Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

501.BB Palestine/12–2248: Airgram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Acting Secretary of State

top secret

London, December 22, 1948.

Subject: Appeal of British Government for US–UK understanding with regard to forthcoming Arab-Jewish negotiations re frontiers in Palestine.

A–2377. For Lovett and Satterthwaite (NEA).

Bevin held his “Palestine” luncheon mentioned my 5244 December 14 at his residence December 20. He had invited among others A. V. Alexander (Minister of Defence), Lord Tedder, General Slim (Chief, Imperial General Staff), Hector McNeil, Sir Orme Sargent, General Hollis, Michael Wright, Admiral Lord Frazer (First Sea Lord), William Hayter and Frank Roberts as well as Holmes and Jones of this Embassy.¹ Post-prandial conversation led by Bevin took place in atmosphere perhaps even more serious and charged with anxiety than at earlier meetings of same character (Embtel 2267, May 25 and Martel 134, Nov. 15 to Dept) and Defence Minister Alexander, when he spoke of Arab loss of faith in US and UK as result of Palestine and British observance of Arms Embargo, seemed particularly disturbed.

2. Bevin began by saying that he thought US and UK had “done well” in Europe: it remained for them to work out a Middle East policy and to “stay put on it”. World was in a difficult position: no one can forecast outcome in China and SE Asia although Bevin had been working hard on Indo China and had suggested to French that they should take “bolder line” there with view to establishing a kind of “Western Union for Southeast Asia”. Recent Dutch action had for time being spoiled Bevin’s hopes this connection.

3. Bevin said Pal developments were disappointing. He had banked on Bernadotte proposals and US support therefor. He now finds that all Arab States are rapidly losing faith in US and UK and deep pessimism re attitude of West is growing in addition to divisions between individual Arab States. Bevin said Pal settlement at the earliest possible date is essential. UK does not intend to “hold out” against recognition PGI and at proper time when UK knows location Israeli frontiers, UK will extend promptly full recognition to Israel. However, UK believes prospects for UK obtaining its strategic requirements from Israel in the foreseeable future are poor and possibility must be faced that “within five years” Israel may be Communist state. Bevin infers this from fact that new Jewish immigrants come largely from countries behind Iron Curtain where they have been exposed to Communist philosophy. There was no great exodus to Israel from the US and UK where democratic philosophy could have been absorbed. To have communist Israel lying athwart vital strategic roads in ME such as Auja-Beersheba, Gaza-Beersheba and El Kuntilla-Aqaba, would be serious blow to UK strategic plans for area, Bevin said provided these roads and airfield area in Gaza coastal strip (see Embs TopSec Despatch No. 2497 of December 21, 1948²) were safely in Arab hands UK would not object to Israel receiving part Negev and recognized this was inevitable. (Note: it seemed clear that Bevin had in mind that Israeli portion Negev should be within limits Nov. 29 Resolution east and west but not south Auja–Beersheba road which, together with Beersheba itself, should be in Arab hands.)

4. Bevin reiterated (Embs 5244, Dec. 14) that he hoped US would quickly appoint high caliber representative to Conciliation Commission and that CC would deal specifically with frontiers as well as with general conciliation between parties. He thought CC should endeavor to complete its work in not more than 90 days from present. If CC were not successful, Bevin thought it likely that US and UK would be faced with “another China” in ME.

5. When the Ambassador asked Bevin to explain what he meant by “another China” he mentioned following as factors in support this idea:

a) Kurds in Iraq offer admirable opportunity for Sov agents to work up racial feeling;

b) economic stagnation in Iraq following closure south leg pipe line; and

c) possibility that at any time USSR may switch its support from Israel to Egypt and Transjordan thus creating a great impression in Arab world.

Bevin thought it should not be difficult for USSR to coalesce these indigenous factors into a series of ME civil wars.

6. In contrast to above, Bevin said that once Pal is settled US and UK can quickly push ahead with economic development of Iraq along lines of scheme which he had brought to Secretary’s attention in Moscow.³ Iraq, on basis present irrigation schemes, could be made capable of absorbing 150% larger population and this might go far to take care of many Arab refugees as well as Arab population increase.

7. Alexander interrupted at this point to make impassioned plea regarding importance Arab goodwill to US and UK since “only this can check subversive Soviet efforts in area”.

8. Bevin said that UK took great risk in supporting Bernadotte proposals and in abiding by UK Arms Embargo. UK had been successful in persuading Arabs to accept first Truce and now Arabs hold UK responsible for Israeli successes achieved by breaking practically every phase of Truce. UK asked Arabs to accept Bernadotte proposals on understanding these were supported by US, but when time came US Del Paris urged postponement consideration Pal problem until after November 2. As it turned out, US attitude has not been in any way changed since Nov. 2 and Arabs have grown progressively weaker. Now Arabs are asking UK to supply them with arms up to the level of arms acquired illegally by Israel. Only way out of situation which Bevin could see was for US and UK to make certain that CC achieves a settlement within next 90 days. With this objective in mind Bevin suggested that US and UK should arrive at an understanding regarding location southern frontier of Israel in Negev.

9. Bevin then asked Tedder to explain latest Brit thinking re broad strategic aspects Pal problem. This Tedder did substantially along lines para two Embtel 2267, May 25. He commented that it was being said that UK military in supporting Arabs “had backed the wrong horse”. He did not think that this was the case since all along Brit military have said Jews would win the first round in any Arab-Jewish clash. Tedder spoke forcefully of danger to defence Suez Canal of Communist infiltration in Middle East and other Moslem countries but commented that he did not think Moslems are likely to go Communist unless local governments collapse with resultant chaos. Of various grave aspects Pal situation, among the most important was its effect on stability of local Arab governments.

10. Slim at this point injected the view that it is “very wrong” to think that Moslems do not become Communists: for example, Bokhara, with its Moslem population, early fell under Soviet domination even while USSR was weak. Alexander opined that Israel will go Communist much more readily than any Moslem State.

11. The Ambassador said that if he understood the British proposition correctly, the Brit Chiefs of Staff are anxious to take out insurance against possibility that Israel, in the event of hostilities, would be either a neutral or an unfriendly state. With this in mind UK would like to see Negev boundary Israel so placed that it would not affect most pressing Brit needs in Negev (see para 3 above and Embs Top Sec Despatch No. 2497 of December 21, 1948). Those present agreed with the Ambassador’s statement of the British position.

12. The Ambassador then suggested that if Brit military believe Israel possesses the strongest indigenous military force in the Middle East it would be advisable for UK to consider how Israel can be kept oriented towards the West. Bevin promptly agreed with this point and said that his greatest wish is to achieve an early settlement Pal problem provided this is not done at expense of Britain’s Arab friends. Hector McNeil expressed view that if CC operates with clear understanding strategic problems involved in locating Negev frontier it should be possible for it to achieve a settlement which would neither outrage Arabs nor perpetuate Arab-Jewish friction in the Middle East. It could be argued, McNeil said, that Israel might become eventually important asset in Middle Eaistern defence. However, at present Transjordan and Egypt are certainly “better bets than Israel”, and consequently their goodwill should not be destroyed to satisfy exaggerated Israeli claims upon territory in the Negev. This caused McNeil to believe it would be desirable for CC to have a “working plan” based on US–UK understanding before it sits down to work with parties.

13. Michael Wright said UK is faced with difficult diplomatic problem since it is certain that Arab States will ask UK advice before and during CC negotiations. UK does not wish to advise Arabs contrary to ideas of US. But what are ideas US? Without these UK could say very little to Arabs.

14. Bevin asked that the Ambassador should take particular pains during his brief visit Washington to discuss foregoing Brit view with Dept since in Bevin’s view the sooner US and UK reach an understanding re location southern frontier of Israel which UK could recommend to Arabs and which US could recommend to PGI, the better. Vital factor in such an understanding would be unwavering US and UK support to parties of agreed line. The Ambassador promised, without commitment re prospects of success, that he would do this and would send Bevin Depts reactions. He would do this if possible before Jan 1, 1949. The Ambassador made it clear, however, that present trend Depts thinking as he understood it is to leave location Negev frontier so far as possible to CC.

15. Tedder again raised question desirability UK supplying RAF installations Amman along lines para 10 et seq., Martel 134, Nov 15, to Dept. It was clear that he and Alexander regard this as matter of pressing concern but that no immediate moves to take this action are contemplated. Bevin mentioned reinforcement RAF installation Amman in connection with arranging for Brit Consul General to open office Tel Aviv and for release of Jews detained Cyprus. He said that if these two pro-Israel measures were taken, reinforcement RAF Amman would be one of things which he might do in an effort to compensate and restore confidence of Arab side.

16. To summarize foregoing, the British Government is most anxious that:

(a) US immediately appoint a high-caliber man to be US representative on the Conciliation Commission and direct him to use his influence to get the Conciliation Commission operating on the spot in Palestine at the earliest possible date;

(b) US and UK should reach a firm understanding based upon mutual strategic needs regarding the location of the southern frontier of Israel with a view to:

(i) UK recommending Arab acquiescence to this agreed frontier,

(ii) US recommending Israeli acquiescence to this agreed frontier, and

(iii) US member Conciliation Commission being appropriately briefed re US–UK strategic thinking so that in so far as possible he can use his influence to secure Arab-Israeli acquiescence to the agreed frontier.⁴

Holmes

1. Ambassador Douglas led the American group but left London for Washington before this airgram was ready for his signature.
2. Not printed.
3. See Mr. Bevin’s undated memorandum transmitted with a memorandum of March 20, 1947, and footnote 33, Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. v, p. 503.

4. A notation on airgram 2377 states that London placed the original and four carbons in an envelope addressed to Ambassador Douglas in care of Mr. Lovett and sent them to Washington via Navy courier. The editors presume that the Ambassador handed what became the Department’s record copy of the airgram to officers of the Department during his conversations with them.

   In a letter of January 18, 1949, to First Secretary Jones at the Embassy in the United Kingdom, Mr. Satterthwaite wrote in part: “Shortly after Ambassador Douglas’ arrival here, a meeting was set up to discuss Palestine with him. Present were Dean Rusk, Ray Hare, Rob McClintock, Stuart Rockwell and myself. The Ambassador went over your long Top Secret airgram 2377 of December 22 with us and described in detail his meetings with Bevin on the general subject. We went into the background of the US position on Palestine, with particular reference to the basic policy set up by the President. At the end of the meeting the Ambassador said that he completely understood the situation and realized that the Department would not be able to go along with Mr. Bevin on the position which the latter wished to see adopted.” (501.BB Palestine/1–1849)