501.BB Palestine/11–1048
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State
| Participants: | Mr. Lovett |
| Mr. Eliahu Epstein, Chief of Israeli Mission | |
| Mr. Michael Comay, Israeli Representative at United Nations | |
| Mr. Rockwell |
Mr. Epstein had requested an appointment to present Mr. Comay. The latter said that the principal reason he had come to the United States was to acquaint Israeli officials in this country with developments in the United Nations.
Mr. Comay stated that the Israeli Government, while in general welcoming Dr. Bundle’s proposal looking toward the establishment of an armistice in Palestine, was seriously disturbed by Bundle’s suggestion regarding the establishment of demilitarized neutral zones. The Provisional Government of Israel felt that this was most unsatisfactory in that such demilitarized zones would be difficult to control and would be subject to entry by irregular forces which would imperil the Jewish settlements. The Provisional Government of Israel would, instead, prefer the demarcation of a line between the Israeli and Egyptian forces.
I pointed out to Mr. Comay that the Bunche resolution does not mention how large the demilitarized zones would be and stated that in my opinion it was essential, if an armistice were to be discussed, that the opposing armies be separated by a neutral zone rather than be face-to-face across a line of demarcation.
Mr. Comay then went on to say that the Israeli Government was also very much disturbed by the Security Council resolution of November 4 calling for withdrawal of forces which had advanced in the Negev beyond the positions held on October 14. The Provisional Government of Israel, said Mr. Comay, was convinced that the British were using this resolution as a means of achieving their ends as regards the final political settlement in Palestine and not merely as a measure in connection with truce violations. Mr. McNeil’s statement to Major Eban proved this.
Mr. Comay then produced a cable from Shertok setting forth the points he had just made.
I inquired whether the Provisional Government of Israel’s desire not to withdraw from the newly gained positions had anything to do with the forthcoming Israeli elections. Mr. Epstein admitted that domestic political factors were indeed involved, and that the Provisional Government of Israel would be embarrassed politically by such a withdrawal. He said that the extremists were still an important [Page 1563] and dangerous element in Israel and that it was essential they be kept in control. If the Israeli forces should be withdrawn from the new lines in the Negev, apparently under United States and United Kingdom pressure in the United Nations, it would strengthen the hand of those in Israel who claim that the only friend that Israel has is the USSR.
I then went on to mention to Messrs. Comay and Epstein that this; Government had given its support to the retention by Israel of the territory allotted to it under the November 29 Security Council resolution, and that this territory included the Negev but did not include Western Galilee or Jaffa, now occupied by the Jews. I said that if the Israelis intended to claim Western Galilee and Jaffa as well as the Negev, their claims to the November 29 territory could not then be justified on the grounds of right and justice. I said that it seemed to me that if Israel desired to retain the Negev she would have to give up Western Galilee. I added that in my opinion, the Provisional Government of Israel was now called upon to show the highest degree of moral courage and statesmanship. The situation in the United Nations as regards Palestine was reaching an impasse and a way had to be found to satisfy, insofar as possible, the claims of all parties without impairing the authority of the United Nations. I said that I would hate to see the matter come to sanctions, but that the United Nations could not continue to be disregarded. I was sure, I added, that a solution could be achieved through negotiation either directly between the parties or through the United Nations, but that it would be necessary for both sides to make some concessions. The United Nations had been and could still be very useful to Israel, and it would make a most unfortunate impression if Israel in the triumph of its military victories, should adopt an uncompromising attitude.
Mr. Comay said that the Provisional Government of Israel regarded the territory allotted to Israel by the November 29 resolution as belonging to Israel by right, and considered that the territory militarily occupied outside of this area could be a matter for discussion. I said that one could discuss all one wanted to, but the fact was that the retention by Israel of Western Galilee as well as the territory allotted to Israel under the November 29 resolution could not be justified on the grounds of right and justice. Mr. Epstein said that the position I had described was entirely correct, and that the Provisional Government of Israel wished to abide by decisions of the United Nations.
Mr. Epstein then said that the Israelis were convinced that it would be possible to work things out by direct negotiations with the Arabs but that the Arabs were encouraged not to negotiate by such United
Nations steps as the November 4 resolution and by the machinations of the British.