Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

501.BB Palestine/11–148: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Acting Secretary of State

top secret   us urgent
niact

London, November 1, 1948—9 p. m.

4707. For Lovett (eyes only) from Douglas.

1. For the Secretary.¹ This will confirm in writing what I told you orally of my conversation with Michael Wright this morning in regard to Palestine, (a) Wright said that the SC sub-Committee, appointed for the purpose of drafting a resolution in regard to Palestine, will complete its work and submit its draft to the Security Council tomorrow afternoon, November 2; (b) That the SC will meet on Wednesday to consider this draft; (c) That it would be an obvious and transparent sham to postpone beyond Wednesday a meeting of the SC for the above purpose.

2. Wright expressed great concern about the operations of the Israeli Armed Forces and their success in driving the Arab forces out of Galilee. He said that it might be necessary for the British to consider now delivery of ammunition and arms to the Arab forces which, because of the meticulous observance by the British of the arms embargo, had reduced the Arab forces and the Arab Legion to a state of almost complete impotence. (See previous telegrams on this subject.)

3. In reply to a question I told Wright that no commitment could be made about the prospects of US–UK concerted support of the resolution which the SC will consider, but that he could be assured that if the British were at the present moment to send arms to the Arabs, they would be running the very great risk of destroying all hope of concerted US–UK support. Particularly would this probably be the case were news of any such action on the part of the British to be given public currency.

4. Wright then said that the British would do nothing during the next 48 hours unless Israeli forces should attack the Arab Legion, when they would have to reconsider and would consult US.

5. Wright reaffirmed British position, with which I concur heartily, that there can be no answer to the Palestinian problem with all of its manifold consequences in the Middle East and elsewhere, unless the US and UK stand firmly together in regard to: (a) The resolution covering the truce, et cetera, on which the SC will act on Wednesday; and (b) The Bernadotte proposals on which the GA will commence consideration during the course of the next week or so.

6. Wright indicated that the position taken by Ukraine on the subcommittee might be prophetic of a Soviet veto of the resolution in the SC on Wednesday.

7. In the event that the UK–US stand together on the truce resolution and that there is no Soviet veto, Wright expressed the hope that should the Israeli refuse to abide by the terms of the SC resolution, we would not support admission of Israeli to the UN and would not extend de jure recognition.

8. Wright asked whether any consideration had been given by the US to any course of action should the Soviet veto the SC resolution. He expressed his personal view that the first obvious step would be for the US–UK to stand firmly behind the Bernadotte proposals in the Assembly.

9. Should the Israeli not abide by the terms of the resolution in regard to the truce, even though vetoed by the Soviet while being supported by all the other members, Wright expressed again, personally, the hope that we would maintain our arms embargo, that we would not support the admission of Israeli to the UN, and that we would not, in these circumstances, extend de jure recognition. While he could not state formal British position, he thought it not unlikely, under these circumstances, particularly if the Israeli indicated any preparation for further aggressive action, that Britain might have to honor its treaty obligations to furnish ammunition to Transjordan and the Arab Legion. HMG would, of course, consult with US.

10. In view of Parodi’s implied change of position in regard to the resolution for the SC, particularly that portion of it dealing with consideration of the imposition of sanctions, Wright wondered whether any member of the American Delegation had been directly or indirectly bringing pressure to bear on French Government.²

Sent Department as 4707; repeated Paris for Secretary as 830.

Douglas

1. At Paris.
2. The Secretary commented on this paragraph on November 2, stating that “No member USDel has been directly or indirectly bringing pressure on French. USDel has taken no part at all in work of sub-committee and has refused to comment even when sub-committee members ask for our views.… After all, it must be recalled that the French too have their Zionist pressures.” (Telegram Delga 568 from Paris, 501.BB Palestine/11–248)