the implementation of the truce-agreement, concluded between the Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic under the auspices of the Committee of Good Offices in January 1948. These documents, which already have been classified as Annex I, II and III of the as yet unfinished general report, are an anthology of all the documents which came in the possession of the Netherlands authorities since the signing of the truce.

In view of the importance of the contents of the documents, which give a somewhat disconcerting picture of the manner in which the T.N.I. and the Republican High Command since January 1948 onwards, have tried to frustrate the purpose of the truce, I feel justified in sending you for your own use and for the information of the officials concerned in the Department of State (but not for purposes of wider use) four copies of these Annexes,¹ without waiting for the time that the general report itself will be ready for presentation.

As you will see from the documents concerned, the main reasons for the deterioration of the general situation in Indonesia during 1948 can be summed up as follows:

a) contrary to the truce-agreement many Republican fighting units were deliberately left behind in the Netherlands-controlled areas, when the evacuation of the T.N.I. took place. Contrary to the self-praise with which the Republic repeatedly has spoken of its “success” in evacuating the T.N.I. troops, it is now clear that the T.N.I. High Command in fact did not honestly try to carry out its obligations;

b) contrary to the truce-agreement arms and munition were left behind by the departing Republican troops and caches of these weapons were established in Netherlands-controlled territories for later use;

c) contrary to the truce-agreement, following carefully laid plans by the High Command of the T.N.I., evacuated Republican troops gradually began to return to Netherlands-controlled areas to collect their hidden arms and to form and organize bands and groups of soldiers for the purpose of terrorizing the population and of creating unrest and disorder. These acts of terror and sabotage were mainly directed against the native population and not against Netherlands troops or the Netherlanders. As can be seen from Annex I sub 9² the Republican Minister of Defense gave orders that from June 1, 1948 infiltrations of 500 men per unit should take place until at least 10,000 men of the fighting forces would be in Netherlands-occupied territories. I believe that no impartial observer can deny, after a perusal of these documents, that either the Republican Government or the Republican Ministry of Defense working together with the High Command of the T.N.I., from the moment of the signing of the truce, have deliberately tried to frustrate the truce and to do everything possible in order to create disturbances and unrest in Netherlands-controlled territory which activities could then be qualified by the Republic as “spontaneous resistance of the native population against the Dutch”. Slogans like these are very useful for propaganda-purposes and are—superficial and misleading as they may be—as you know, always eagerly accepted and exploited by certain newspapers and crusaders against “colonialism”.

It is evident that the activities have not contributed to a favorable atmosphere for the political negotiations initiated since the Renville-agreement, and that the Netherlands Government in their long and protracted discussions with the Indonesian Republic always had to take the risk that any promise made by the Republic would be undone by actions of the T.N.I. Moreover, it is obvious that any political agreement with the Republic must include a solution for the disbandment of the T.N.I. and its partial absorption into the armed forces of the Federal Interim Government. In the light of past experiences, the Federal Interim Government obviously should not be left in a position in which it would be helpless to face the ever-present menace of the armed forces of the Republic which, either under instruction of the Republic itself or on its own initiative, would undoubtedly continue activities striking at the roots of this Government and the federalistic principle upon which the United States of Indonesia, according to the Renville-agreement, has to be created. It is equally obvious that during the interim period—in which, according to the Renville-agreement, Netherlands sovereignty will continue over Indonesia—the High Representative of the Crown should be in command of the integrated federal forces so as to take action in cases of disturbance of public order against which the federal authorities or the individual states fail to take appropriate measures.

I believe there is no need for me to enlarge upon this problem here at this moment, but I am convinced that the Netherlands Government was justified in its desire to seek in the direct conversations with Premier Hatta a definite and final solution for the problem of the re-organization of the T.N.I. and its future position within the armed forces of the Federal Interim Government. I believe that this really remains one of—if not the most crucial problem to be solved. If we accept the continued presence and menace of “warlords” in Indonesia, no political system or organization and no cooperation with political leaders can prevail in the end, but only chaos and internal strife as is now so clearly demonstrated by recent events in China and Burma. Independence cannot be upheld without its counterpart: a responsible government in Which the military act as instrument of the government and not as its master. If this lesson is not learned now, I am afraid that much loss of life and gradual disintegration is in store for Indonesia, a situation which, I am sure, both your Government and mine will wish to prevent. An agreement without satisfactory guarantees for these problems would not constitute the acceptance of a calculated risk, on the contrary, it would mean a leap into the dark or a gamble with the future welfare of Indonesia at stake.

If the T.N.I. would be allowed to continue its present activities, no future Indonesian Government could be sure of a peaceful existence but always would be at the mercy of these adventurers who care little about creating a responsible Indonesian Government and less about the principles of democracy as conceived and agreed upon by both parties in the Renville-agrvemeiit.³

Please believe [etc.]

E. N. van Kleffens

1. For texts, see SC, 3rd yr., Suppl (Dec), pp. 257 ff.
2. Ibid., p. 267.
3. Mr. Lovett acknowledged the Netherlands Ambassador’s communication on December 10 and asked that the material be made available to Mr. Cochran at Batavia (501.BC Indonesia/12–1048).