501.BC Indonesia/12–348: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia 1
secret
us urgent
niact
us urgent
niact
Washington, December 3, 1948—6 p. m.
610. Usgoc 212. Projected aide-mémoire to Neth (Deptel 559 Nov 5) now redrafted as follows, for your info and comments. It will be held until you consider its presentation necessary and advisable.
- “1. Welcome decision by Govts of Kingdom Neth and Repub Indonesia to resume negotiations on basis draft agreement submitted informally Sept 10 by US Repr on GOC provides appropriate occasion for recapitulation certain views US Govt on situation confronting parties to dispute.
- 2. At outset, Dept State wishes express its appreciation of resolute and successful efforts of statesmanship exerted by Neth Minfonaff to clear way to earliest consideration essential issues in dispute. Dept confident his achievements have greatly enlarged possibility of attainment of final political settlement.
- 3. Regarding objectives of such settlement, successive US Reprs on GOC together with other neutral observers whose opinions this Govt has reason to respect have come to identical conclusions. These Dept State may venture recite as follows: (1) Welfare of Indonesia vitally dependent upon continued availability to Indonesia of experience and judgment and of technical and administrative proficiency of Dutch. (2) In long run, influence of Neth and economic stake it retains in Indonesia will be proportional to confidence and good will accorded Dutch by Indo people. (3) Preponderant desire of Indo people govern themselves finds its chief expression in Repub of Indonesia, which must be considered not as geographical concept but as political force.
- 4. In view this Govt, US draft agreement embodies in broad outline concessions to nationalist movement which must probably be incorporated in any agreement which Repub Govt could accept without loss of essential political support and which Neth Govt may offer without impairment its essential interests. This is, of course, not to imply that draft agreement is in any sense to be regarded as fixed and unalterable in its specific provisions. US Govt earnestly hopes, however, that Neth Govt will find itself able accept general concepts draft agreement as pattern of settlement with Repub and that negotiations may be continued on understanding that their object is not to provide occasion for substitution by either party of wholly different design which other could not accept but to effect such alterations draft agreement as both sides may consider possible of acceptance or as GOC may be convinced are reasonable and advantageous, and with assurance both sides mean carry out in cooperative spirit undertakings entered upon.
- 5. Should final position taken by Neth be one which Repub Govt, even with end of its political and physical resources in sight, would consider it could not meet, present truce could scarcely be expected endure. Further weakening Repub Govt, which has so far been able offer its supporters neither satisfactory settlement nationalist issue nor amelioration of deteriorating economic condition Repub-controlled territories, could only further impair its ability restrain extremist elements, whose activities have already been source natural concern to Neth.
- 6. In any general conflict, it is not doubted that Neth military forces would be able capture all Repub centers in Java and all but most remote in Sumatra in matter of few weeks or even days. However, aside from fact that resort to military force would come as profound shock to American people, it is doubtful that any issue would be settled by such quick successes. Concurrent development would probably be destruction of substantial proportion Neth properties in Repub-controlled territory by retreating Repub forces as part of general scorched-earth strategy for which Repub said to have made preparations. Repub potential for guerilla warfare cannot yet be known. But at same time, it believed that revolutionary groups, however split up, would in long run be able utilize weapon of sabotage to decisive effect, that by destruction factories, plantations and transportation facilities, by assassination estate personnel and intimidation workers, revolutionary forces would be able cancel profits which might normally accrue from Dutch-owned and foreign-owned properties and transform [Page 514] Indonesia from economic asset to Neth to ever more costly liability. Such outcome could seriously deplete resources of Neth and tend nullify effect appropriations made to Neth and Indonesia under ECA, or jeopardize continuance thereof.
- 7. Physical assets to Neth in Indonesia, precious as they are to European recovery and stability, would not be only assets lost. Good will of Indo people would necessarily in course of struggle be replaced by bitterness and enmity toward Europeans and nationalist movement come under sway of leaders with whom no truce, no common understanding would be possible. Govt of Prime Min Hatta may, in opinion Dept State, offer last opportunity for settlement Indo dispute in which legitimate interests both sides could well be preserved and enhanced.
- 8. Should this opportunity be lost through rejection by either party of basic intent of US draft agreement without agreement being reached on any other solution of dispute, US will have no other recourse but make clear in SC its position that draft agreement is fair and practical basis for settlement, fully consonant with Renville principles.
- 9. Should US Govt at this or any subsequent stage conclude that it has made without avail full contribution of which it capable to settlement Indo dispute through agency GOC, it would perforce consider its resignation from Committee would be in order.”
In light final para Gocus 466 Dec 3,2 you may wish recommend other representations from Dept to Neth Govt designed more specifically than aide-mémoire above to promote continuation present negotiations. If so, Dept will await your suggestions both as to substance and timing.
Lovett