Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

867N.01/12–2048: Telegram

The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

secret

Tel Aviv, December 20, 1948—4 p. m.

323. Remistel 317, December 17.¹, While not aware Department thinking re publicized Export-Import Bank loan Israel or exact timing de jure recognition, mission deems it most important take into account following considerations:

1. While domestically there are party differences as to future socioeconomic and religious pattern, any appraisal Israel international political problems must proceed from fundamental premise that thinking is conditioned by ardent desire to achieve “kibbutz galuyot” (“ingathering of exiles”) to save persecuted Jews abroad.

2. Political struggle coming elections essentially between MAPAI and MAPAM. MAPAI orientated West in belief Western system political freedom and socio-economic justice is closest to objectives Israel people is aware dangers Soviet, its historic antipathy Zionism and present persecution Zionists USSR; is willing cautiously risk Soviet ire, both nationally and with respect Jews in USSR and satellites to form working liaison with West. MAPAM, which is itself coalition, contains substantial elements who, although not Communists in party-line sense, are nevertheless pro-Soviet in sympathy these elements against any overt move tying Israel irrevocably with West owing desire remain “neutral” and fear Israel will be a pawn for Western powers with consequent disaster hostage Jews abroad; they are impressed by Soviet UN” aid and stress US “alliance” with British whom vast majority population now considers Israel arch-enemy. Extended conversations with MAPAM leaders indicate naive and wishful thinking re USSR with great ignorance of USA; they believe that by being “nice” to Soviets and above all avoiding antagonize USSR Soviets will continue give Israel firm support UN” and ultimately let 3 to 4 million Jews in Soviet orbit go Israel without any specific quid pro quo.

3. As previously reported Mission unable to date obtain evidence any quid pro asked or offered other than cash payment for arms purchased satellite countries. However, gratitude population to USSR is strong and if composition Israel Government should be one of amenable type Soviets will press for favors. Incipient pressures this direction may be implicit in action Czechoslovakia, Rumania, etc., re emigration and training recently reported by Missions here. True Soviets failure so far capitalize underlying widespread gratitude, but there is strongest reason believe MAPAI leaders more disturbed than they admit at possibility USSR pressure.

4. In coming election general belief is MAPAI will probably get 30 to 35 percent seats Assembly, MAPAM 18 to 20 percent, and balance will go center and extreme right. Thus MAPAI would have control by margin of coalition with center and right. However, such margin not sufficient insure stability of all probable international contingencies, nor to resist more radical domestic policies of MAPAM. Moreover, Soviets may plan some campaign tricks, possibly using MAPAM front to influence January 25 election Assembly or February elections Histadrut Council.

5. In view above, Mission hopes Department will immediately consider political advisability some action unambiguously demonstrating USA determination strengthen those elements here who stand clearly for Western system political freedom and socio-economic justice. In so doing US should avoid forcing those elments make specific declaration they are openly antagonistic to USSR. Since Department is expected ultimately announce de jure recognition or recommend loans, it would be advantageous make announcement immediately of recognition, or at least of loan, utilizable by MAPAI as clear evidence reliability US. Regarding loan, MAPAM position is that it is needed but MAPAM will resist imposition political conditions and hence announcement should make clear no political conditions while, of course, reserving free action re credit risk and applicable bank regulations.

6. Mission of opinion that firm declaration by Department on loan to Israel would accomplish much. De jure recognition statement would show US not lagging behind USSR and not tied British policies. Mission recommends any announcement action simultaneously Washington and Tel Aviv to obtain maximum effect. Department requested also keep Mission continuously informed, for its comment.²

McDonald

1. Not printed.
2. Mr. McDonald, on December 21, suggested that telegram 323 be sent to the White House (telegram 325, 867N.01/12–2148). A marginal notation on the latter message by Mr. Rockwell stated that Mr. Humelsine would send No. 323 to the White House. The next day, Mr. McDonald sent a telegram for the “Personal attention Clifford and info Department,” which stated in part: “Anxious you study personally recommendations ourtel 323. … President’s timely action loan and de jure recognition could checkmate Russian attempts weaken predominant moderate pro-Western forces during present electoral campaign.” (No. 333, 867N.01/12–2248)