501.BB Palestine/8–2548: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State
3851. Foreign Office has been pressing forward its detailed consideration Department’s views as embodied Department’s 31871 and more tentatively in Department’s 3208, August 13. Foreign Office has in mind advancing exchange of ideas with United States Government one step further by submitting its views to Department partly in form of draft report and recommendations by Mediator to UN. At level of officials this draft is already well advanced and should be ready for despatch soon.
2. While Foreign Office views may change, Embassy understands from usual Foreign Office sources that British reply likely to be upon following lines.
3. Foreign Office finds substance Department’s thinking not far from its own on major points. However, Foreign Office entertains certain differences of view re practical approach to problem, and has been trying to work out satisfactory compromise. Outstanding among differences is Foreign Office belief that at this stage it will be impossible to bring about negotiations or even informal discussions between Arabs and Jews (paragraph 5 Department’s 3187). Foreign Office [Page 1343] feels that if acquiescence both sides is to be secured this can only be on basis of Israeli frontier physically drawn by Mediator without consultation with either side as to its main features. Wherever possible Mediator would take into account views local inhabitants, communications, etc., but his decision re boundary location would be final.
4. In particular, for reasons given in paragraph 3 Embassy’s 3756, August 182 Foreign Office believes Transjordan Government should not at this stage be asked to undertake negotiations with PGI (paragraph 6 Department’s 3208, August 13). Foreign Office believes that if Transjordan Government should do this it would lose last vestige respect accorded Transjordan by other Arab states and net result might be disappearance from scene of most moderate and cooperative Arab League state along with Arab Legion (see Embassy’s 3592, August 92).
5. Another idea likely to be in reply is free zone at Haifa (paragraph 2 Department’s 3187) including oil area. This would be under Israeli sovereignty but in initial stages at least Mediator would have to be charged with getting zone into operation on basis free use by Arabs who would be called upon to place no obstacle in way oil deliveries. Zone would be governed by UN port commissioner with international police force. Foreign Office also believes both sides must have access to Lydda airfield.
6. Re future Jerusalem Foreign Office believes Department’s idea tripartite condominium would be improved and chairmanship by interested parties two-thirds of time avoided if Jerusalem made fully autonomous municipal unit under neither Arab nor Jewish sovereignty. Jerusalem would be governed by a governor responsible to UN assisted by a force of international police responsible to him. Governor would be appointed in such a way as to avoid deadlock as over governor Trieste. Administration of city would be carried out by Arab and Jewish municipal administrations on either side of line demarcated on ground. UN governor would have overriding authority (powers of veto and of initiative) over both municipal administrations which Foreign Office hopes would fuse after a time into one municipal authority. Meanwhile governor would make necessary arrangements for common services, and would have special responsibilities re rights of Christian communities, preservation of holy places and access thereto. There would be no Jewish corridor to Jerusalem and governor would make necessary arrangements for transit facilities; failure by either party to enter into reasonable arrangements or to respect arrangements made in this regard would be reported by him to SC.
[Page 1344]7. Re Arab refugees (paragraph 3 Deptreftel) Foreign Office considers that realistic appraisal this problem indicates that either Jewish authorities should agree to allow refugees to come back or give them compensation for property they have left behind. Mediator would report to SC if PGI refused to enter into reasonable arrangements in this regard. Foreign Office believes that despite their plight in other Arab countries many Arab refugees are too terrified of Jews ever to return (paragraph 7, Embassy’s 3785, August 203).
8. Re prospective 100 million dollar US Government loan for PGI (paragraph 9g Deptreftel) Foreign Office still has in mind desirability equaling outside economic help to both Jews and Arabs (paragraph 5b Embassy’s 34844) and wonders whether Department plans to make similar or smaller loan to Arab states, who might be slow to realize ultimate advantage to them of encouraging Israel’s industrial capabilities.
9. Foreign Office appears in general agreement with principle of letting Arabs decide future Arab part Palestine but thinks it unlikely Palestine Arabs and Arab states could reach agreement on disposal. Foreign Office thinks agreement could only be reached on unrealistic idea independent Arab state. Therefore it believes Mediator should fix general principles disposal with Arab Palestine going to Transjordan subject to any frontier rectification desired by Egypt, Mediator to supervise demarcation.
10. Foreign Office shares Department’s views that reference Palestine to UNGA except on basis of agreed settlement would be undesirable. However, Foreign Office is doubtful that this can be prevented particularly if Mediator’s proposals are vetoed or fail to secure majority in SC.
11. Re paragraph 10 above interesting minority view exists in Foreign Office to effect that there is something to be gained by letting case go to UNGA. Idea is that Mediator should ask UNGA to authorize him to go ahead on a new plan for Palestine which in Mediator’s view is most just possible settlement in circumstances. Simultaneously SC would stand by its resolutions and if Mediator should meet with opposition to carrying out his proposals after he has been authorized to go ahead by UNGA he can summon offending side before SC as a truce breaker. Thought is that by using dual origin Mediator’s powers it would be possible to reconcile the concept that only UNGA can propose a solution but only SC can impose its will (Department’s 3358, August 245 paragraph 3). Even minority recognizes undesirability long UNGA debate and believes that if its views adopted matter should be introduced late in session with a view to securing UNGA’s rubber stamp approval Mediator’s ideas.
[Page 1345]12. Foreign Office thinking is against making a commitment at this time re recognition of PGI by HMG (paragraph 9f Deptreftel) although all concerned realize that this will come at some stage. Re US–UK support for applications of Transjordan and Israel for UN membership Foreign Office believes that practically speaking two states are in very different positions: Israel would be elected and Transjordan would be vetoed by USSR. Be committing itself on recognition PGI Foreign Office arguments are familiar ones: (a) HMG must retain vestige influence with Arabs on threshold of all-out drive to secure acquiescence Arab states to Mediator’s proposals now under discussion with US, (b) HMG must know frontiers of state it recognizes particularly because of UK–Transjordan treaty commitments, (c) PGI has consistently displayed indifference to British interests and normal rights British subjects.
13. Before British reply is handed this Embassy for communication to Department it is likely that Bevin will take precaution of advising British Cabinet of its outlines. This may be done August 26.