Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

501.BB Balkan/3–948

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs (Rusk)¹

confidential

[Washington,] March 9, 1948.

Although it was recognized, when the GA established a Special Committee in connection with the Greek case, that the Soviet Union and its Balkan satellites would probably not cooperate with it, was hoped that the presence of this Committee in Greece might accomplish one or more of three purposes:

(1) Make flagrant assistance across the borders more difficult;

(2) Convince the northern neighbors of Greece that their policy was unprofitable, and permit a gradual change in their attitude;

(3) Lay a basis for any further UN action by providing the necessary evidence.

With the steady worsening of conditions under which the committee has been working, it becomes evident that some action should be taken to make this group an effective instrument for ameliorating a situation in the Balkans which threatens international peace. It is requested, therefore, that you give urgent consideration to the alternatives outlined in the attached memorandum and forward to NEA your comments and recommendations, as well as any other suggestions which may occur to you.

[Annex]

Future Plans for United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans²

The Greek Government affirms, and it is generally accepted by this Government, that aid to the Greek guerrillas is continuing on an increased scale in the face of General Assembly recommendations to Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia to furnish no assistance to these guerrillas. Despite official protestations by Greece’s northern neighbors that no aid is being sent across the frontiers, officially sponsored organizations in all of these countries, as well as in Hungary, Rumania, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, are publicly conducting campaigns to collect money and material assistance for Markos’ fighters. Captured weapons and ammunition strongly support the contention that such materiel is being introduced into Greece from the north. An UNSCOB report on fighting at Konitsa flatly states that logistic support from Albania was furnished to the guerrillas during that engagement.

Most of the UNSCOB delegations are already firmly convinced that outside aid to the guerrillas is an established fact and that U.S. insistence on further observation is both unnecessary and a subterfuge to mark time instead of taking action required by the situation. However, it is our opinion that UNSCOB has not yet produced a sufficient body of substantiated proof of Albanian, Bulgarian and Yugoslav complicity to constitute a basis for new action in the UN or for any other steps directed at Greece’s northern neighbors. Although five small UNSCOB observation teams have been activated, they are stationed so far away from the frontier and the actual routes through which assistance flows that they have not yet been able to collect the necessary evidence, and may never be able to do so. The Greek Government has recently made a suggestion that observer headquarters should be established at thirteen points along the frontiers, with smaller subsidiary teams attached to each headquarters, in order that first-hand information can be collected concerning violations. It is obviously the Greek hope that the presence of such “observers” would discourage flagrant violations, and that such a force would in actual fact become an international or American border patrol.

The desirability for UNSCOB to establish an elaborate network of observation teams cannot be seriously questioned if it is to report on the compliance by Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia to the specific recommendation concerned with extending aid to the Markos group. However, the question is immediately raised as to the ability of UNSCOB to send its personnel into areas under guerrilla control. A document recently found on a captured guerrilla and alleged to be an authentic order of the Markos high command instructs all guerrillas to seize UNSCOB personnel as prisoners of war and not to discontinue their attacks on the “Monarchists” when UNSCOB personnel is present.³

It would appear that Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia have gone far toward rendering completely ineffectual an organ of the UN, thereby discrediting the Charter, which is a foundation of U.S. foreign policy. We must decide, and decide quickly, whether we are determined to make UNSCOB successful in protecting the independence of a member of the UN.

The following are alternatives to be examined at this time:

(1) Admit that UNSCOB is unable to perform its functions and that it should therefore be withdrawn;

(2) Send unarmed UNSCOB observers to the necessary points on the frontier to test the intentions of the guerrillas or of the northern neighbors, with the hope that these observers will be accorded safe conduct as representatives of a neutral international body;

(3) Bequest the Greek Government to furnish armed guards for UNSCOB observers;

(4) Enlarge the observer groups to include armed guards from the Nations who have furnished observer personnel;

(5) Despatch to Greece, as guards for UNSCOB observers, armed contingents from various members of the UN, such contingents to be requested either by UNSCOB or by the Greek Government, which would presumably base its request on the fact that it is unable to guarantee the safety of members of an international group established within its territory by the UN.

Preliminary observations on the foregoing numbered possibilities, formulated without reference to other interested offices, are as follows:

(1) It appears unthinkable that UNSCOB should be withdrawn and the UN discredited until all possible measures to ensure its success have been exhausted.

(2) Recent reports from our representatives in the area make it appear inadvisable to make any plans based on the belief that observers can operate with safety in forward areas. We should not take the responsibility for sending observers into certain danger.

(3) It is probable that the Greek Government would not agree to furnish Greek armed guards, basing its refusal on the assumption that they could not assure adequate protection. In this connection, it is doubtless true that armed Greeks would draw fire rather than forestall attack, as the guerrillas claim to be in a state of war with Greek Government forces and would therefore insist that Greek armed guards are enemies or at least intelligence agents reporting to the Greek Government.

(4) It would at first glance seem possible for nations whose citizens are exposed to the dangers of observation in guerrilla territory to furnish protection to these citizens without opening the question of an international police force. However, the legal aspects of such procedure need to be explored both from the point of view of the UN and of domestic U.S. legislation.

(5) Armed contingents furnished by various UN nations at Greek request would inevitably involve Article 51 of the Charter or might open up the whole question of whether a UN armed force would have to be created before such contingents could be despatched to Greece.

1. Addressed also to Walworth Barbour, Chief of the Division of Southern European Affairs, George C. McGhee, Coordinator for Aid to Greece and Turkey, and Henry S. Villard, Member of the Policy Planning Staff.
2. Drafted by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs (Baxter) on March 8.
3. This document had been handed to Mr. Baxter by Paul Economou-Gouras, Counselor of the Greek Embassy, on March 4 (501.BB Balkan/3–448).