Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

501.BB Palestine/10–2648: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

secret   us urgent
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Paris, October 26, 1948—8 p. m.

Delga 488. Both Egyptian and Israeli Governments have accepted ceasefire¹ and Case 12 decision (document S/1042) relating convoys northern Negev. Meanwhile, General Riley ordered yesterday in name Bunche parties return their previous military positions (October 14 truce line) contemplated October 19 SC action. Informed by Eban, Comay last night PGI very reluctant agree withdrawal to previous positions.² At SC meeting this morning Egyptian, Lebanese, Syrian delegates laid very heavy stress on Israeli conquest teritory by force and in effect served notice they would regain own freedom action in event Israeli failure comply Riley’s order. This would undoubtedly lead serious truce violations in northern Palestine and renewed fighting Negev.

Next meeting Council set for Thursday morning and Bunche expects have report from Riley regarding compliance his withdrawal order by that time.

UK delegate instructed introduce resolution, text in next following telegram (Delga 489, October 26³). Instructed seek joint sponsorship US, France or other appropriate Council members. We discouraged idea US joining sponsorship but British feel very strongly US, support essential. We assume in light of Gadel 266, October 21, Department would prefer that we not join UK in sponsoring this resolution but that we should speak briefly in support of and vote for resolution if it comes to vote Thursday morning. Please instruct most urgently any contrary view.

Department will observe UK draft resolution is still in nature of holding and time-serving action. If after passage such resolution either party refuses comply with order for withdrawal to previous military positions such refusal would be most serious breach of truce and affront to prestige of SC which is not at present very high regarding Palestine. Minimum immediate action required in this event would be further SC resolution ordering parties return at once previous military positions as further provisional measure under article 40 (compare July 15 resolution) together with strong declaration failure comply would be cause imposition sanctions under article 41 against party failing comply or if single party not determinable because of confused situation then against both parties. Strong US support and preferably joint sponsorship resolution along foregoing lines would not only be minimum consistent our previous position in SC but also essential effective SC action and maintenance US prestige in SC particularly in view recent factors which have again seriously weakened our prestige in UN regarding Palestine. Failure such action by SC under circumstances envisaged would not only further seriously weaken prestige of SC and of US but would also most seriously impair chances GA settlement based on Bernadotte plan or Arab subsequent acquiescence therein.

It would obviously be desirable if at all possible avoid deterioration truce situation Palestine to point requiring further SC action along strong lines indicated preceding paragraph. We feel therefore that every possible step should be taken prevent such deterioration and, in addition support UK resolution referred to above, recommend strongly Department send most immediate circular telegram to Tel Aviv, Cairo, particularly, as well as Amman, Baghdad, Beirut and Damascus, instructing US representatives urge strongest terms prompt compliance with orders withdraw to previous military positions. Informed by UK delegation their missions Arab capitals instructed make strong representations avoid hostilities.⁴

Repeated London as Paris 1114.

Marshall

1. As of 12 noon, GMT, October 22.
2. Mr. Eban gave the Israeli position on this matter in a statement before the Security Council on October 26. He noted that in its action of October 19 (see editorial note, p. 1493), the Council had set three conditions as “the basis for further negotiations looking toward insurance that similar outbreaks will not again occur and that the truce will be fully observed in this area.” He then requested the Council to “observe that no distinction is made … between sub-paragraph (a), referring to suggested withdrawal to previous positions, and sub-paragraphs (b) and (c), referring to other questions … which were referred to the parties with a recommendation for direct negotiation. But, in the speech of the representative of Egypt this morning, we find that, instead of opening the negotiations on subjects recognized by the Security Council as controversial, he seeks to prejudice the outcome of these negotiations by expressing himself in favour of withdrawal and ignoring the Security Council’s injunction to make these three points an immediate subject of negotiation.” (SC, 3rd yr., No. 121, p. 20.)
3. Not printed; for the text of the joint resolution offered by the British and Chinese Representatives on October 28, see SC, 3rd yr., No. 122, p. 12. It proposed the Security Council’s endorsement of the Acting Mediator’s order to the Egyptian and Israeli Governments to withdraw to the positions they occupied on October 14 and establish a committee of the Council “to examine urgently and report to the Council on the measures which it would be appropriate to take under Article 41 of the Charter if either party or both should fail to comply with the order of the Acting Mediator . . . .”
4. The Department, on October 27, informed Secretary Marshall of its “Regret owing to conditions which you will understand we do not yet find it possible to take action recommended last para. Delga 488.” (Telegram Gadel 329 to Paris, 501.BB Palestine/10–2748)