Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East and Australasia, Volume VI

856d.00/12–748

The Department of State to the Netherlands Embassy ¹

Aide-Mémoire

1. The United States Government, having been encouraged by the resolute efforts of statesmanship exerted by the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs to clear the way to the earliest consideration of the essential issues in the dispute between the Government of the Netherlands and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, has been deeply disappointed to learn that the conversations in Indonesia between the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Netherlands Minister for Overseas Territories on the one hand and the Prime Minister of the Republic of Indonesia on the other, have been temporarily suspended with the return of the Netherlands Ministers to The Hague. The United States Government views with concern the possibility that these conversations may not be resumed. The return of the Netherlands Ministers to The Hague is viewed by the United States Government as regrettable inasmuch as expectations had been raised that a full delegation of the Republic would be invited to Batavia to participate with representatives of the Bandung group in a comprehensive discussion of the difficulties that appear to lie in the way of a final political settlement. This prospect had been regarded by the United States Government and its Representative with the Committee of Good Offices as offering unusual promise of fruitful negotiations looking toward such a settlement, which, as the Netherlands Government is aware, have been subject to unconscionable delays. The hopes entertained by this Government of a successful outcome had derived in no small measure from the excellent impression created on everyone concerned by the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, whose attitude appeared particularly well calculated to allay Republican fears of the Netherlands intentions, which otherwise would continue to make full cooperation impossible.

2. While aware of the critical points of contention which arose in the exploratory talks between the Netherlands Ministers and the Republican Prime Minister, the United States Government considers that it is precisely such points as these which might well be resolved by full and frank discussions among the three parties concerned in the future of Indonesia.

3. The United States Government is convinced that a resumption of bona fide negotiations is imperative. It may point out that a ready basis for such negotiations exists in the draft agreement submitted informally to the parties by the United States Representative on September 10 and accorded the status of a working paper of the Committee of Good Offices on November 10. It is the understanding of this Government that the draft agreement was, indeed, taken as a point of departure in the recent informal talks between the representatives of the parties.

4. The Netherlands Government is, of course, [fully] aware of the weakening position of the Government of Prime Minister Mohammed Hatta, who, while acting with skill and fortitude against a Communist revolt, has had to contend with an increasing deterioration of the Republic’s economic situation, and, at the same time, the as yet unsatisfied legitimate nationalist aspirations of his people. The United States Government is confident that the Netherlands Government will agree that Dr. Hatta has in recent interchanges given persuasive evidence of his desire to cooperate in a reasonable solution of the political differences between the Netherlands and the Republic and that the fall of his Government could only exacerbate, perhaps disastrously, the conditions under which a settlement must be reached.

5. In this connection, it would appear undeniable that the creation of a fully formed Provisional Federal Government without the participation of the Republic, should such an action be taken before all avenues of possible agreement with the Republic have been definitely exhausted, would discredit in the eyes of the Republican elements the moderate and conciliatory policy which Dr. Hatta has sought to promote.

6. The United States Government hopes that the Netherlands Government will be able to agree to the earliest possible resumption of negotiations, with or without the participation of the Committee of Good Offices in the preliminary phases and that it will not jeopardize the success of such negotiations or render them futile by proceeding with the creation of a Provisional Federal Government of the non-Republican territories.

7. The United States Government may venture to take this occasion to reiterate certain of its views on the character of the situation confronting the parties to the Indonesian dispute.

8. Successive United States Representatives on the Committee of Good Offices together with other neutral observers whose opinions this Government has reason to respect have come to identical conclusions regarding this situation. These may be summarized as follows: (1) The welfare of Indonesia is vitally dependent upon the continued availability to Indonesia of the experience and judgment and of the technical and administrative proficiency of the Dutch. (2) In the long run, the influence of the Netherlands and the economic stake it retains in Indonesia will be proportional to the confidence and good will accorded the Dutch by the Indonesian people. (3) The preponderant desire of the Indonesian people to govern themselves finds its chief expression in the Republic of Indonesia, which must be considered not as a geographical concept but as a political force.

9. The United States draft agreement was conceived with the aim of outlining the pattern of a reasonable and workable settlement between the Government of the Netherlands and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia. As such, it calls for concessions by the Republic which would provide the basis for the continuation of the Netherlands’ indispensable role in Indonesia and for concessions by the Netherlands to the nationalist movement which must probably be incorporated in any agreement which the Republican Government could accept without loss of essential political support and which the Netherlands may offer without impairment of its essential interests. As has been affirmed on several occasions by officials of the United States Government, the draft agreement was never meant to be regarded in any sense as fixed or unalterable in its specific provisions. The United States Government is of the opinion, however, that negotiations should be resumed on the understanding that their object is not to provide occasion for the introduction by either party of proposals which the other could not accept but to effect such alterations in the draft agreement as both sides, faced with the extreme costliness of a failure of negotiations, may consider possible of acceptance or as the Committee of Good Offices may be convinced are reasonable and advantageous, and with the assurance that both sides mean to carry out in a cooperative spirit the undertakings entered upon.

10. Should the final position taken by the Netherlands be one which the Republican Government, even with the end of its political and physical resources in sight, would consider that it could not meet, the present truce could scarcely be expected to endure. A further weakening of the Republican Government could only further impair its ability to restrain extremist elements, whose activities have already been a source of natural concern to the Netherlands.

11. In any general conflict, it is not doubted that Netherlands military forces would be able to capture all Republican centers in Java and all but the most remote in Sumatra in a matter of a few weeks or even days. However, aside from the fact that a resort to military force would come as a profound shock to the American people, it is doubtful that any issue would be settled by such quick successes. A concurrent development would probably be the destruction of a substantial proportion of Netherlands properties in Republican-controlled territory by the retreating Republican forces as a part of a general scorched-earth strategy for which the Republic is said to have made preparations. The Republican potential for guerilla warfare cannot yet be known. But at the same time, it is believed that the revolutionary groups, however split up, would in the long run be able to utilize the weapon of sabotage to decisive effect, that by the destruction of factories, plantations and transportation facilities, by the assassination of estate personnel and intimidation of workers, the revolutionary forces would be able to cancel the profits which might normally accrue from Dutch-owned and foreign-owned properties and transform Indonesia from an economic asset to the Netherlands to an ever more costly liability. Such an outcome could seriously deplete the resources of the Netherlands and tend to nullify the effect of appropriations made to the Netherlands and Indonesia under the Economic Cooperation Administration.

12. The physical assets to the Netherlands in Indonesia, precious as they are to European recovery and stability, would not be the only assets lost. The good will of the Indonesian people would necessarily in the course of the struggle be replaced by bitterness and enmity toward Europeans and the nationalist movement come under the sway of leaders with whom no truce, no common understanding would be possible. The Government of Prime Minister Mohammed Hatta may, in the opinion of the United States Government, offer the last opportunity for a settlement of the Indonesian dispute in which the legitimate interests of both sides could well be preserved and enhanced.

13. Should this opportunity be lost through a rejection by either party of the basic intent of the United States draft agreement without an agreement being reached on any other solution of the dispute, the United States will have no other recourse but to make clear in the Security Council its position that the draft agreement is a fair and practical basis for settlement, fully consonant with the Renville principles.

14. Should the United States Government at this or at any subsequent stage conclude that it has made without avail the full contribution of which it is capable to a settlement of the Indonesian dispute through the agency of the Committee of Good Offices, it would perforce consider that its resignation from the Committee would be in order.

15. In that event, the United States Government would regard itself as no longer bound by the restraints heretofore imposed by its membership on the Committee and would consider itself free to take such measures as the changed circumstances might require.

16. The Netherlands Government will understand that the United States Government, in presuming upon a long and tested friendship in stating frankly an expression of these views, is seeking only to give the Netherlands Government the benefit of its perspective so that the Netherlands Government will embark upon no course of action which, while undertaken with the most unexceptionable motives, could result in weakening the newly emerging Western European structure to the lasting disadvantage of the component nations.

Washington, December 7, 1948.

1. Text revised as of December 8 and substituted for original text not here printed. (See telegram 616, December 6, p. 527.) Revision was reported in telegram 614, December 8, 4 p. m., to The Hague, repeated in telegrams 619, Usgoc 220, to Batavia, and Gadel 718, December 9, 6 p. m., to Paris (for Jessup only).