501.BB Palestine/11–948: Telegram
The Ambassador in Egypt (Griffis) to the Acting Secretary of State
1585. For Lovett. Against background of (1) my conviction that King Farouk is sole effective source of Egyptian policy today; (2) my belief that HM’s influence and prestige are such as to induce other Arab states to follow Egypt’s lead; (3) the assumption that UN will either fail to adopt effective measures to bring about settlement in Palestine or will delay taking action until Israelis have completely conquered Negeb, thereby forcing us to abandon our announced support of Bernadotte plan, if we have not already done so, and probably causing collapse Egyptian Government with disastrous impact on stability Middle East, the following thoughts are presented on which I would like the Department’s comments.
King Farouk is apparently aware of implications present situation Negeb and may be seeking way out possibly along line direct negotiations. (Embtel 1584, November 9 and Delga telegram 640, November 6).1 I might further influence King’s inclination toward direct [Page 1561] negotiations by suggesting to His Majesty that US being always eager for peace would look with favor on his entrance into final peace negotiations with Israel and would appreciate instructions being sent his delegation at UN that he was prepared to take this step. His delegation might also be instructed to advise SC or GA. Should King indicate desire for part of Negeb I might also indicate limited US support. I might additionally suggest that US would then promptly agree to negotiate a treaty which would include the exchange of students, et cetera, between the two countries (Fulbright plan); the sending to Egypt from US of such engineering, agricultural and commercial commissions as be desired to aid in Egypt’s problems; the existing goodwill Egypt-American treaty of 1929 would be strengthened and extended, the Department would be prepared to recommend to the Tariff Commission a further increase in the cotton quota, et cetera. Facilities might also be granted for training selected Egyptian officers in US Army and air schools, eagerly sought by King Farouk.
I understand perfectly that no military guarantees could be involved and that the proposed treaty would constitute primarily a smokescreen behind which Egypt could negotiate with Israel. HM could, however, combine with his statement of recognition of Israel a statement relative to UN pressure and initiate a tremendous amount of propaganda to what he had accomplished as a result of his negotiations with the US.
The keynote of these suggestions lies in my belief that Egypt desires an authoritative mandate which involves the US rather than the UN. At the same time UN would not be by-passed as HM’s entire approach to the matter would be through it.
In this connection Mohamed Ali, uncle of the King, and heir to the throne, stated to me in conversation Saturday that only three things would be required by Egypt to bring settlement Palestine: (1) internationalization of Jerusalem; (2) ejection from Palestine of terrorists and what he described as “Russian Jews”; and (3) guarantee of new borders by US and England.
Please note that practically every high official in government with whom I have discussed Palestine settlement in last ten weeks has referred to this type of guarantee and feeling of impotency of UN guarantee. My answers have been invariably that UN guarantee as good or better than any other as if UN fails we all fail. However, all Egyptians desperately desire US trade-mark.
- Neither printed.↩