Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

501.BB Palestine/9–2448: Telegram

The Minister in Syria (Keeley) to the Acting Secretary of State

secret
urgent

Damascus, September 24, 1948—11 p. m.

618. Whereas my instructions (Depcirtel September 22, 2 p. m.) limit me to urging “acceptance” Bernadotte conclusions, Bevin’s instructions (London’s 4221 to Department September 22, 7 p. m.¹) to British Chargé Dundas pointed out cardinal point of plan is that neither party is called upon to make any active sign of acceptance or to recognize position of other party and charged him in collaboration with his US colleague “who will receive similar instructions” to seek “acquiescence” of Syrian Government [apparent omission] at his discretion in initial interviews, in subsequent conversations and in publicity guidance suggested arguments given him in great detail. “Only essential” said Bevin “is that our persuasions should be successful”.

After consultation with me and before receipt of my instructions (Legtel 617, September 24, 11 p. m.¹), Dundas made to Barazi plea for “acquiescence” on ground that however imperfect Bernadotte’s conclusions might be they were considered by HMG as best proposal likely to get universal support. Dundas and I are in agreement that Arab weakness in both political and military sphere is such as to give them no reasonably acceptable alternative. He plans support my arguments in this sense with President, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister and I propose generally to support his arguments as suggested by Bevin to extent applicable to our somewhat different situation.

Since Barazi has frequently expressed Syrian Government’s grave doubts re value of UN guarantee of any recommended Palestine frontiers, because Syrians sincerely doubt Israel’s peaceful intentions and fear its aggressive designs, they might well be more amenable to reason in this crucial point and hence more willing acquiesce in imposition of Bernadotte conclusions if American Government were on record at least as approving British position. I therefore respectfully recommend out of depth my conviction and that of my staff concerning its desirability and timeliness that US show some awareness of Arab fears of announced Zionist pretensions and offer something as quid pro quo for Arab acquiescence. Specifically I request Department’s authority make, at moment which may seem to us here most opportune for promotion of Syrian acquiescence in plan, a statement along following lines:

“British assurances that unprovoked Israeli violation of Arab frontiers would be considered in effect ‘act of war’ against Britain and would put into operation various Anglo-Arab treaties under Article 51 of Charter is made with knowledge and full approval American Government. Furthermore, US Government, which fully understands that alleged Zionist ambitions are source of grave concern to Syrian Government, desires emphasize that, while for constitutional reasons it cannot give pledge similar to British assurances it is bound by UN Charter in concert with other UN members ‘to take effective collective measures for the suppression of acts of aggression.’”

In interest not only of influencing Syrians to “go along” with implementation of Bernadotte plan but in concern for future of American interests in this area, I urge above message or some show of sympathy with disagreeableness of bitter pill Syrians are being asked to swallow in acquiescing in perpetuation in Palestine of Zionist state which they honestly feel will be perpetual threat to their national security. Even words alone, a few understanding ones, mean far more in eastern psychology than in occidental. Let us not lose this opportunity honestly to fortify our position for the future.²

Pouched Arab capitals, Athens, Ankara.

Sent Department; Department pass Paris 19 for USUNDel and London 7.

Keeley

1. Not printed.
1. Not printed.
2. The Department, in reply on September 30, expressed its appreciation of the reasoning underlying the penultimate paragraph but regretted it was unable “at present” to authorize Mr. Keeley to make a statement along the lines suggested (telegram 377, 501.BB Palestine/9–2148).