501.BB Palestine/9–2448: Telegram
Mr. Wells Stabler to the Secretary of State
63. Since for reasons given by King (mytel 62, September 241) it may be difficult for Transjordan to accept Bernadotte’s conclusions, am convinced no problem will be encountered in obtaining Transjordan’s acquiescence to them if they are adopted by UN and imposed by resolution.
King’s well-known reluctance pursue war, his past and present reasonable attitude toward Jews, his desire annex Arab parts Palestine, his Greater Syria scheme, and his close alliance with British are all calculated make his position among Arab states difficult, if not [Page 1420] dangerous. So far strength of Arab Legion has been deterrent to any overt conspiracy. King realizes therefore that any forthright acceptance Mediator’s conclusions would make his position untenable and that in storm such acceptance would cause, he might lose all he had struggled for. No doubt exists that King generally favors Bernadotte’s conclusions (with possible exception matters as Jaffa and Jerusalem) since he is one of principal beneficiaries. Accordingly, Transjordan will be among first, if not first, to urge acquiescence by Arab states to UN imposed solution based on Mediator’s conclusions.
Although realize matter under active consideration, feel US recognition this country, even if de facto, at this time would contribute to solution Palestine problem by placing Transjordan on equal footing with Israel before UN and by giving it needed support for taking major lead in any debate by Arab League concerning acceptance or acquiescence Bernadotte’s conclusions.
Department pass Jerusalem 46, Tel Aviv 2.
- Not printed; the reasons given by the King were that “he is surrounded by hostile elements in Syria, Lebanon, Egypt and to certain degree in Iraq. … Arab hostile elements are seeking destroy him and Transjordan and criticize every step he makes which they consider not in concert with Arab (League decisions. Therefore as an Arab leader he is obliged concur in and adopt decisions made by majority other Arab leaders.” (501.BB Palestine/9–2448)↩